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PREFACE
Whereas the work in this thesis is my own, it obviously developed and matured within
a context of advisors, colleagues, friends and family, to whom I am exceedingly grateful.
First and foremost, I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to my supervisor
and mentor Ernst Fehr. I originally began to work for Ernst as an undergraduate
student and my first task was to run dozens of experiments. That is where I learned
how to conduct an economic experiment properly. I will never forget all those public
good games. Ernst introduced me to the emerging and fascinating field of Experimental
Economics. To a great extent it was simply by watching Ernst do research that I learned
all the necessary tools and skills which eventually lead to the completion of this thesis.
As a doctoral thesis supervisor, Ernst was demanding when I needed a push and patient
when ideas required time to mature; and he never failed to inspire.
I am indebted to Rainer Winkelmann who agreed to be my second supervisor. I am
also grateful for his valuable comments on my thesis in several occasions.
The three essays reported in this thesis are embedded in a large scale project that
involved many people. These people laid the groundwork that made these three projects
possible. (Without the groundwork created by the overarching large scale project, my
individual contributions would not have been possible.)
Among these, Ju¨rgen Schupp became a great companion over the last few years.
Ju¨rgen is the survey manager of the German Socio-ecnomic Panel (SOEP) study which
is the dataset I used for all three essays in this thesis as well as for several other projects.
Whenever I was lost in the universe of data, I chose the telephone joker and called Ju¨rgen.
I am deeply grateful for his constant patience and great advice. His openness for new
ideas makes him an ideal collaborator.
I wish to extend my undivided thanks also to Gert G. Wagner. As the head of the
SOEP he invited me to Berlin several times, which always provided me with new ideas
and motivation. In May 2009 I was a research fellow at the DIW Berlin. That month
was a very productive one and the last chapter of thesis was finally born.
Urs Fischbacher is a good friend, who is and was always available for a discussion of
a research problem or just politics. It is a pleasure and an honour to work with him.
My time at the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at the University of
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Zurich was of outstanding importance for this thesis. One of the many reasons is that
there were so many great researchers around who were always available for exchanging
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Among the many members of the institute, I would like to particularly thank Lorenz
Goette, Simon Gaechter, Armin Falk, Christian Zehnder and Daniel Schunk, with whom
I frequently interacted, for their support. After moving to the Economics Department
at Royal Holloway, University of London, I profited from the department’s generosity
in allowing me to complete this thesis as well from interesting conversations with my
new colleagues. Particularly I wish to mention Dirk Engelmann whose comments have
proved to be especially insightful.
The social life at the institute in Zurich would have been much less inspiring and
relaxing without the presence of Andreas Kuhn, Oliver Ruf, and Christoph Eisenegger.
We not only shared jokes during coffee breaks but also the joys and pains of writing
a thesis. My heartfelt gratitude goes to Andreas and Oliver for their help in finding
solutions to statistics problems. Christoph and I became good friends and office maites.
Besides, Christoph functioned as my very own private medic. A biologist by training,
our conversations were always horizon-widening. I am indebted to his patience in these
interdisciplinary dialogues and hope to have the pleasure of many more such occasions.
Bettina Petralli saved me from doing the institute’s administrative work. Thanks
to her efficient management of the institute she improved everyone’s lives, but most
especially mine.
Without the continuous support of my extended family this thesis would not be what
it is. Never underestimate the effect of a meal prepared by a loving mum when her son is
too busy making charts; a lift from the airport when planes are late; emergency ironing
when the conference preparation left no time; some forced relaxation in the mountains
when deadlines seem pressing; or a spot of timely proof-reading when it is most needed.
For this and much more I am grateful to my parents Ruth and Werner, to my siblings
Peter and Rebekka and her husband Ju¨rg, to my partner’s family Billy, Rebekah and
Ruby; they never ceased to believe in me.
I know no words to adequately express my gratitude to Shahanah Schmid, my part-
ner. She has most definitely earned those holidays.
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CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Why Trust?
Trust is a concept which is familiar to everyone. You do not have to be a scientist or
economist to understand how important trust is in our world. Of course, there are many
different kinds of trust which we come across in our everyday lives. For instance, there
is the basic sense of trust, developed by babies towards their parents and the world -
according to the psychiatrist Erik Erikson (Erikson, 1950), the successful development
of this kind of trust influences us for the whole of our lives. But there is also the kind
of trust which we witness between couples in long standing relationships, where each
partner knows the other so well that very little communication is needed. A nod, a
sigh, and they trust the other to understand their meaning and react appropriately. We
also understand that sometimes trust can be blind, where our willingness to believe in
the good of people can lead us to blank out all signs to the contrary, thus making us
vulnerable to exploitation. For some people, there is a very basic and powerful trust in
god or another higher force, a phenomenon which we often call faith. Self-confidence
can also be seen as a form of trust, where we primarily trust ourselves, having faith in
our own abilities and worth.
Perhaps it is precisely because we encounter trust in so many different situations,
and because it often appears to be lacking of any sound rational basis, that economists
have, in an historical perspective, only recently begun to investigate trust as an economic
phenomenon. The main relevance attributed to trust in this discipline is founded on the
identification of trust as an important, if not vital, element of economic transactions. It
can be as simple as a purchase: How can I be sure that once I hand over my money,
you will not simply run away and keep it, without ever passing on the goods I paid for?
As long as the two parties of the transaction know each other and are perhaps bound
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in a web of mutual obligations of kinship and honour, it is easy to trust the other.
However, nowadays only a small minority of economic transactions is completed in such
circumstances. In the vast majority of cases, the participants of the transaction know
little of each other. Here, it is the state and institutions which fill the gap and trust is
placed in the rule of law rather than in individuals.
Economic transactions thus benefit greatly from legal security and certainty, and this
has therefore been studied by economists around the world. And yet, whereas trusting
the state to guarantee economic obligations enables transactions, this trust may come
at high costs. On the one hand, there are the costs associated with the upkeep of a
legal system which is able to provide such guarantees, without becoming totalitarian in
its scope of control. On the other hand, and most importantly, there are the costs of
spelling everything out so as to make it legally enforceable. If we imagine for a moment a
society where no-one really trusts anyone else, but rather everyone places all their trust
in the state and rule of law, then even the simple act of buying a loaf of bread from the
bakery would require a complicated, fool-proof contract. It is here that the importance
of trust in strangers becomes apparent. If I do not know the baker, but do not generally
mistrust anyone I do not know well, then I can complete this transaction without the
need of safeguarding against all manner of occurrences however unlikely they might be.
Thus, trust in strangers proves to be a lubricant for social relations. It is this kind of
trust, trust in strangers, which the essays in this collection focus on.
In situations of social uncertainty, trust helps to form relations. It reduces the trans-
action, monitoring and sanctioning costs of ordinary spontaneous relationships (Arrow,
1974; Putnam et al., 1993)1. Empirical indications for the relevance of trust can be found
in the fact that trust is not equally distributed throughout the population, nor is its dis-
tribution the same or even similar across countries. On the contrary, seminal papers by
Knack and Keefer (1997) and La Porta et al. (1997) have not only analysed the uneven
distribution of trust between countries but have also demonstrated the relation of trust
to important economic variables such as growth and inflation in those countries. Further
empirical evidence for the importance of trust has only recently appeared, during the
last decade, and includes explorations of trust in relation to trade and foreign direct
investment (Guiso et al., 2009), stock market participation (Guiso et al., 2004, 2008),
investment decisions of venture capitalists (Bottazzi et al., 2008) and tax compliance
(Scholz and Lubell, 1998).
1Trust has also been explored as part of what constitutes social capital, following Robert D. Putnam’s
‘Bowling alone’, which has breached the boundaries of academia (Putnam, 2000). The extent of the
debate on social capital’s impact can perhaps be seen in that even politicians and leaders of the World
Bank, the White House and the German Chancellery are nowadays working on strengthening the sense
of community and thus individuals’ trust in each other.
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The ascertainment of the importance of trust for economic and social life led ex-
perimental economists to study trust since the early 1990s. As economists are mostly
concerned with actual behaviour, the introduction of a behavioural measure for trust
started a whole wave of new studies. On July 13, 1993 Berg et al. (1995) conducted the
first session of the investment game which has become the standard design for measur-
ing trusting behaviour. Since then, over a hundred trust games have been run by many
different researchers and the article by Berg et al. (1995) has been cited more than 370
times according to the Social Science Citation Index and more than 1,200 times accord-
ing to Google Scholar2. These experimental studies covered numerous topics starting
from socio-economic determinants of trust (e.g. Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007; Croson
and Buchan, 1999; Sutter and Kocher, 2007), to trust and discrimination (e.g. Born-
horst et al., 2009; Burns, 2006; Cardenas et al., 2008a), to communication and trust
(e.g. Ben-Ner et al., 2007; Meidinger et al., 1999) across methodological questions (e.g.
Burks et al., 2003; Casari and Cason, 2009; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2005a) to bio-
logical determinants (for an overview see Fehr, 2009) such as oxytocin (Kosfeld et al.,
2005) and vasopressin (Stanton, 2007).
In section 1.3 I will describe in detail precisely how we implemented the trust game
for the research presented in this collection. But first, let us carefully consider the
meaning of the term ‘trust’ and provide a definition.
1.2 Trust: Easy to Define . . .
What is trust? Many studies which analyse trust do not provide any kind of definition,
or if they do, it is striking how varied the definitions provided are. The consequence
is confusion. Statements on trust might appear to be conflicting or even contradictory
superficially, but as they have different starting points, it is near impossible to actually
compare like for like, thus opening the way for many misunderstandings (Hardin, 2002).
In order to avoid such confusion and to guide our thinking, in the following we shall
make clear what we mean by trust. We largely follow James Coleman’s concept of
trust (Coleman, 1990) which is well suited for behavioural sciences such as economics.
Although not very widely known - Coleman is more often read in sociology these days
- referring to him in relation to trust is by no means exotic. In fact, Berg et al. (1995)
also referred to Coleman when they first introduced the trust game. The definition is
easily summarised. In Coleman’s perspective the following two points characterise the
action of placing trust. On the one hand it implies that the truster freely transfers assets
to another person, without controlling the actions of that other person or having the
2Accessed on August 11, 2009
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possibility to retaliate. On the other hand there must be a potential gain in order to have
an incentive to trust. The incentive is such that if the other person is trustworthy, the
truster is better off trusting than not having trusted, and worse off if the other person
does not fulfil the trust placed in him/her. Going beyond Coleman’s simple definition, we
feel that for clarity’s sake, it is necessary to specify that ‘worse off’ can be understood in
an absolute sense where the truster ends up with less assets than initially, however it can
also be understood relatively where ‘worse off’ is seen in relation to the other person’s
assets. Coleman further adds that in his definition there is no monetary incentive for
the second-mover to reward the first-mover’s trusting behaviour with trustworthiness.
Note that in this concept, trust is considered as a form of behaviour rather than as a
personal characteristic or personal trait. Following this concept, the use of experimental
methods to measure trust suggests itself (Berg et al., 1995).
In the following I will introduce the specific design of my experimental measure of
trust, which I will extensively use in the following three essays.
1.3 . . . Difficult to Measure!
We used an adapted version of the design by Berg et al. (1995). The design was kept
simple. There are two players each endowed with 10 Euros. They do not know each other
and will never know the identity of the other player. The first-mover decides on how
many of his/her 10 Euros he/she would like to transfer to the other player. Every Euro
transferred to the other player is doubled by the experimenters. Then it is the turn of
the other player, the second-mover. Like the first-mover, the second-mover decides how
many of the 10 Euros he/she transfers to the first-mover. Again the transfer is doubled
by the experimenter. After the decision of the second-mover, the game is over and both
players get paid according to the outcome of the game. Thus, the only difference between
the decisions of the first and the second mover is that the second-mover already knows
what he/she will receive from the first-mover while deciding what to give, whereas the
first-mover has to take a risk. That is why we label the first-mover decision a trusting
decision, which is a subset of risky decisions. The difference is that in a trusting decision
the risk taken depends on the actions of another human. This design is used in all the
studies presented in this thesis3.
We combined the trust game with the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP),
a household panel representative for Germany (Wagner et al., 2007). A randomly cho-
sen subset of respondents of the SOEP participated in the experiment. The SOEP is
an interviewer based study, which means that the experiment was conducted by inter-
3The exception is chapter 2 where we vary the design slightly to test the sensitivity of the design.
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viewers within the homes of the respondents. After the normal SOEP questionnaire was
completed, the interviewer handed over the written instructions to the participants. The
interviewers were briefed to give, if needed, detailed information to the participants be-
fore they made their decisions. Then the participants were asked to privately make their
decision and put the decision sheet into an envelope and close it. Thus the interviewers
did not know and will never find out how the participants decided. Feedback and a
check for the amount earned were mailed to the subjects a few weeks later, together
with a thank-you letter.
The are several advantages of including behavioural experiments in large representa-
tive surveys. First, we have the opportunity to measure behaviour rather than intentions.
Second, this approach allows us to simultaneously analyse the influence of a large vari-
ety of personal characteristics on trusting behaviour. Third, in contrast to many studies
based on experiments conducted with student populations, we have the opportunity to
analyse trusting behaviour of the general populace of a country. This has the advantage
that the heterogeneity of our subjects’ behaviour and characteristics is much larger than
within a student population.
1.4 Three Essays on Trust
Given the importance generally attributed to trust - confirmed by the studies mentioned
- it is surprising how little we actually know about it. Research on trust spans a range
of disciplines; but even within a single discipline such as economics, there is little that is
agreed upon. Disagreement starts with the definition of trust, extends to methodological
questions of how best to measure trust as well as to what explains differences in trust,
and does not end with what drives changes in trust. The disagreement can mainly be
attributed to a lack of studies and/or suitable data to analyse the questions raised.
In light of the ambiguities surrounding not just the definition of trust, but also the
question of how to measure trust (as described in chapter 2), any empirical research on
trust needs to carefully review the different methods and select the one most suited for
the purpose. However, little is yet known about how the different measures of trust relate
to each other. Accordingly, this is one of the questions that this collection’s first essay
‘Can We Trust the Trust Game? A Comprehensive Examination.’ addresses. In this
essay I analyse the gaps that remain in our understanding of what exactly is measured
by the different experimental and survey measures of trust and how they relate to each
other. The relation between experimental and survey measures of trust is a topic which
many papers have touched upon. However, they all have either comprehensive survey
measures or extensive experimental measures but never both.
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In contrast, our study examines survey and experimental measures, both compre-
hensively and simultaneously. Using nationally representative data, we are thus able to
demonstrate that the commonly used trust game measures trust in strangers, but is not
related to other standard survey measures of trust. We also demonstrate that the trust
game is robust to a number of interferences. Further, we show that selection for the ex-
periment can be a problem if people are unfamiliar with the situation and that students
exhibit higher trust than the general population – a result which needs to be taken into
consideration by researchers working with student subjects only. Inspired by criticism of
the widespread trust question used in many surveys, we created a new, improved survey
trust scale consisting of three short statements. In the essay we demonstrate that our
new scale is a valid and reliable measure of trust in strangers. The analysis shows that
the experimental measure correlates with the survey measure of trust in strangers but
not with trust in institutions nor with trust in known others. The survey measure of
trust captures mainly the expectations part of the decision to trust. The survey and
the experimental measure correlate similarly with related factors such as risk aversion,
entrepreneurship and share-holding.
We conclude that the experimental measure of trust is a robust and valid measure
which does not refer to trust in a general sense, but specifically to trust in strangers.
Having established a definition of trust in this introduction as well as a sense of the
advantages and peculiarities of an experimental methodology, in the first essay, we next
turn to some topical questions.
In the second essay ‘Decomposing Trust: Explaining National and Ethnic Trust Dif-
ferences’, I focus on the striking differences in aggregate levels of trust (by individuals)
which we find between nations. This is especially intriguing as national differences in
trust may well be at the core of understanding differences in economic developments
and between changes of economic systems. Unlike survey studies of trust, which have
revealed large differences in the levels of trust in different countries, no study has yet
investigated cross-country differences in trusting behaviour. This might be due to a
lack of resources needed to collect this kind of data. Previous studies either investi-
gated trusting behaviour representatively for a single country or a specific region or
city (Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007; Cardenas et al., 2008b; Johansson-Stenman et al.,
2005b), or compared trusting behaviour of non-representative samples across countries
(Buchan et al., 2002, 2006; Croson and Buchan, 1999; Csukas et al., 2008; Willinger
et al., 2003). In contrast, in this essay we measure trusting behaviour in two nationally
representative samples of the United States and Germany for the first time. We detect a
large trust gap: people in the United States trust strangers much more than do people in
Germany. Based on variables suggested by economic theory, we can explain almost the
8
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entire trust gap. People in the United States are less risk and betrayal averse. Moreover,
they expect to achieve a high payoff as well as equality between truster and trustee at
much higher trust levels than Germans. Overall, socioeconomic variables and income
explain only 7% each of this trust gap while preferences and belief-variables suggested
by economic theory explain 91% of the gap. Within the United States Caucasians trust
more than Latinos and Latinas, who in turn trust more than African Americans. These
differences are similarly explained by the same variables. Therefore we conclude that
risk and social preferences and belief variables constitute important explanatory factors
and deserve increased attention such as inclusion in future survey research.
In the third essay ‘Mistrust and Betrayal: a Vicious Circle’, I analyse changes in
trusting behaviour. This is interesting since little is known about the temporal dynamics
of trusting behaviour. On the basis that trust in strangers is important for economic
and social relations, we study the forces that drive the changes in individuals’ levels of
trust. From theory we expect that positive and negative experiences change trusting
behaviour. However, no empirical study has yet investigated whether and how this
happens. In this paper, we are able to establish a strong causal link from past experience
of untrustworthiness to reduced trusting behaviour, measured by a repeated trust game
over the period of one year. We determine that this causal link mainly functions by way
of changed beliefs, and is moderated by social preferences. Experience of trustworthiness,
in contrast, does not alter trusting behaviour. Furthermore, we investigated if an increase
in the experience of trust promotes trustworthy behaviour. We show that there is indeed
a causal link here, too. We conclude that negative experience in relation to trust might
kick-start a vicious circle thus eroding overall levels of trust. Further research is needed
to improve understanding of the factors that increase trusting behaviour.
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CHAPTER
TWO
CAN WE TRUST THE TRUST GAME?
A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION
Joint with Ju¨rgen Schupp
2.1 Introduction
In surveys like the General Social Survey (GSS) or the World Values Survey (WVS),
trust is measured with the statement ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ This measure of
trust has been criticised and its behavioural relevance has been called into question.
The first systematic study of the relation between survey and behavioural measures
of trust was reported by Glaeser et al. (2000). They investigated whether behaviour in a
trust game is correlated with this standard survey measure of trust. They find that the
above question is not correlated with trusting behaviour. This result has been replicated
in several other studies (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2006; Burks et al., 2003; Ermisch et al., 2009;
Ga¨chter et al., 2004; Haile et al., 2008; Holm and Nystedt, 2008; Johansson-Stenman
et al., 2005b). No correlation either was found by Eckel and Wilson (2000) and Eckel
and Wilson (2002) using a slightly different trust scale. However, other studies have
found a significant correlation between the survey and the experimental measures (e.g.
Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007; Cox et al., 2009; Holm and Danielson, 2005; Sapienza
et al., 2007; Vyrastekova and Garikipati, 2005). Based on the previous research one
cannot conclude whether the GSS question is behaviourally relevant in the sense that it
correlates with the behaviour in the trust game.
What are the reasons for these conflicting results? Are the experiment and the survey
measures both valid and reliable measures of trust? Concerning survey measures, several
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studies have revealed that the GSS question is neither a valid nor a reliable measure
of trust (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008). The question is rather imprecise, the possible
answers are not mutually exclusive, and only one item is not considered to be a reliable
measurement (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000; Miller and Mitamura, 2003; Yamagishi et al.,
1999). Concerning the experimental measure, little is known about its sensitivity and
validity in large and heterogeneous populations.1 Against this background, it is no
surprise that there is no clear relationship between survey and experimental measures
of trust.
The aim of this article is to connect the survey measures and the experimental
measures of trust. In particular, we aim to show that survey and experimental measures
can be connected in a large representative survey. Since the experimental measure might
capture a very specific dimension of trust, we created a new survey measure of trust that,
on the one hand, takes recent criticisms of the GSS question into account, and on the
other, measures the same dimension of trust as the experiment.
To avoid confusion we have to clarify first what we mean by the word ‘trust’. We
largely follow James Coleman’s concept of trust (Coleman, 1990). From his perspective,
the following two points characterise the action of placing trust. On the one hand, trust
implies that the truster freely transfers assets to another person, without controlling the
actions of that other person or having the possibility to retaliate. On the other hand,
there must be a potential gain in order to have an incentive to trust. The incentive is such
that the truster is better off than not having trusted if the other person is trustworthy,
and worse off if the other person does not merit the trust placed in him/her. Note that in
this concept, trust is considered a form of reflected behaviour rather than as a personal
characteristic or personal trait.
Our new survey measure is more precise than the GSS question on what dimension of
trust is measured. We frame and focus the response on trust in strangers. We have used
this new survey measure in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) study and several
independent studies that are all representative for the German population. In order to
distinguish the newly developed trust questions from the GSS question, we refer to them
as ‘SOEP-trust’. A factor analysis shows that SOEP-trust (trust in strangers) measures
a different dimension of trust than questions on trust in institutions and trust in known
others. Further, we show that SOEP-trust is a valid and a sensitive measure of trust.
Concerning the latter, we find that SOEP-trust is correlated with social desirability and
the position in the survey. Furthermore, trust is moderately stable over three weeks.
This has implications for the use of the survey question in international comparisons
and over time.
1Most experiments are run with students as subjects
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The design of the simplified trust game is as follows. Two players are each endowed
with 10 euros. The first mover decides how many of his or her 10 euros he or she
would like to transfer to the second mover. The transferred amount is doubled by the
experimenters. The second mover then gets to know the first mover’s transfer and then
decides him or herself about the back-transfer. As with the first mover, the second mover
can transfer any amount between zero and ten euros. The second mover’s transfer is
doubled as well. Then the game is over and both participants are paid by a cheque. In
order to distinguish the experiment from other trust measures we refer to it as ‘EXP-
trust’ in the following.
Our implementation of the experiment in a large survey has several advantages over
an ordinary laboratory experiment. With our survey measure of trust, we are able to
directly check whether only highly trusting people decide to participate in the trust
game. Since this is a panel study, we can additionally check whether less trusting people
are more likely to leave the panel in the future. Further, we can compare students and
non-students in the same experimental setting (design and procedure).
Another advantage of the combination of survey and experiments is that we can
use the information in the survey to validate EXP-trust. We thus analyse whether
the decision to trust is influenced by preferences, and expectations, as postulated by
economic theory. We also assessed the sensitivity of the experimental design to a social
desirability bias, the stake size, and the available strategy space.
We find that EXP-trust is surprisingly robust and also not subject to a social desir-
ability bias, and not dependent on the exact stake size or on the size of the strategy space.
Furthermore, we find that for subjects who are familiar with the interview situation (i.e.,
through previous participation in a panel study), selection into the experiment is not
subject to their level of trust. In contrast, for subjects who have not previously been part
of a panel study, more trusting people are more likely to participate in the experiment.
And contrary to previous research, we find that students due to their higher education
are more trusting than non-students, which has consequences for the generalisability of
experimental results from students to the general population.
Finally we analyse what kind of trust the experiment actually measures. We find
that EXP-trust measures people’s trust in strangers, but not their trust in institutions
or in known others. That is, EXP-trust is significantly correlated with the newly devel-
oped SOEP-trust measure. Both, SOEP- and EXP-trust, correlate similarly with other
variables such as education, income, risk aversion, reciprocity, being an entrepreneur
and shareholder, which confirms that they measure the same underlining concept. In
more detail, SOEP-trust mainly (but not exclusively) measures the expectation part of
the decision to trust.
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Thus, on a representative level for Germany, we show that survey and experimental
measures of trust are connected in the way that the trust game measures a specific
dimension of trust, that is, trust in strangers.
In the following, we first analyse the survey measure of trust (SOEP-trust), and in
the second part analyse the experimental trust measure (EXP-trust). In the third part,
we combine these two measures and analyse their similarities and differences.
2.2 Using Surveys to Measure Trust
In this section, we propose a new measure of trust in strangers and analyse its sensitivity,
reliability, and validity. In particular, we show that trust in strangers measures a specific
dimension of trust that is distinct from other dimensions like trust in institutions or trust
in known others. We implement this entire analysis in the framework of the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a household panel that contained 22,611
individuals in 12,061 households in the year 2003, comprising a representative sample for
Germany (Wagner et al., 2007). Additionally, we conducted five accompanying studies
(AS), one each year from 2002 to 2006. These accompanying studies all have a randomly
drawn sample of 400 to 1,000 observations of the German population and are thus
representative for Germany as well. Together these data sets provide a suitable tool to
assess survey questions in a large heterogeneous population. In Appendix 2.A (Table
A.1) we list all the surveys used and give an overview of which survey we used to
implement the different variations of the study design. In Appendix 2.B, we discuss
whether our results can be viewed as representative for trust.
2.2.1 SOEP-Trust — A New Measure of Trust
The General Social Survey (GSS) measure of trust, together with the quite similar
question in the World Values Survey (WVS)2 is probably the most widely used question
to measure trust in surveys: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? The possible answers are:
Most people can be trusted, Can´t be too careful, or Do not know.
This question measures people’s expectations of others’ trustworthiness. Based on our
concept of trust, expectations about other people’s trustworthiness is an important factor
in deciding whether one decides to trust or distrust. The advantage of this question is
that the same question is used over time and space, thus allowing a wide array of different
analyses. However, it has been criticised that the respondents have the choice between
2Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very
careful in dealing with people? Most people can be trusted OR Need to be very careful.
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trust and caution and not between trust and distrust or between cautious and incautious
behaviour (for a review, see Yamagishi et al., 1999). Although trust and caution are
difficult to disentangle, it is important to measure them separately, since trust and
caution are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The interpretation of the GSS question
can therefore differ widely among different societies (e.g. Gabriel et al., 2002). Miller
and Mitamura (2003) showed, for example, that Japanese students are more trusting
than Americans measured with the above question from the GSS. Measuring trust and
caution separately, they find, however, that American students are more trusting than
Japanese students but at the same time also more cautious. These differing results
clearly demonstrate the problems for the interpretation of the above question.
Based on this evidence, we decided to create a new measure of trust using the German
Socio-Economic Panel. We split the GSS question up into two parts. On the one hand,
we asked people to what extent they agree with the following two statements:
• In general, you can trust people.
• Nowadays, you can’t rely on anybody.
The possible answers on a four point rating scale were ‘disagree strongly’, ‘disagree
somewhat’, ‘agree somewhat’, or ‘agree strongly’.
Another criticism of the GSS question is that answers may differ significantly depend-
ing on whether people understand ‘most people’ in the question as meaning acquain-
tances or strangers (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008). We therefore let people rate their
agreement with two further statements about trust and caution, in which we clearly
state that trust towards strangers is meant and not towards family or friends:
• How much do you trust strangers you meet for the first time.
• When dealing with strangers, it’s better to be cautious before trusting them.3
The possible answers on a four-point rating scale were either ‘no trust at all’, ‘little trust’,
‘quite a bit of trust’, and ‘a lot of trust’ for the first question and ‘disagree strongly’,
‘disagree somewhat’, ‘agree somewhat’, or ‘agree strongly’ for the second question. These
four statements constitute our new measure of trust in strangers. To distinguish it from
GSS trust, we will call it SOEP-trust in the following.
The emphasis on trust in strangers takes into account that trusting people in general
is a very heterogeneous concept. To test whether SOEP-trust measures trust in strangers
specifically, we let people rate other statements on trust in different institutions like the
3The second part of the question emphasises the timing of the decision to trust. Thus, survey
respondents could express their agreement with the proposed sequence of actions. The question does
not imply a contrast between trust and cautiousness.
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police or the government and in acquaintances like friends and family. The list of items
can be seen in Table 2.1. People could answer on the scale from ‘no trust at all’, ‘little
trust’, ‘quite a bit of trust’, to ‘a lot of trust’. Because of the multidimensionality
of trust, these items are expected to measure different aspects of trust. A principal
component analysis over all the trust items can show us how many dimensions these
items measure4. We find that these items represent three distinct components.
Table 2.1: Dimensions of trust
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Trust in Trust in Trust in
institu- strangers known
tions others
How much trust do you have in...
... parliament 0.742 0.173 -0.006
... public authorities 0.715 0.139 0.107
... the European Union 0.686 0.163 0.004
... courts 0.665 0.085 0.092
... large companies 0.581 -0.003 0.033
... churches 0.460 0.218 0.193
... schools and the educational system 0.564 0.088 0.193
... press 0.550 0.076 0.081
... labour unions 0.493 0.015 0.028
... police 0.584 -0.015 0.273
... your own family 0.070 -0.051 0.647
... neighbours 0.115 0.165 0.716
... friends 0.045 0.145 0.695
... strangers 0.183 0.636 0.091
To what extent do you agree or disagree?
In general, you can trust people. 0.155 0.647 0.268
Nowadays, you can’t rely on anybody. -0.106 -0.666 -0.229
It’s better to be cautious before trusting strangers. -0.050 -0.685 0.154
Notes. Factor analysis using the principal components factor method and an orthog-
onal varimax rotation. The table reports the rotated factor loadings for the three
factors with an eigenvalue larger than 1.
Sources. AS02, AS03, AS04, AS05, and AS06 with a total of 3,180 observations.
Table 2.1 reports the factor loadings of the different items. The bold numbers indicate
the component to which each item belongs. Each component has a straightforward
interpretation. The first factor can be interpreted as trust in institutions, the second
factor as trust in strangers, and the third factor as trust in known others. The second
component consists of all the items of SOEP-trust and can thus be interpreted as ‘trust
4A principal component analysis uncovers the underlying pattern in the data, such that the variance
of the data is best described.
16
Can We Trust the Trust Game? 2.2. Using Surveys to Measure Trust
in strangers’. This clearly shows that SOEP-trust measures the specific trust people
have in strangers. It can clearly be distinguished from trust in institutions and known
others. For each of the three dimensions we calculated count indices5. The reliability
of these scales measured by Cronbach’s alpha is quite good. It is 0.82 for the index on
trust in institutions, 0.62 for trust in known others, and 0.66 for SOEP-trust. Having
introduced these three measures of trust we are interested how sensitive these indicators
are.
2.2.2 Sensitivity of SOEP-Trust
In this section we assess the sensitivity of SOEP-trust. We check whether the position in
the survey matters, whether there is a social desirability bias, and whether SOEP-trust
is a stable and reliable measure.
Position in the Survey
We varied the position of the items of SOEP-trust in the AS06. Subjects were randomly
divided into two groups. In one group, the trust questions were asked early in the
questionnaire (number 33 out of 118 questions) and in the other group towards the end
(question 93). We compare the ranking and the variance of this variable. The latter
is clearly not dependent on the position in the survey (Levene’s robust test statistic
for the equality of variances: F(1, 1039) = 0.169 P > 0.681). However, the ranking is
affected. Respondents who were asked the questions late in the survey exhibit more trust
in strangers than people who answered the question early in the questionnaire (Table
2.2). Since the four preceding questions were the same in both situations, this effect is
not likely to be driven by different preceding questions but by the position in the survey.
Although the size of the effect is rather small, this suggests that to compare trust across
time or space, the items have to have a similar position within the survey.
Social Desirability
We measure social desirability by the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding
(BIDR) developed by Paulhus (1991). This is well-established survey tool in which
respondents rate several statements. Based on this, Winkler et al. (2006) developed a
5The count indices are the mean answer of the non-missing items that load highest on each of the
three dimensions. The bold numbers indicate which item loads highest on which dimension. The value
for a person is calculated as soon as at least two items per component are non-missing. For the count
index SOEP-trust we additionally made sure that at least one caution item and one trust item was
included. For the count index trust in known others, we additionally included an item about trust in
co-workers. This item was not included in the factor analysis, since only people with a job are asked.
An inclusion would thus exclude a major share of the population.
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Table 2.2: Position of the trust questions within the survey
Position in Wilcoxon
To what extent do you agree survey rank-sum
or disagree? (percentage agreeing) early late test (p)
- In general, you can trust people. 72.8% 73.4% > 0.298
- Nowadays, you can’t rely on anybody. 36.3% 32.3% < 0.073
- It’s better to be cautious before
trusting strangers. 89.4% 88.2% < 0.023
Count-index: SOEP-trust early < late < 0.017
Sources. AS06 with a total of 1,033 observations.
short version that is suitable for large surveys in the general population. The BIDR has
two dimensions. One is called ‘self-deceptive enhancement’ and captures a tendency to
see reality in a more optimistic way than justified. This self-deception is not thought to
be conscious. The other dimension is called ‘impression management’ and measures the
degree to which a person consciously tries to construct a favourable representation of
themselves. Since trust is desirable in society, trust questions are found to be correlated
with scales of social desirability (Rotter, 1967).
We find that the dimension ‘impression management’ is significantly and positively
correlated with the survey measures SOEP-trust (Spearman’s rank correlation: ρ =
0.11), trust in known others (ρ = 0.15) and trust in institutions (ρ = 0.14). The cor-
relations of survey trust measures with ‘self-deceptive enhancement’ are quite low and
only significant for SOEP-trust (ρ = 0.07, p < 0.051) and trust in known others (ρ =
0.08, p < 0.036). The correlation with trust in institutions is not significant (ρ = -0.00).
Given that these correlations indicate an association between survey measures of trust
and social desirability, it would be interesting to see if the correlations are dependent on
the interview mode. In AS04 in which we collected information on respondents’ social
desirability measures, this is not possible since all interviews where oral interviews. In
the SOEP however, different modes are used to collect data. It would be an indication
for the importance of the interview mode concerning social desirability effects, if the
mean trust varied between interviews that were conducted orally and those that were
conducted by post. However, we do not find any difference between these modes in
SOEP-trust (Mann-Whitney test: z = 1.26, p > 0.207), which suggests that the above
reported correlations do not depend on the presence of an interviewer.
We conclude that people who are subject to a social desirability bias are likely to
overstate their trust in strangers, known others, and institutions - and this appears to
be independent of the presence (or not) of an interviewer. This calls into question the
validity of these measures of trust and raises doubts about the feasibility of comparisons
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across space and time.
Stability and Reliability
We assessed the stability of SOEP-trust by repeating core questions of the AS05 six weeks
later with a sub-sample (n = 193). If trust measured in a survey is a stable measure,
we expect a correlation close to one. We find that SOEP-trust is a moderately stable
measure since the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the two time periods
is 0.486. The trust level did not change for one-third of the participants, increased for
37%, and decreased for 30%. Since trust is moderately stable over time, the reliability
of SOEP-trust cannot be assessed through a simple correlation. Instead we used a
composite reliability test according to Raykov (2004), which tests whether the same
single factor underlies a certain set of variables in two points in time. A structural
equation model approach is used to calculate the reliability coefficient ρ. We find that
it is 0.81. This shows that our measure of SOEP-trust is a reliable measure of trust.
In sum, SOEP-trust is moderately stable across time, and it does prove to be a reliable
measure of trust.
2.2.3 Validity of SOEP-Trust
In the previous section we showed that our new survey measure of trust has a high level
of reliability but is sensitive to the position and also has a social desirability bias. In this
section, we assess the validity of the new measure in two different ways. First, we used a
survey measure of past trusting behaviour (Glaeser et al., 2000). Relying on self-reports,
we asked people: ‘How often do you...’
• ...lend personal possessions to your friends (CDs, books, your car, bicycle etc.)?
• ...lend money to your friends?
• ...leave your door unlocked?
Respondents’ answers were either ‘never’, ‘infrequently’, ‘sometimes’, ‘often’, or ‘very
often’. A factor analysis confirms the one-dimensionality of these three items. We
interpret this as past trusting behaviour indicator. The reliability of these items in a
count index is 0.56. A first indication that the new trust measure is valid stems from the
fact that it correlates significantly with past trusting behaviour (Table 2.3: Spearman’s
ρ = 0.17). Concerning the other two dimensions, we find that trust in known others
6The items of SOEP-trust are correlated as follows: ‘In general you can trust people’ with 0.41,
‘Nowadays, you can’t be too careful’ with 0.45 and ‘It’s better to be cautious before trusting stranger’
with 0.34.
19
2.3. Using Experiments to Measure Trust Can We Trust the Trust Game?
correlates significantly with past trusting behaviour (Spearman’s ρ = 0.08) whereas the
correlation with trust in institutions is essentially zero and not significant. The latter is
not surprising since the past trusting behaviour has little to do with trust in institutions.
Table 2.3: Correlations between different concepts of trust in surveys
self-rep. ESS NEO-A1 GSS
trusting
behaviour
SOEP-trust 0.17?? 0.47?? 0.55?? 0.53??
- In general you can trust people. 0.10?? 0.37?? 0.49?? 0.47??
- Nowadays, you can’t rely on anybody. -0.15?? -0.34?? -0.40?? -0.39??
- It’s better to be cautious before
trusting strangers. -0.13?? -0.19?? -0.31?? -0.48??
- Trust in first-time met stranger 0.08?? 0.34?? 0.33?? 0.22?
Trust in known others 0.08?? 0.29?? 0.31?? 0.34??
Trust in Institutions 0.02 0.28?? 0.31?? 0.29??
Notes. Spearman’s rank correlations. The table reports the correlation coefficients.
◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sources. AS02, AS03, AS04, AS05, and AS06 and the data on the GSS trust
question was collected in a separate student survey at Royal Holloway, University
of London in June 2008.
A second way of assessing the validity of the new trust measure is to compare it to
other established measures of trust. Apart from the formulation in the World Values
Survey, we used two other well-established measures of trust, namely the question from
the European Social Survey (ESS) and the original 10 items of the dimension ‘agree-
ableness’ from the NEO-PI-R that measures trust. The ESS-trust question simply asked
people on an 11-point Likert scale how much trust they have in others. As can be seen
in Table 2.3, this ESS-trust correlates highly (ρ = 0.47) with our new measure of trust.
A similar correlation of 0.55 can be observed between the new measure of trust with the
trust factor of the NEO-PI-R and of 0.53 with the GSS question.
From this we conclude that SOEP-trust is a valid measure of trust in strangers, and
is well connected to existing survey measures of trust.
2.3 Using Experiments to Measure Trust
In this section we assess the sensitivity and validity of EXP-trust in a common frame-
work. Despite its frequent use in economic research, we are not aware of any other study
that analyses the sensitivity and validity of the trust game in depth and at the same
time in the same framework. Furthermore, we have chosen to run the experiment with
a representative sample in order to compare the experiment directly with representative
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surveys. Since not all randomly selected persons agree to participate in an experiment,
it is important to check whether results from the experiment can be generalised to a
whole population. That is why we start by analysing a possible selection effect, then
analyse its sensitivity and validity.
2.3.1 Design of the Experiment
The design of the experiment to measure trust is based on the investment game intro-
duced by Berg et al. (1995). Two players anonymously interact with each other in the
following way. The first mover gets an endowment of 10 points and can transfer 0 to 10
points to the second mover. Every point that is transferred is doubled by the experi-
menters. The second mover also gets an endowment of 10 points. After receiving points
from the first mover, he/she decides on how much of the endowment to transfer back to
the first mover (0 to 10 points). As with the first mover’s transfer, the back-transfer by
the second mover is doubled by the experimenters. After the second mover’s decision,
the game ends and the subjects are paid their income in euro (1 point equals 1 euro) by
cheque sent a few days later.
This design was developed by Fehr et al. (2002b) and it was implemented in the
SOEP 2003 and in the AS02. In the other two accompanying studies, we used a small
variation of the design. In the AS03, we implemented the strategy method for the second
mover. In order to keep the game simple, we restricted the options of both players to
transfer either 0, 5, or 10 points to the other player. In the AS04, we removed the option
to transfer half of the endowment to the other player by allowing them to transfer only
0, 2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 points to the other player. In the SOEP 2003 we implemented a
high-stakes treatment that used an exchange rate of 1 point to 10 euros for a small part
of the sample (117 out of 1,432). Thus, both players had an endowment of 100 euros.
The participant’s instructions for the different games can be found in the appendix 2.E.
The Nash equilibrium of this trust game can be described as follows. If we assume
that both players are rational and selfish and that this is common knowledge, neither
one of the players ever transfers a single point to the other. We can relax the assumption
that both players are selfish and instead assume that both players are inequality-averse
as described by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). If the second mover is inequality-averse
enough, his/her back-transfer is equal to the first mover’s transfer. If the second mover’s
inequality-aversion is not common knowledge, the first mover’s transfer depends on
his/her belief about the probability that the second mover will equalise the inequality.
If this belief is above a certain threshold, the first mover transfers the whole endowment
and otherwise nothing at all. One can show that the more inequality-averse the first
mover, the higher this threshold is. Another less strict assumption is that players have a
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preference for reciprocity instead for complete selfishness (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). With this assumption, the second mover’s back-
transfer increases weakly with the strength of his/her preference for reciprocity. Note
that the prediction is not only a back-transfer of zero or equal to the first mover’s transfer,
but that transfers in between are possible as well. However, the first mover’s transfer
is predicted to be either zero points or the whole endowment. He/she will transfer zero
points if his/her second-order beliefs are low enough, that is, below a certain threshold.
Otherwise, first movers will transfer the whole endowment. This threshold increases
with the first mover’s degree of reciprocity. Thus, the more reciprocal a first mover is,
the less he/she is predicted to transfer in a trust game.
In sum, a preference for equity or reciprocity increases the likelihood that the second
mover is behaving in a trustworthy manner. However, it decreases the probability that
the first mover trusts given the second mover’s preferences.
2.3.2 Selection Effects
Imagine the situation that someone knocks on your door and asks you to participate in a
survey on politics and society that would last about an hour. Included in the survey is a
‘game’ in which you can earn some money. Many people will be suspicious and mistrust
the person at the door. This situation is common for the interviewers in the social
research section of TNS Infratest in Munich. They conduct the interviews for SOEP’s
accompanying studies as well as for the panel study itself. Besides other factors, the
distrust in the interviewer and/or the survey organisation may lead people to refuse to
participate in the survey.
If one wants to study trust on a representative level, it is therefore crucial to avoid
a randomisation bias (Heckman and Smith, 1995) due to trust. The issue has grown
in importance in light of recent criticism of experimental economics (Levitt and List,
2007), which is confronted with the same selection problem. So far, however, there has
been little discussion about selection into either lab or field experiments. In one of the
few studies that has addressed the problem, Bellemare and Kroeger (2007) do not find
any randomisation bias for a trust experiment in a random sample of 541 regular panel
participants in the Netherlands. Contrary, Harrison et al. (2009) find a randomisation
bias in a sample of 253 Danish subjects who were not part of a panel study but recruited
for a ‘snapshot study’ like our accompanying studies. They found that risk-averse people
were less likely to participate in their study. These two studies indirectly assess the
randomisation bias for the variable of interest.
There are two possible randomisation biases in our study design. The first is that
less trusting persons will be less likely to participate in the survey and second, that
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conditional on participation in the survey, it is less likely that they will agree to par-
ticipate in the experiment at the end of the questionnaire. It is important to analyse
these effects separately, since survey respondents know what the survey is about, while
participants in an experiment normally do not see its ultimate purpose. We analyse
the first randomisation bias in Appendix 2.C. In sum, we do not find any indication for
selection due to trust into the survey.
The aim of this section is to examine the second randomisation bias, the selection
into the experiment. This can be addressed directly by comparing trust measured in
the survey for participants in the experiment with non-participants. Since all the sub-
jects who refused to participate in the experiment completed the survey, we are able to
directly assess their trust through trust measured in the survey. As a proxy for trust
in the interviewer and the survey organisation, we take SOEP-trust and past trusting
behaviour. The latter captures the experience of past interactions that involved trusting
others. We find that in the SOEP, neither past trusting behaviour nor SOEP-trust are
related to the refusal to participate in the experiment (Mann Whitney test: past trust-
ing behaviour z=0.673 p>0.500; SOEP-trust 0.505 p>0.613). Contrary to the SOEP,
we find in the accompanying studies a significant lower level of trust among people who
refused to participate in the experiment than those who participated (Mann Whitney
test: past trusting behaviour z=2.23 p<0.026; SOEP-trust 1.322 p>0.185).
One likely explanation for a randomisation bias due to trust in the AS but not in
the panel study (SOEP) is based on the different set-ups. In the SOEP, subjects are
familiar with the survey organisation and usually also with the interviewer, since these
persons have been participants in the panel for three years. In accompanying studies,
on the other hand, people are coming into contact with the survey organisation and the
interviewer for the first time. Trust in strangers can thus only influence the participation
decision in the AS and not in the SOEP since the interviewer is not stranger for the
SOEP participants. According to this interpretation the refusal rates should be higher
in the AS than in the SOEP. In the accompanying studies, we indeed find that in 2003,
5.1% and in 2004, 10.8% of subjects refused to participate in the experiment. In the
panel study SOEP however, only 4.8% of 1,504 subjects who completed the questionnaire
refused to participate in the experiment in 2003. The difference in refusal rates between
AS and SOEP is highly significant (Fisher’s exact test: p<0.001).
Furthermore, those people who refuse to participate in the experiment are also
more likely to leave the panel (SOEP) in the following three years (Fisher’s exact test:
p<0.001). However, the people who left the panel did not exhibit different trust lev-
els in the experiment (Mann-Whitney test: z=0.387 p>0.698). In the accompanying
studies, we looked at people’s willingness to participate in a similar study another time
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compared to the decision to leave in the panel. As in the panel study, people who refuse
to participate in the experiment are also less willing to participate another time in a
similar study (Mann-Whitney test: z=10.641 p<0.000). Unlike in the panel study, we
find that people who are less willing to participate in another similar study exhibit less
trust in the experiment (Spearman’s rank correlation ρ = 0.08 p<0.034).
Concerning risk-aversion we find very similar results as those for trust and found in
Harrison et al. (2009). We measured people’s risk aversion by asking ‘Are you generally
a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks?’.
People answered on a Likert scale. This measure of risk-aversion is shown to be a valid
measure by comparison to a lottery experiment with real monetary stakes (Dohmen
et al., forthcoming). As with trust, we find that in the panel study SOEP, there is no
significant relation between risk preferences and the participation rate (Mann-Whitney
test: z=1.487 p>0.136), whereas in the AS03 the most risk-averse people are less likely
to participate in the experiment than the least risk-averse (Mann-Whitney test: z=2.135
p<0.033).
Thus, our results suggest that representative trust games are subject to selection
effects due to trust and risk preferences if subjects are unfamiliar with the situation
they are in (e.g., unknown survey organisation and/or interviewer).
In Appendix 2.C, we additionally analyse other factors that might influence the par-
ticipation in the experiment, including social preferences, personality, and demographic
variables. In sum we find that selflessness, reciprocity, and interviewer characteristics do
not matter in the decision to participate in the experiment. A medium income, a large
household size, and living in Eastern Germany reduce the probability that a person will
refuse to participate. Finally, the longer the previous questionnaire lasted, the more
likely it is that participants will refuse to participate in the present experiment in the
AS.
In sum, we found that the level of trust is related to the decision to participate
in the experiment for subjects who are participating for the first time in this kind of
interview. On the other hand, trust has no influence if subjects are familiar with the
general set-up of the study. Based on these findings we conclude that a longitudinal panel
survey where a ‘trust relationship’ between the survey institute and the respondents is
already established is the best way to minimise the total response error when adding
experimental add-ons.
2.3.3 Validity of Experimental Measure
The decision to trust is influenced by people’s preferences and expectations. Risk pref-
erences and expectations about the other player’s behaviour are expected to shape the
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decision to trust (Coleman, 1990). Thus, one can check the validity of the trust measure
by showing that these preferences and expectations indeed correlate with EXP-trust.
We measured people’s risk-aversion as outlined in section 2.3.2. We find that the
first mover transfer is higher the less risk-averse people are in AS03 (Spearman’s rank
correlation ρ = 0.13 p<0.012). Thus, people’s risk preferences influence their decisions
to trust or mistrust.
In the AS03 we elicited first movers’ expectations by asking how much they expected
the second mover to transfer back if they were to transfer zero, five, or ten points to the
second mover. A selfish first mover would like to maximise his/her payoff. We therefore
calculated which of the three transfers (zero, five, or ten) a first mover expected to
maximise his/her payoff. The higher the transfer is that maximises expected profits,
the more a selfish first mover is expected to transfer. We find a positive and significant
correlation (Spearman’s rank correlation ρ = 0.20 p<0.003). However, a non-selfish first
mover is not primarily interested in making the transfer that he/she expects to maximise
profits. If he/she cares about inequality, he/she would like to know which of the three
transfers yields the lowest inequality. With our data, this is also possible to calculate,
and the higher the transfer expected to minimise inequality is, the higher we expect the
first movers’ transfers to be. This other measure for expectations is positively correlated
with first mover’s transfer, as well (Spearman’s rank correlation ρ = 0.31 p<0.001). As a
third measure, we calculate the average expected back-transfer, which can be interpreted
as a general measure for the expectation of the second mover’s selflessness. Again, we
find a positive correlation (Spearman’s rank correlation is: ρ = 0.18 p<0.005).
In sum, we have shown that EXP-trust is influenced by risk preferences and by ex-
pectations about the second mover’s behaviour. Further, in Section 2.4, we demonstrate
that EXP-trust is correlated with survey measures of trust. All these results are strong
indications that the EXP-trust is a valid measure of trust.
2.3.4 Sensitivity of the Experimental Measure
In this section we analyse whether students, as a subset of the general population, behave
differently; whether the size of the stakes in the trust game matters and whether trusting
behaviour is influenced by social desirability. In Appendix 2.D we further analyse the
impact of the use of the strategy method and the number of possible choices a first-mover
has.
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Students versus General Population
A common critique of laboratory experiments is that students, the preferred subject pool
in experiments, may behave systematically differently than non-students (Levitt and
List, 2007). In addition, there are a number of studies showing that students behave dif-
ferently than other groups or that economics students are different from non-economics
students (e.g. Fehr et al., 2006). A stronger test of the claim that students behave sys-
tematically differently is to compare their behaviour to a representative sample of the
general population. Only a few studies have been designed this way, and the following
results are found. In the U.S. state of Vermont, Carpenter et al. (2008) found in a field
experiment that students donated 17 dollars less to charities than non-students, who do-
nated 72 dollars out of 100. In a representative ultimatum game in Taiwan, no difference
was found between students and non-students (Fu et al., 2007). Concerning discount
rates, Harrison et al. (2002) found that in Denmark, students have a six percentage point
higher discount rate than non-students. In a similar study in Denmark, students were
found to be more risk-averse than non-students (Harrison et al., 2007). Since students
are found to be more risk-averse and less pro-social, previous studies have suggested that
students transfer fewer points in trust games than non-students. Indeed, this result was
found by Bellemare and Kroeger (2007) for the Netherlands, where students transferred
much less in a trust experiment than a representative population sample.
Among our German sample of 1,665 first movers in the trust game, we identify
47 as students. We find the opposite of all previous studies in that students transfer
61% whereas non-students transfer 50% of their endowment. Thus, students exhibit
a 21% higher level of trust than non-students. This is difference is highly significant
(regression 1 in Table 2.4). The results from the survey measure of trust strongly support
these findings. SOEP-trust, trust in institutions, and past trusting behaviour are more
pronounced among students (Mann-Whitney test: SOEP-trust z = 10.521 p<0.001;
trust in institutions z = 2.88 p<0.005; trust in known others z = 0.01 p>0.99; past
trusting behaviour z = 19.78 p<0.001). Students are typically younger than the average
population, have a lower income, and a higher level of education. Do these different
characteristics explain the observed differences? When controlling for age and income,
we find that these variables cannot explain the higher level of trust in students. The
coefficient hardly changes, although the significance level slightly decreases (regression 2
in Table 2.4). Furthermore, in the German population with our survey measure of risk
aversion, we find that students seem to be less risk-averse than non-students. Therefore
it is important to control for whether lower risk aversion can explain the higher level of
trust among students than non-students. As expected, risk aversion is a determinant
of trusting behaviour but the differences between students and non-students remains
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weakly significant (regression 3 in Table 2.4). However, controlling for education reduces
the student dummy substantially and renders the coefficient insignificant (regression 4
in Table 2.4). Having a higher education is related to high trust levels which explains
the higher level of trust among students compared to non-students.
Table 2.4: Dependent variable: level of trust (first mover transfer)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for being a student 0.897? 0.836◦ 0.981◦ 0.535
(0.436) (0.445) (0.591) (0.468)
Age −0.003 −0.002 −0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Household income: <2500 Euro −0.050 0.006 −0.060
(Base: <1500 Euro) (0.195) (0.239) (0.195)
Household income: <3500 Euro −0.102 −0.240 −0.167
(0.212) (0.258) (0.213)
Household income: <5000 Euro 0.541? 0.648? 0.434◦
(0.238) (0.285) (0.240)
Household income: >5000 Euro 0.987?? 1.071?? 0.825??
(0.301) (0.374) (0.310)
Risk aversion: medium 0.224
(Base: high) (0.187)
Risk aversion: low 0.529?
(0.252)
Intermediate secondary school 0.165
(Base: less than interm. secon. school) (0.169)
High school and more 0.522??
(0.198)
Constant 5.080?? 5.118?? 4.907?? 4.932??
(0.071) (0.273) (0.375) (0.290)
N 1550 1550 1010 1550
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.013 0.024 0.016
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and robust standard errors (in parenthesis) re-
ported. The number of observations is lower in model 3 since data on the survey
question on risk aversion is only available for people in the SOEP and AS03. ◦, ?,
?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sources. SOEP 2003 and AS02, AS03, and AS04
Trustworthiness does not differ between students and non-students (regression 1 in
Table 2.5). Thus, students exhibit a higher level of trust than non-students. The differ-
ence is not due to a different age, income or differences in risk preferences. Education is
the driving force behind the higher level of trust among students. People with a higher
education trust more.
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Stakes
Only a few studies have examined the effects of stake size on behaviour in experiments.
Most of these studies have analysed the ultimatum game and found that first movers’
offers are independent of the stake size7. However, it is also found that the respondents’
minimal acceptable offer is lower with high stakes than with low stakes (Cameron, 1999;
Fu et al., 2007; Hoffman et al., 1996; Munier and Zaharia, 2002; Slonim and Roth, 1998).
No significant effects are found in the dictator game (Carpenter et al., 2005; Cherry et al.,
2002; Forsythe et al., 1994; List and Cherry, 2008) or in the gift-exchange game (Fehr
et al., 2002a). Mutual trust measured in the centipede game is reduced significantly
with lower stakes (Parco et al., 2002).
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005a) are the only ones that have studied the effect of
stake size in the trust game. In contrast to the findings in the gift-exchange game and the
ultimatum game and in line with the centipede game, they found that first movers’ trans-
fers in rural Bangladesh were lower the higher the stakes. The proportions transferred
to the second movers was 55% in the case with low stakes. The proportion transferred
decreased to 46% in the medium-stakes condition, and to 38% in the high-stakes con-
dition. The stakes were equivalent to 67, 337 and 1683 U.S. dollars. Concerning the
behaviour of the second-mover, no difference was found for the different stake sizes.
Figure 2.1: Levels of trust: different stake sizes
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7An exception was reported by Fu et al. (2007), who found that offers decrease with stakes.
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We compared the differences between endowments of 10 and 100 euros. Contrary to
the results of Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005a), we find no differences in the average
level of trust (Figure 2.1: t-test: t = 0.50 p>0.62). The high-stakes endowment was ten
times higher than the low-stakes one, and so was the average transfer (5.16 versus 49.9
euros). The distributions also do not differ (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p>0.968). The
levels of trustworthiness are not different in the two treatments either (regression 2 in
Table 2.5).
Social Desirability
Contrary to the questionnaire, the decision in the experiment remains private and is not
communicated to the interviewer. Thus social desirability is not expected to influence
the decision. We again use the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding by Paulhus
(1991). We indeed find that impression management (Spearman’s rank correlation ρ =
0.08 p>0.145) and self-deception (Spearman’s rank correlation ρ = 0.03 p>0.590) are
not significantly correlated with EXP-trust. The decision to behave trustworthily or not
is not correlated with social desirability either (regression 3 in Table 2.5).
Table 2.5: Sensitivity of experimental measure of trustworthiness
Dependant variable: Students Stakes Social de-
dummy of being trustworthy sirability
Dummy for being a student −0.001
(0.048)
Dummy for 100 Euro treatment −0.072
(0.052)
Soc. desir.: Impression (std.) −0.020
(0.028)
Soc. desir.: self-deception (std.) −0.001
(0.028)
Constant 0.535?? 0.518?? 0.606??
(0.020) (0.047) (0.058)
Controlled for first mover transfer Yes Yes Yes
N 1912 602 292
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.166 0.014
Cluster on individual level Yes No No
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and robust standard errors (in paren-
thesis) reported. ◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
Sources. AS02, AS03, AS04 and SOEP 2003
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2.4 Comparing Experimental and Survey Measures
of Trust
It yet remains uncertain if our experimental measure captures the same kind of trust as is
described by the various survey measures of trust. Previous research yielded ambiguous
answers when comparing EXP-trust to GSS-trust. Given the criticisms lodged against
this measure, this may not come as a surprise. In GSS-trust, it is unclear, for example,
what or who it is that we trust. In Section 2.2.3 we showed that GSS-trust is correlated
with several dimensions of trust such as trust in strangers, trust in known others, and
trust in institutions. Unclear relations between GSS-trust and the experimental measure
of trust are probably due to weakness of the survey question rather than problems with
the experiment. Further indications for this can be found in Glaeser et al. (2000) and
Ga¨chter et al. (2004). Both studies report that their experimental measure of trust is
not correlated with GSS-trust.
However, Glaeser et al. (2000), Ga¨chter et al. (2004), and Csukas et al. (2008) find
that their experimental measures of trust are clearly correlated with survey questions
on past trusting behaviour and a question on trust in strangers, which is formulated as
the statement ‘You can’t count on strangers anymore’ and is similar to statements on
which SOEP-trust is built. Thus, the question should not be whether survey measures
of trust are correlated with experimental measures or not, but rather what kind of trust
the trust game measures. To this effect, we measured trust in strangers (SOEP-trust),
trust in known others, trust in institutions, and past trusting behaviour.
With our surveys, we have all the ingredients needed to test what kind of trust
the trust game (EXP-trust) actually measures. We find that EXP-trust is significantly
correlated (ρ = 0.12) with SOEP-trust (Table 2.6). Not only the overall measure (SOEP-
trust) but also all its components are correlated with the experimental measure. Fur-
thermore, EXP-trust is not correlated with the index ‘trust in institutions’ nor the index
‘trust in known others’. The fact that none of the single items of these two indexes are
correlated significantly with EXP-trust further confirms that the experimental measure
specifically measures trust in strangers.
Furthermore, we find that self-reported past trusting behaviour is significantly cor-
related with the experimental measure of trust (ρ = 0.16) and that all the three items
of the index ’past trusting behaviour’, – lending money, lending possessions, and leaving
the door unlocked – are significantly related to experimental trust.
We additionally analysed two frequently used survey questions on fairness and help-
fulness that are implemented in the GSS as well. The questions are ‘Do you think most
people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be
30
Can We Trust the Trust Game? 2.4. Experiment and Survey Compared
Table 2.6: Correlations of different survey measures of trust with EXP-trust
Spearman’s sign.-level obs.
ρ
Different indices of survey measures of trust
SOEP-trust 0.116 0.000 1661
Trust in institutions 0.022 0.493 952
Trust in known others 0.013 0.682 949
past trusting behaviour 0.156 0.000 1654
To what extent do you agree or disagree?
In general you can trust people. 0.066 0.007 1660
Nowadays, you can’t rely on anybody. −0.107 0.000 1702
It’s better to be cautious before trusting strangers. −0.099 0.000 1704
How much trust do you have in...
strangers 0.137 0.000 732
your own family −0.008 0.814 946
neighbours 0.010 0.768 947
friends 0.038 0.239 946
co-worker 0.041 0.257 764
churches 0.001 0.965 940
schools and the educational system 0.054 0.102 930
press −0.014 0.669 945
labour unions −0.013 0.688 923
police 0.027 0.411 948
parliament 0.034 0.292 943
public authorities 0.025 0.439 945
the European Union 0.018 0.591 923
courts 0.037 0.259 941
large companies −0.034 0.301 931
How often do you ...
lend personal possessions to friends? 0.140 0.000 1653
lend money to your friends? 0.097 0.000 1653
leave your door unlocked? 0.107 0.000 1692
Do you think most people would try to take
advantage of you if they got a chance,
or would they try to be fair? (GSS-fair) 0.067 0.006 1679
Would you say that most of the time people
try to be helpful, or that they are mostly
just looking out for themselves (GSS-help) −0.004 0.880 1683
Sources. SOEP 2003 and AS02, AS03, and AS04
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fair?’ (GSS-fair) and ‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or
that they are mostly just looking out for themselves’ (GSS-help). We find that trusting
behaviour is significantly positively correlated with fairness measured by GSS-fair but
that the correlation is rather low (ρ = 0.07). GSS-help, on the other hand, is not related
to trusting behaviour.
We have thus shown that trust measured in the experiment actually measures a
specific kind of trust, namely trust in strangers. Whereas this in itself is perhaps not
surprising, given the nature of the experiment where participants are by design unknown
strangers to each other, it is noteworthy on the other hand that EXP-trust has almost
nothing to do with trust in institutions nor with trust in known others.
The correlations of trust measured in the experiment and SOEP-trust (ρ = 0.12)
and past trusting behaviour (ρ = 0.16) are rather low, although they are significantly
different from zero. The reason for this could be that the survey measure SOEP-trust
mainly measures expectations of other people’s trustworthiness. The statements ‘In
general, you can trust people’ and ‘Nowadays, you can’t rely on anybody’ give strong
indications of how a person sees strangers. In the experiment, however, the decision to
trust or not is not only influenced by expectations of others’ trustworthiness but also
by risk and social preferences (chapter 3). If the measure SOEP-trust in fact mainly
measures the expectation part of the motivation to trust, then we would expect the
correlations between the survey measure and expectations in the experiment to be rather
high – in particular, higher than the correlations with the actual decision (for a related
argument see also Sapienza et al. (2007)).
Table 2.7: Correlations between expectations and behaviour in the experiment
Exp. back-transfer EXP-trust
at a transfer of ... un- controlled
0 5 10 con- for expec-
points points points trolled tations
SOEP-trust 0.11?? 0.25?? 0.16?? 0.10? 0.05
Trust in known others 0.02 0.13? 0.10? 0.03 -0.02
Trust in institutions 0.03 0.17?? 0.04 -0.00 -0.00
past trusting behaviour -0.05 0.20?? 0.15?? 0.11? 0.07◦
(number of observations) (556) (296) (556) (556) (556)
Notes. Pearsson’s correlations. The table reports the correlation coefficients. ◦,
?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sources. AS03 and AS04
We measured first movers’ expectations of the behaviour of the second movers as
outlined in Section 2.3.3. We indeed find that survey measures of trust correlate more
strongly with expectations than with first mover transfers (Table 2.7). The correlation
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between SOEP-trust and EXP-trust is mainly driven by the correlation between SOEP-
trust and expectations. This can be seen by looking the partial correlation of SOEP-
trust with EXP-trust while controlling for the expectations at transfers of 0 and 10
points.8 The partial correlation (ρ = 0.05) is half the full correlation (ρ = 0.10) and not
significant whereas the uncontrolled correlation is significant. From this we conclude
that SOEP-trust measures the expectations part of the decision to trust.
Note that expectations correlate not only with SOEP-trust but also with our mea-
sures for trust in institutions and trust in known others, too. Thus, expectations seem
to be less specific to one dimension of trust than is the first mover decision in the trust
game. In sum, whereas expectations measure a somewhat unspecified kind of trust, the
decision in the experiment specifically measures trust in strangers.
Table 2.8: Different trust measures and recently found correlations of trust
Exp. back-transfer
EXP SOEP SOEP at a transfer of ...
trust trust trust 0 5 10
(same obs.) (all obs.) points points points
Age -0.04◦ -0.01 -0.01◦ 0.05◦ -0.05 -0.10??
Being female -0.00 0.01 -0.02?? 0.01 -0.02 -0.08??
Education 0.09?? 0.11?? 0.16?? -0.06? 0.11?? 0.12??
Household income 0.08?? 0.14?? 0.15?? -0.04 0.03 0.10??
Being foreigner -0.05◦ -0.02 -0.04?? 0.03 -0.02 -0.03
Living in East Germany -0.06? -0.11?? -0.09?? -0.01 0.05 -0.06?
Religious 0.00 0.12?? 0.11?? -0.01 0.06◦ 0.10??
Being undenominational 0.01 -0.08?? -0.06?? -0.02 0.04 -0.02
Risk aversion -0.09?? -0.08? -0.15?? -0.00 0.02 -0.07◦
Negative reciprocity -0.06◦ -0.08? -0.10?? -0.03 0.01 0.01
Freq. of volunteering 0.06? 0.12?? 0.13?? 0.02 0.01 0.08??
Being an entrepreneur 0.06◦ 0.04 0.04?? -0.00 0.00 -0.00
Being a shareholder 0.07◦ 0.05 0.12?? -0.07◦ 0.02 0.12??
Appr. number of obs. 1,660 1,660 25,500 1,150 860 1,150
Notes. Spearman’s rank correlations. The table reports the correlation coef-
ficients. ◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Sources. SOEP 2003, SOEP 2005, AS02, AS03, AS04, and AS05
Trust is a widely researched concept and many different factors have been found to be
correlated with trust. Therefore, we address the question if these factors are correlated
with the experimental measure of trust similarly – or differently – than how they are cor-
related with survey measures of trust. As a further illumination of the relation of survey
and experimental measures of trust we investigate exactly the level of similarity. In order
8We did not ask the expectation for a transfer of 5 in the AS04.
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to answer this question, we chose prominent factors that previous research has shown
to be correlated with trust. As measures of trust, we compare trusting behaviour in the
experiment, SOEP-trust, and the different measures of expectations in the experiment
as explained above. Several studies have reported that socio-economic variables such as
age, gender, income, education, nationality, and place of living are correlated with trust
(e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007; Buchan et al., 2008;
Rainer and Siedler, 2009; Sutter and Kocher, 2007). We find that the behavioural trust
measure and SOEP-trust are correlated in similar ways with socio-economic variables9
(Table 2.8). The only exception is gender where we find lower trust in women than
in men when measured by survey, but no gender difference in trust when measured by
experiment. Concerning religion, we find that people with no religious affiliation ex-
hibit lower SOEP-trust and people who are actively religious have higher SOEP-trust.
These results are similar to those found in Guiso et al. (2003) with survey measures of
trust. However, we cannot confirm these two effects with the behavioural measure of
trust for Germany. Risk and social preferences (volunteering and negative reciprocity)
are correlated significantly with both the survey and the experimental measure of trust
with similar magnitudes. Finally, trust is found to be higher among entrepreneurs and
shareholders (Guiso et al., 2006, 2008). In our data, we find that both EXP-trust and
SOEP-trust are higher for entrepreneurs and shareholders. In sum, we find that trust
measured by the experiment has similar correlations with factors that have been re-
ported, as trust measured by survey. This is a further indication that both - EXP-trust
as well as SOEP-trust - are valid measures of trust.
Another interesting finding is that SOEP-trust is related to preference measures such
as risk and social preferences. This points to the fact that SOEP-trust does not only
measure the expectation part of the decision to trust but also the influence of preferences.
That SOEP-trust not exclusively measures expectations is further supported by the fact
that correlations of expectations with these various variables yield a different, mixed
picture. The expectation at a transfer of 10 points yields similar results as SOEP- and
EXP-trust. The expectations at a transfer of 0 and 5 points, however, yield opposite
results for age and education and no significant correlation with many other variables.
Overall, we find that SOEP-trust and EXP-trust are significantly correlated. A
large part of the correlation between SOEP- and EXP-trust can be explained by the
relatively high correlation between SOEP-trust and expectations. SOEP- and EXP-trust
correlate in a similar way with various other variables (e.g. social and risk preferences
and being and entrepreneur and shareholder), which suggests that both measures are
valid measures of trust.
9We do not find that the relation of trust and age is quadratic
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2.5 Conclusions
We have developed a compact survey measure of trust in strangers (SOEP-trust) that
takes into account recent criticism of the widely used GSS and WVS question. We
rigourously tested this measure and find that it is a valid and reliable measure of trust
in strangers.
We analysed an experimental measure of trust extensively and most importantly,
always in the same setting. We showed that there may be a selection of more trusting
people into the experiment if the individuals are participating in such a survey for
the first time, whereas in the panel study, we do not find that selection is an issue.
Moreover, the experiment is quite insensitive to various changes. We find that stakes,
social desirability, strategy space, and use of the strategy method do not affect the
behaviour in the experiment in significant ways. However, we find that students, who
are typical subjects of lab experiments, behave differently than non-students in that
they trust strangers more than non-students. This finding is confirmed by the survey,
where we find that SOEP-trust is higher among students than among non-students.
Furthermore, we show that trusting behaviour is influenced by people’s risk and social
preferences as well as their expectations.
In combination, we find that the experimental measure of trust is significantly cor-
related with SOEP-trust, which is specifically aimed to measure trust in strangers; but
not with an index of trust in institutions and an index of trust in known others. Further-
more, experimental trust correlates with related factors similarly as SOEP-trust does.
We conclude that the common experimental measure of trust - the so-called ‘trust game’
- is a valid measure for empirical research, which captures a specific form of trust: trust
in strangers.
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2.A Data Overview
Table A.1: Data overview
Study No. of obs. stake scale strategy survey
Survey Exp. size method sensitivity
AS02 442 442 10 11 options no
SOEP 03 22’611 1’432 10/100 11 options no
AS03 846 803 10 3 options yes
AS04 772 689 10 6 options no NEO-FFI
AS05 1’012 reliability
AS06 1’063 question order
ESS question
All questionnaires can be downloaded from http://www.diw.de/soep.
2.B Selection Effects: Survey
Did only highly trusting people participate in the survey? If this were the case, we could
not claim that our results are representative for Germany. We address this potential
problem in three different ways. First we compare the level of trust when people are
weighted such that the distribution in some basic characteristics conforms with the
population distribution and when people are not weighted. Second, we check whether
it makes a difference whether people are familiar with the survey organisation and/or
the interviewer or whether the situation is unfamiliar by comparing the AS03 with the
SOEP in 2003. Finally we know who has left the panel since 2003 and we can check
whether this decision is dependent on their trust level in 2003.
In the accompanying studies, the unweighted mean of SOEP-trust (2.38) lies in the
95% confidence interval of the weighted mean (2.35 - 2.39). Similarly, no differences
between the weighted and unweighted means are found for ‘trust in known others’ or
for ‘trust in institutions’. In the SOEP, the unweighted mean of SOEP-trust (2.308) lies
inside the 95% confidence interval of its weighted mean (2.29 - 2.31) as well. Further the
weighted means in the AS03 (2.30) and in the SOEP 2003 (2.30) are not significantly
different from each other (t-test: t = 0.03, p >0.974). That is, it makes no differences for
SOEP-trust whether it is the first time people are interviewed, as in the accompanying
study, or whether people have been in a panel for at least four years. The final test
for a randomisation bias is that we know who left the panel between 2004 and 2006
and we know what their level of trust was in 2003. There is no difference in the mean
of SOEP-trust between those who left the panel and those who stayed the following
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two years (t-test = 1.24 P > 0.21). In the accompanying studies we do not have this
measure, but people were asked whether they would like to participate in similar study
again. Again this can be used as an indication whether there is a randomisation bias
due to trust. Again, we do not find any significant difference (t-test = 1.34 P > 0.17).
In sum we find that the participation in the survey in general is not influenced by
how much trust people have.
2.C Selection Effects: Experiment
Beside trust we are able to test whether social preferences, personality characteristics,
demographic variables, interviewer characteristics and the length of the questionnaire
are determinants of refusal to participate in the experiment (Table C.1). As a proxy for
social preferences we take the frequency with which subjects volunteer and participate
in politics and citizens’ initiatives. Again, we find that in the AS and in the SOEP 2003
there is no significant impact on the rate of refusal. Concerning the personality measures
we find that positive and negative reciprocity do not predict refusal in the experiment
either. However, some demographic variables do explain refusal to participate. There is
a slight tendency for married people to be less likely to participate in the experiment.
Further we find that in the SOEP 2003, people with a high or low household income
are more likely to refuse to participate. In the AS, people in larger households are more
cooperative in participating, whereas East Germans are less likely to participate. A
further test is the length of the survey as a proxy for an additional response burden.
The interviews in the AS04 were conducted using a laptop that recorded the time used
for each question. We thus test whether the length of time from the beginning of the
survey to the decision to participate in the experiment predicts this decision. We indeed
find that the longer the questionnaire, the less likely it is that participants agree to
participate in the subsequent experiment in AS04.
Furthermore, the interviewer is a possible source of influence on participation in the
experiment. However, we do not find interviewer characteristics such as age, gender and
years of experience to be influential (models 1 - 3 in Table C.2).
In sum we find that selflessness, reciprocity, and interviewer characteristics do not
matter in the decision to participate in the experiment. A medium income, a large
household, and living in Eastern Germany reduce the probability that a persons will
refuse to participate. Finally the longer the previous questionnaire lasted, the more
likely it is that participants will refuse to participate in the present experiment in the
AS.
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Table C.1: Selection into the experiment
Dep. var.: Dummy of whether a person
refused to participate in the experiment SOEP03 AS03 AS04
Dummy of volunteering at least sometimes −0.008 0.008 0.044
(0.013) (0.014) (0.028)
Dummy of participating in political parties, −0.005 0.039 −0.010
citizens’ initiative (0.017) (0.029) (0.027)
Dummy of being female 0.001 0.016 −0.028
(0.011) (0.010) (0.022)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Intermediate secondary school 0.015 −0.012 −0.007
(Base: less than interm. secon. school) (0.015) (0.011) (0.025)
High school and more −0.007 0.004 0.017
(0.014) (0.015) (0.035)
Living with partner (Base: Married) 0.010 −0.010 −0.049◦
(0.025) (0.013) (0.028)
Single or not living with partner −0.009 −0.024◦ −0.022
(0.013) (0.012) (0.027)
Household income: <2500 Euro −0.034?? 0.003 −0.019
(Base: <1500) (0.012) (0.014) (0.028)
Household income: <3500 Euro −0.028? 0.015 −0.033
(0.013) (0.022) (0.029)
Household income: <5000 Euro −0.019 0.012 −0.042
(0.015) (0.027) (0.032)
Household income: >5000 Euro −0.009 0.008 −0.003
(0.020) (0.030) (0.055)
Household size 0.007 −0.026?? −0.011
(0.005) (0.007) (0.012)
Dummy of living in east Germany −0.011 −0.012 −0.053?
(0.012) (0.011) (0.021)
Dummy of being foreigner −0.013 0.005
(0.021) (0.061)
Negative reciprocity 0.009
(0.007)
Positive reciprocity 0.015
(0.011)
Length of interview (in minutes) 0.002??
(0.001)
Pr(refusal) 0.045 0.022 0.081
N 1480 716 659
log-likelihood −278.269 −107.316 −193.788
Prob > χ2crit. 0.581 0.014 0.062
Notes. Probit regression, marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) reported.
◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sources. SOEP 2003, AS03, and AS04
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Table C.2: Selection and interviewer characteristics
Dep. var.: Dummy of whether a person
refused to participate in the experiment SOEP03 AS03 AS04
Years of experience in polling firm 0.001 −0.000 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Dummy for a female interviewer 0.022 −0.024 −0.040
(0.014) (0.015) (0.044)
Age of the interviewer −0.000 −0.001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
N 1491 729 558
Adjusted R2 0.005 −0.001 0.005
Prob > Fcrit. 0.116 0.229 0.559
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses)
reported. ◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Sources. SOEP 2003, AS03, and AS04
2.D Sensitivity of the Experimental Design
2.D.1 Design
In the AS02 and the SOEP 2003 we observed that the modus of the distribution of first
movers’ choices is to transfer half of the endowment (36% and 45%). This result is not
an artefact of our specific study design or our instructions since in other studies half
of the endowment is the modal choice as well (e.g. Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007; Berg
et al., 1995). The question arises whether the widely observed pattern is dependent on
the design of the trust game. More specifically we ask how the level of trust changes
if we reduce the number of choices and remove the possibility to transfer half of the
endowment. To test this, we run three different experiments. In the SOEP 2003, we
have run the basic experiment with 11 options for a transfer, which run from 0 to 10
points. In the AS03 we reduced the choices to only three transfer options, which were
0, 5, or 10 points. In the AS04 we eliminated the choice for a transfer of 5 points by
allowing only transfer levels of even numbers.
The distributions of transfers in the three experiments are very different by con-
struction (Figure D.1). However, the average transfer was almost the same in the three
experiments. In the SOEP 2003 with 11 options 51.5% of the endowments was trans-
ferred, in the AS03 51.3% and in the AS04 50.3% of the endowment was transferred.
These differences are far from being significant.10 The probability of behaving trustwor-
10Two-sided t-test for differences in the mean: SOEP 03 vs. AS03 t = 0.46 p>0.64; SOEP 03 vs
AS04 t = 0.12 p>0.90; AS03 vs. AS04 t = 0.32 p>0.74
39
2.D. Sensitivity of the Experimental Design Can We Trust the Trust Game?
thy and second-movers’ back-transfers are not dependent on how many options subjects
have either (Figure D.2 and regression 1 and 3 in Table D.1).
Figure D.1: Levels of trust: different scales
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Figure D.2: Levels of trustworthiness
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2.D.2 Strategy Method
The strategy method is a widely used elicitation procedure in experimental economics.
With this method, second movers are asked to decide on a reaction to every possible
first mover decision, but payoff occurs only for the one first-mover decision which was
actually taken. In the trust game, this procedure allows us to distinguish between selfish
players and conditionally cooperative players as well as between the latter and altruistic
players. If a second mover in a direct method set-up, for example, receives zero points
from the first mover and he/she does not transfer anything back, we gain no information
on whether he/she would transfer a positive amount back if a first mover had transferred
5 points. The disadvantage is clearly that it is more complicated to explain to subjects,
and the incentives are diluted since only one decision will actually be paid out. A further
potential disadvantage is that the conditional decisions are less emotionally arousing
than in the situation in which one knows what the other person decided. This might
have the effect of gaining overall more rational responses and obscuring, to an extent,
emotional reactions. Indeed, previous research on bargaining games has shown that
subjects’ behaviour is different when using the strategy method than with the direct
method (e.g. Brosig et al., 2003; Guth et al., 2001; Hoffman et al., 1998; Schotter et al.,
1994). Brandts and Charness (2000), however, analysed a prisoner’s dilemma and a
game of chicken and found no difference. Concerning trust games, the only study that
explored possible effects of the strategy method is the study by Casari and Cason (2009).
They find that the strategy method lowered trustworthy behaviour. As this result would
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have implications on the interpretations of our data, we explored if we could find similar
strategy - direct method differences in our material.
We implemented the strategy method for the second mover in the AS03. In order
to reduce complexity, we restricted the potential first movers’ choices to which we asked
second-movers to react, to three options, which were 0, 5, or 10 points. In the other
AS and in SOEP 2003 we used the direct method. Thus, we can compare the level of
trustworthiness with and without the strategy method. We find no difference in the
average level of trustworthiness between the strategy method and the direct method
(Figure D.2 and regression 2 in Table D.1). To make our results comparable with Casari
and Cason (2009) we also look at the actual back-transfer rather than simply whether
the back-transfer can be classified as trustworthy or not, and now we do find a small,
significant effect; that is, second-movers’ transfers are 0.3 points higher by strategy
method compared to the direct method (regression 4 in Table D.1) - which is in fact the
opposite of the findings by Casari and Cason (2009). This discrepancy raises questions
as to what could be its causes. Since they used students as their subject pool, whereas
we have nationally representative samples, this difference could be an explanation for the
different results. However, our high back-transfer is not driven by a higher back-transfer
or more trustworthy behaviour by non-students compared to students. Furthermore, in
their trust game the truster had only a binary choice. Thus, trustees only had to decide
for the case in which trusters fully trusted. We can test if the level of trust placed by
first-movers influences the effect of the strategy method. For that reason, we compare
second-movers’ back-transfer for all three first-mover transfers separately. We find that
the back-transfers for a first-mover transfer of 10 points is 0.78 points higher in the
strategy method compared to the direct method (t-test = 2.67 P < 0.01). However, the
average back-transfers for first-mover transfers of 0 and 5 points do not differ between
the strategy and the direct method. Thus, the overall effect of the strategy method
which we find is driven by a higher back-transfer when the first-mover fully trusts. The
remaining difference between our test and the one by Casari and Cason (2009) is that
their subjects only decided for one situation, that is, when the first-mover fully trusted.
In our design, however, trustees had to decide in three different situations. Whether this
drives the differences in our results remains an open question.
We conclude that the strategy method has no effects on the level of trustworthiness
but increases second-movers’ back-transfers in those cases, when first-movers placed full
trust in them. This raises doubts for the use of the strategy method in trust game since
decisions might be biased.
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Table D.1: Sensitivity of experimental measure of trustworthiness
Dependent variable: dummy of being Second-mover’s
trustworthy back-transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for design with 3 options −0.009 −0.441
(Base: 11 options) (0.040) (0.270)
Dummy for design with 6 options 0.027 −0.039
(0.025) (0.156)
Dummy for strategy method 0.010 0.313?
(Base: direct method) (0.024) (0.153)
Constant 0.551?? 0.530?? 6.734?? 6.320??
(0.023) (0.024) (0.156) (0.166)
Controlled for first mover transfer Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,625 1,333 2,181 1,908
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.160 0.215 0.220
Cluster on individual level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and robust standard errors (in parenthesis)
reported. ◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Sources. AS02, AS03, AS04, and SOEP 2003
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2.E Participants’ Instructions
2.E.1 Instructions for the Accompanying Study in 2002
 
 1 
Informationen für Teilnehmer 1: 
 
In den letzten Jahren hat sich neben der Umfrageforschung ein neuer wichtiger Forschungszweig - die 
Verhaltensforschung - herausgebildet. Dabei wird das Verhalten von Menschen in Situationen untersucht, in denen man 
Entscheidungen über die Verwendung von Geldbeträgen treffen muss. Daraus kann man schließen, wie die Wirtschaft 
funktioniert. 
 
Wir bitten Sie nun, eine derartige Entscheidung zu treffen. Das Geld für Ihre Entscheidung wird von der 
Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz bereitgestellt. Bei Ihrer Entscheidung müssen Sie beachten, dass 
Sie mit einem anderen - anonymen - Teilnehmer von „Leben in Deutschland“ gepaart sind, d.h. Ihre Entscheidung und die 
Entscheidung des anderen Teilnehmers bestimmen zusammen, wie viel Sie und der andere letztlich verdienen. Das von 
Ihnen verdiente Geld zahlt Ihnen INFRATEST nach der Befragung aller Teilnehmer aus. 
 
Bitte lesen Sie nun die Informationen zur Entscheidungssituation genau durch und treffen Sie dann Ihre Entscheidung.  
 
Die Entscheidungssituation besteht aus zwei Teilnehmern: Teilnehmer 1 und Teilnehmer 2, die beide eine Entscheidung 
treffen, ohne sich zu kennen. 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 1.  
 
Jeder Teilnehmer erhält 10 Punkte Ausgangskapital. 
 
Die Entscheidung jedes Teilnehmers besteht darin, das Ausgangskapital ganz oder teilweise für sich zu behalten bzw. 
ganz oder teilweise an den anderen Teilnehmer weiterzugeben. 
 
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie für sich behalten, bekommen Sie genau 1 €, der andere nichts. 
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie an den anderen weitergeben, bekommt er 2 €, Sie nichts. 
 
Umgekehrt gilt dasselbe: 
Für jeden Punkt, den der andere Teilnehmer behält, bekommt er 1 €, sie nichts.  
Für jeden Punkt, den der andere an Sie weitergibt, bekommen Sie 2 €, der andere nichts.  
 
Teilnehmer 1 beginnt: 
d. h. Sie entscheiden wie viele Punkte Sie behalten bzw. an Teilnehmer 2 weitergeben. 
Diese Entscheidung wird an Teilnehmer 2 weitergeleitet.  
 
Dann muss dieser entscheiden, wie viele Punkte er für sich behält oder an Sie weitergibt. 
Aus beiden Entscheidungen zusammen (der von Ihnen und der von Teilnehmer 2) ergibt sich das Einkommen, das Sie 
und Teilnehmer 2 erhalten. 
 
Hier drei Beispiele: 
 
• Jeder Teilnehmer behält seine 10 Punkte und gibt 0 Punkte an den anderen weiter. In diesem Fall erzielt jeder 
Teilnehmer ein Einkommen von 10 €. 
 
• Jeder Teilnehmer behält nichts für sich selbst und gibt seine gesamten 10 Punkte an den anderen weiter. In diesem 
Fall erzielt jeder Teilnehmer ein Einkommen von 20 €. 
 
• Teilnehmer 1 behält keine Punkte für sich und gibt die gesamten 10 Punkte an Teilnehmer 2 weiter. Teilnehmer 2 
behält 8 Punkte für sich und gibt 2 Punkte an Teilnehmer 1 weiter.  
In diesem Fall erzielen die beiden Teilnehmer folgende Einkommen: 
Einkommen von Teilnehmer 1 = behaltene Punkte + 2 x erhaltene Punkte 
 0 P.  + 2 x    2 P.         =   4 € 
Einkommen von Teilnehmer 2 = behaltene Punkte + 2 x erhaltene Punkte    
      8 P.  + 2 x   10 P.         = 28 € 
 
 
 
Um Ihre Punkte einzutragen, drehen Sie das Blatt bitte um. 
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Entscheidungsblatt für Teilnehmer 1 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 1. 
 
 
Wie teilen Sie die 10 Punkte Ihres  Ausgangskapitals auf? 
Wie viele Punkte (von 0 bis 10) behalten Sie und wie viele geben Sie an 
Teilnehmer 2 weiter? 
 
 
Ich behalte                               Punkte und 
 
 
gebe weiter                               Punkte, 
 
 
zusammen also:       10          Punkte. 
 
 
Wie geht’s weiter? 
 
Infratest übermittelt nun die Punktezahl, die von Ihnen weitergegeben wurde, an 
Teilnehmer 2. 
 
Teilnehmer 2 entscheidet dann, wie viele Punkte er an Sie gibt. 
 
Hierzu noch eine Frage: 
Was glauben Sie, wie viele Punkte wird Teilnehmer 2 an Sie transferieren? 
 
                        Punkte 
 
 
Über das Ergebnis und das Einkommen, das an Sie ausbezahlt wird, werden Sie 
anschließend von INFRATEST informiert.  
 
Bitte stecken Sie das ausgefüllte Blatt in den Briefumschlag und überreichen Sie 
den Umschlag dem Interviewer! 
 
Einstweilen vielen Dank fürs Mitmachen! 
 
 
Can We Trust the Trust Game? 2.E. Participants’ Instructions
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  3 
Informationen für Teilnehmer 2: 
 
In den letzten Jahren hat sich neben der Umfrageforschung ein neuer wichtiger Forschungszweig - die 
Verhaltensforschung – herausgebildet. Dabei wird das Verhalten von Menschen in Situationen untersucht, in denen man 
Entscheidungen über die Verwendung von Geldbeträgen treffen muss. Daraus kann man schließen, wie die Wirtschaft 
funktioniert. 
 
Wir bitten Sie nun, eine derartige Entscheidung zu treffen. Das Geld für Ihre Entscheidung wird von der 
Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz bereitgestellt. Bei Ihrer Entscheidung müssen Sie beachten, dass 
Sie mit einem anderen - anonymen - Teilnehmer von „Leben in Deutschland“ gepaart sind, d.h. Ihre Entscheidung und die 
Entscheidung des anderen Teilnehmers bestimmen zusammen, wie viel Sie und der andere letztlich verdienen. Das von 
Ihnen verdiente Geld zahlt Ihnen INFRATEST nach der Befragung aller Teilnehmer aus. 
 
Bitte lesen Sie nun die Informationen zur Entscheidungssituation genau durch und treffen Sie dann Ihre Entscheidung.  
 
Die Entscheidungssituation besteht aus zwei Teilnehmern: Teilnehmer 1 und Teilnehmer 2, die beide eine Entscheidung 
treffen, ohne sich zu kennen. 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 2.  
 
Jeder Teilnehmer erhält 10 Punkte Ausgangskapital. 
 
Die Entscheidung jedes Teilnehmers besteht darin, das Ausgangskapital ganz oder teilweise für sich zu behalten bzw. 
ganz oder teilweise an den anderen Teilnehmer weiterzugeben. 
 
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie für sich behalten, bekommen Sie genau 1 €, der andere nichts. 
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie an den anderen weitergeben, bekommt er 2 €, Sie nichts. 
 
Umgekehrt gilt dasselbe: 
Für jeden Punkt, den der andere Teilnehmer behält, bekommt er 1 €, Sie nichts.  
Für jeden Punkt, den der andere an Sie weitergibt, bekommen Sie 2 €, der andere nichts.  
 
Teilnehmer 1 hat begonnen: 
d. h. er hat schon entschieden wie viele Punkte er behält bzw. an Sie weitergibt. 
Das Ergebnis finden Sie auf der Rückseite.  
 
Nun müssen Sie entscheiden, wie viele Punkte Sie für sich behalten oder an Teilnehmer 1 weitergeben. Aus beiden 
Entscheidungen zusammen (der von Teilnehmer 1 und der von Ihnen) ergibt sich das Einkommen, das Teilnehmer 1 und 
Sie erhalten. 
 
Hier drei Beispiele: 
 
• Jeder Teilnehmer behält seine 10 Punkte und gibt 0 Punkte an den anderen weiter. In diesem Fall erzielt jeder 
Teilnehmer ein Einkommen von 10 €. 
 
• Jeder Teilnehmer behält nichts für sich selbst und gibt seine gesamten 10 Punkte an den anderen weiter. In diesem 
Fall erzielt jeder Teilnehmer ein Einkommen von 20 €. 
 
• Teilnehmer 1 behält keine Punkte für sich und gibt die gesamten 10 Punkte an Teilnehmer 2 weiter. Teilnehmer 2 
behält 8 Punkte für sich und gibt 2 Punkte an Teilnehmer 1 weiter.  
In diesem Fall erzielen die beiden Teilnehmer folgende Einkommen: 
Einkommen von Teilnehmer 1 = behaltene Punkte + 2 x erhaltene Punkte 
 0 P.  + 2 x    2 P.         =   4 € 
Einkommen von Teilnehmer 2 = behaltene Punkte + 2 x erhaltene Punkte    
      8 P.  + 2 x   10 P.         = 28 € 
 
 
 
Um Ihre Punkte einzutragen, drehen Sie das Blatt bitte um. 
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Entscheidungsblatt für Teilnehmer 2 
 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 2, das heißt Teilnehmer 1 hat seine Entscheidung 
bereits getroffen. 
 
 
Die Punkteanzahl, die Teilnehmer 1 an Sie weitergegeben hat, beträgt: 
 
                      Punkte. 
 
 
 
 
Wie teilen Sie nun die 10 Punkte Ihres Ausgangskapitals auf? 
Wie viele Punkte (von 0 bis 10) behalten Sie und wie viele geben Sie an 
Teilnehmer 1 weiter? 
 
 
Ich behalte                               Punkte und 
 
 
gebe weiter                               Punkte, 
 
 
zusammen also:          10       Punkte. 
 
 
 
 
Wie geht’s weiter? 
 
Infratest stellt nun das Ergebnis fest und wird das erzielte Einkommen an beide 
Teilnehmer auszahlen. 
 
Bitte stecken Sie das ausgefüllte Blatt in den Briefumschlag und überreichen Sie 
den Umschlag dem Interviewer! 
 
Einstweilen vielen Dank fürs Mitmachen! 
Can We Trust the Trust Game? 2.E. Participants’ Instructions
47
2.E. Participants’ Instructions Can We Trust the Trust Game?
2.E.2 Instructions for the Accompanying Study in 2003
Infratest Sozialforschung Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
- 1 -
Leben in Deutschland
Verhaltensexperiment „Geben und Nehmen“
Zwei Personen,
die sich nicht kennen,
treffen jeder eine Entscheidung
über die Verwendung von Geld
und erzielen zusammen ein Ergebnis.
Spielregeln: So wird’s gemacht!
Es gibt zwei Teilnehmer.
Jeder Teilnehmer erhält einen Anfangsbetrag von 10 Punkten.
Beide Teilnehmer können ihre 10 Punkte
zwischen sich und der anderen Person aufteilen oder
ganz für sich behalten oder
ganz an die andere Person weitergeben.
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie behalten, bekommen Sie selbst 1€.
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie weitergeben, bekommt die andere Person 2€.
Umgekehrt gilt:
Für jeden Punkt, den die andere Person an Sie weitergibt, bekommen Sie 2€
Für Teilnehmer1 bedeutet:
Behalten: 0 Punkte = 0€/ 5 Punkte = 5€/ 10 Punkte = 10€
Weitergeben: 0 Punkte = 0€/ 5 Punkte = 10€/ 10 Punkte = 20€
Für Teilnehmer2 bedeutet:
Behalten: 0 Punkte = 0€/ 1 Punkt = 1€/ 2 Punkte = 2€/ 3 Punkte = 3€usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 10€
Weitergeben: 0 Punkte = 0€/ 1 Punkt = 2€/ 2 Punkte = 4€/ 3 Punkte = 6€usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 20€
Sie sind Teilnehmer 1, entscheiden also als Erster.
Das heißt, Sie entscheiden, ob Sie 10 oder 5 oder 0 Punkte an die andere Person
(Teilnehmer 2) weitergeben und wie viele Sie behalten.
Danach wird Teilnehmer 2 seine Entscheidung über die 10 Punkte treffen. Er wird nie
erfahren wer Sie sind, aber wir werden ihn über Ihre Entscheidung informieren.
Teilnehmer 2 kann eine beliebige Punktezahl zwischen 0 und 10 an Sie weitergeben.
Aus beiden Entscheidungen zusammen errechnet sich der Geldbetrag, den Sie
erzielen. Diesen Geldbetrag werden wir Ihnen per Verrechnungsscheck zusenden.
Ihre Teilnahme ist freiwillig. Der Rechtsweg ist ausgeschlossen.
Um Ihre Punkte einzutragen, drehen Sie das Blatt bitte um. 
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Entscheidungsblatt für Teilnehmer 1
Wie teilen Sie die 10 Punkte auf?
Das heißt, wie viele Punkte (10 oder 5 oder 0) geben Sie an Teilnehmer 2 weiter und wie viele
behalten Sie?
Ich gebe 10 Punkte weiter Ich gebe 5 Punkte weiter Ich gebe 0 Punkte weiter
und behalte 0 Punkte und behalte 5 Punkte und behalte 10 Punkte
oder oder
Und so geht’s weiter:
Jetzt entscheidet Teilnehmer 2 wie viele Punkte er an Sie gibt.
Hierzu noch eine Frage:
Was denken Sie, wie werden sich die Teilnehmer 2 in der Regel verhalten?
Teilnehmer 2, die 10 Punkte erhalten, geben in der Regel Punkte
Teilnehmer 2, die 5 Punkte erhalten, geben in der Regel Punkte
Teilnehmer 2, die 0 Punkte erhalten, geben in der Regel Punkte
Haben Sie die drei oberen Kästchen ausgefüllt?
Dann sagen Sie uns bitte noch:
Wie gerne nehmen Sie an einer solchen Wie verständlich haben wir die
Entscheidungsaufgabe teil? Entscheidungsaufgabe erklärt?
sehr weniger ungern sehr weniger schlecht
gerne gerne gut gut
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Nun stecken Sie bitte das Blatt in den Briefumschlag und überreichen Sie den verschlossenen
Umschlag dem Interviewer!
Vielen Dank fürs Mitmachen!
Can We Trust the Trust Game? 2.E. Participants’ Instructions
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Leben in Deutschland
Verhaltensexperiment „Geben und Nehmen“
Zwei Personen,
die sich nicht kennen,
treffen jeder eine Entscheidung
über die Verwendung von Geld
und erzielen zusammen ein Ergebnis.
Spielregeln: So wird’s gemacht!
Es gibt zwei Teilnehmer.
Jeder Teilnehmer erhält einen Anfangsbetrag von 10 Punkten.
Beide Teilnehmer können ihre 10 Punkte
zwischen sich und der anderen Person aufteilen oder
ganz für sich behalten oder
ganz an die andere Person weitergeben.
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie behalten, bekommen Sie selbst 1 €.
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie weitergeben, bekommt die andere Person 2€.
Umgekehrt gilt:
Für jeden Punkt, den die andere Person an Sie weitergibt, bekommen Sie 2€
Für Teilnehmer1 bedeutet:
Behalten: 0 Punkte = 0€/ 5 Punkte = 5€/ 10 Punkte = 10€
Weitergeben: 0 Punkte = 0€/ 5 Punkte = 10€/ 10 Punkte = 20€
Für Teilnehmer2 bedeutet:
Behalten: 0 Punkte = 0€/ 1 Punkt = 1€/ 2 Punkte = 2€/ 3 Punkte = 3€usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 10€
Weitergeben: 0 Punkte = 0€/ 1 Punkt = 2€/ 2 Punkte = 4€/ 3 Punkte = 6€usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 20€
Teilnehmer 1 hat begonnen, er hat schon entschieden, ob er entweder 0 oder 5 oder
10 Punkte an Sie weitergibt.
Sie sind Teilnehmer 2, entscheiden also als Zweiter.
Jetzt können Sie Ihre Entscheidung über die 10 Punkte treffen. Sie können jede
Punktezahl von 0 bis 10 an die andere Person (Teilnehmer 1) weitergeben. Da Sie
noch nicht wissen wie sich Teilnehmer 1 entschieden hat, geben Sie für alle drei
möglichen Entscheidungen von Teilnehmer 1 an, wie viel Punkte Sie weitergeben.
Aus der Entscheidung von Teilnehmer 1 und Ihrer entsprechenden Entscheidung
errechnet sich der Geldbetrag, den Sie erzielen. Diesen Geldbetrag werden wir Ihnen
per Verrechnungsscheck zusenden.
Ihre Teilnahme ist freiwillig. Der Rechtsweg ist ausgeschlossen.
Um Ihre Punkte einzutragen, drehen Sie das Blatt bitte um. 
2.E. Participants’ Instructions Can We Trust the Trust Game?
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Entscheidungsblatt für Teilnehmer 2
Sie sind Teilnehmer 2, das heißt Teilnehmer 1 hat seine Entscheidung bereits getroffen.
Jetzt sind Sie an der Reihe und entscheiden wie Sie die 10 Punkte (von 0 bis 10) aufteilen
wenn Teilnehmer1 an Sie, 0 oder 5 oder 10 Punkte weitergegeben hat.
Wenn Teilnehmer 1 an mich 0 Punkte weitergegeben hat,
dann gebe ich Punkte
und behalte Punkte
zusammen also 10 Punkte.
Wenn Teilnehmer 1 an mich 5 Punkte weitergegeben hat,
dann gebe ich Punkte
und behalte Punkte
zusammen also 10 Punkte.
Wenn Teilnehmer 1 an mich 10 Punkte weitergegeben hat,
dann gebe ich Punkte
und behalte Punkte
zusammen also 10 Punkte.
Und so geht’s weiter:
Haben Sie die sechs oberen Kästchen ausgefüllt?
Dann sagen Sie uns bitte noch:
Wie gerne nehmen Sie an einer solchen Wie verständlich haben wir die
Entscheidungsaufgabe teil? Entscheidungsaufgabe erklärt?
sehr weniger ungern sehr weniger schlecht
gerne gerne gut gut
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Nun stecken Sie bitte das Blatt in den Briefumschlag und überreichen Sie den verschlossenen
Umschlag dem Interviewer!
Vielen Dank fürs Mitmachen!
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2.E.3 Instructions for the Accompanying Study in 2004
Infratest Sozialforschung Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 
 
 - 1 - 
Leben in Deutschland 
 
Verhaltensexperiment „Geben und Nehmen“ 
  
Zwei Personen, 
die sich nicht kennen, 
treffen jeder eine Entscheidung 
über die Verwendung von Geld 
und erzielen zusammen ein Ergebnis. 
 
Spielregeln: So wird’s gemacht! 
 
Es gibt zwei Teilnehmer. 
Jeder Teilnehmer erhält einen Anfangsbetrag von 10 Punkten.  
 
Beide Teilnehmer können ihre 10 Punkte 
• zwischen sich und der anderen Person aufteilen oder 
• ganz für sich behalten oder 
• ganz an die andere Person weitergeben.  
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie behalten, bekommen Sie selbst 1 €.   
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie weitergeben, bekommt die andere Person 2 €.   
 
Umgekehrt gilt: 
Für jeden Punkt, den die andere Person an Sie weitergibt, bekommen Sie 2 € 
 
Für beide Teilnehmer bedeutet: 
Behalten: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 2 Punkte = 2€ / 4 Punkte = 4€ / 6 Punkte =   6€ / 8 Punkte =   8€ / 10 Punkte = 10€ 
Weitergeben: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 2 Punkte = 4€ / 4 Punkte = 8€ / 6 Punkte = 12€ / 8 Punkte = 16€ / 10 Punkte = 20€ 
 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 1, entscheiden also als Erster. 
 
Das heißt, Sie entscheiden, ob Sie 10, 8, 6, 4, 2, oder 0 Punkte an die andere Person 
(Teilnehmer 2) weitergeben und wie viele Sie behalten. 
 
Danach wird Teilnehmer 2 seine Entscheidung über die 10 Punkte treffen. Er wird nie 
erfahren wer Sie sind, aber wir werden ihn über Ihre Entscheidung informieren. 
 
Aus beiden Entscheidungen zusammen errechnet sich der Geldbetrag, den Sie erzielen. 
Diesen Geldbetrag werden wir Ihnen per Verrechnungsscheck zusenden. 
Ihre Teilnahme ist freiwillig. Der Rechtsweg ist ausgeschlossen. 
 
 
 
Um Ihre Punkte einzutragen, drehen Sie das Blatt bitte um.   
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Entscheidungsblatt für Teilnehmer 1 
 
Wie teilen Sie die 10 Punkte auf? 
 
Das heißt, wie viele Punkte (10 oder 8 oder 6 oder 4 oder 2 oder 0) geben Sie an  
Teilnehmer 2 weiter und wie viele behalten Sie? 
Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an! 
 
 
 Ich gebe 10 8 6 4 2 0 Punkte weiter, 
 also behalte ich 0 2 4 6 8 10 Punkte 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Und so geht’s weiter: 
 
Infratest übermittelt nun die Punktezahl, die von Ihnen weitergegeben wurde, an Teilnehmer 2. 
 
Teilnehmer 2 entscheidet daraufhin, wie viele Punkte er an Sie gibt. 
 
„Was wäre wenn …“ Die bekannte Frage aus dem Alltag bewegt auch die Wissenschaft. 
Auch im Wirtschaftsleben ist es häufig notwendig, vorherzusagen, wie sich andere Menschen 
verhalten. Daher bitten wir Sie, hier noch eine Zusatzfrage dazu zu beantworten: 
 
Was denken Sie, wie würde sich Teilnehmer 2 in den zwei folgenden Beispielen verhalten? 
 
Wenn ich ihm 10 Punkte gebe, erhalte ich von ihm  Punkte 
 
 
Wenn ich ihm 0 Punkte gebe, erhalte ich von ihm  Punkte 
 
 
 
 
 
Haben Sie auch die beiden unteren Kästchen ausgefüllt? 
 
 
Dann stecken Sie bitte das Blatt in den Briefumschlag und überreichen Sie den 
verschlossenen Umschlag dem Interviewer! 
 
 
 
 
 
Vielen Dank fürs Mitmachen! 
Can We Trust the Trust Game? 2.E. Participants’ Instructions
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 - 1 - 
Leben in Deutschland 
 
Verhaltensexperiment „Geben und Nehmen“ 
  
Zwei Personen, 
die sich nicht kennen, 
treffen jeder eine Entscheidung 
über die Verwendung von Geld 
und erzielen zusammen ein Ergebnis. 
 
Spielregeln: So wird’s gemacht! 
 
Es gibt zwei Teilnehmer. 
Jeder Teilnehmer erhält einen Anfangsbetrag von 10 Punkten.  
 
Beide Teilnehmer können ihre 10 Punkte 
• zwischen sich und der anderen Person aufteilen oder 
• ganz für sich behalten oder 
• ganz an die andere Person weitergeben.  
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie behalten, bekommen Sie selbst 1 €.   
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie weitergeben, bekommt die andere Person 2 €.   
 
Umgekehrt gilt: 
Für jeden Punkt, den die andere Person an Sie weitergibt, bekommen Sie 2 € 
 
Dies bedeutet für beide Teilnehmer: 
Behalten: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 2 Punkte = 2€ / 4 Punkte = 4€ / 6 Punkte =   6€ / 8 Punkte =   8€ / 10 Punkte = 10€ 
Weitergeben: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 2 Punkte = 4€ / 4 Punkte = 8€ / 6 Punkte = 12€ / 8 Punkte = 16€ / 10 Punkte = 20€ 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 2, entscheiden also als Zweiter. 
 
Teilnehmer 1 hat begonnen, er hat schon entschieden, wie viele Punkte er behält bzw. an 
Sie weitergibt. Das Ergebnis finden Sie auf der Rückseite. 
 
Jetzt sind Sie an der Reihe, das heißt, Sie entscheiden, wie viele von Ihren 10 Punkten 
Sie an die andere Person (Teilnehmer 1) weitergeben und wie viele Sie behalten. Sie 
haben die Wahl zwischen 10, 8, 6, 4, 2 oder 0 Punkten. 
 
Aus beiden Entscheidungen zusammen errechnet sich der Geldbetrag, den Sie erzielen. 
Diesen Geldbetrag werden wir Ihnen per Verrechnungsscheck zusenden. 
Ihre Teilnahme ist freiwillig. Der Rechtsweg ist ausgeschlossen.  
 
 
Um Ihre Punkte einzutragen, drehen Sie das Blatt bitte um.   
2.E. Participants’ Instructions Can We Trust the Trust Game?
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Entscheidungsblatt für Teilnehmer 2 
 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 2, das heißt Teilnehmer 1 hat seine Entscheidung bereits  
 
 
 
 
getroffen und hat Ihnen Punkte gegeben. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jetzt sind Sie an der Reihe. 
 
Wie teilen Sie Ihre 10 Punkte auf? 
 
Das heißt, wie viele Punkte (10 oder 8 oder 6 oder 4 oder 2 oder 0) geben Sie an  
Teilnehmer 1 weiter und wie viele behalten Sie? 
Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an! 
 
 
 
 Ich gebe 10 8 6 4 2 0 Punkte weiter, 
 also behalte ich 0 2 4 6 8 10 Punkte 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Haben Sie ein Kästchen angekreuzt? 
 
 
 
Dann stecken Sie bitte das Blatt in den Briefumschlag und überreichen Sie den 
verschlossenen Umschlag dem Interviewer! 
 
 
 
 
Vielen Dank fürs Mitmachen! 
 
Can We Trust the Trust Game? 2.E. Participants’ Instructions
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2.E.4 Instructions for the SOEP 2003
Infratest Sozialforschung Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 
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Leben in Deutschland 
 
 
Verhaltensexperiment „Geben und Nehmen“ 
  
Zwei Personen, 
die sich nicht kennen, 
treffen jeder eine Entscheidung 
 über die Verwendung von Geld 
und erzielen zusammen ein Ergebnis. 
 
 
Spielregeln: So wird’s gemacht! 
 
Es gibt zwei Teilnehmer. 
Jeder Teilnehmer erhält einen Anfangsbetrag von 10 Punkten.  
 
Beide Teilnehmer können ihre 10 Punkte 
• zwischen sich und der anderen Person aufteilen oder 
• ganz für sich behalten oder 
• ganz an die andere Person weitergeben.  
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie behalten, bekommen Sie selbst 1 €.   
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie weitergeben, bekommt die andere Person 2 €.   
 
Umgekehrt gilt: 
Für jeden Punkt, den die andere Person an Sie weitergibt, bekommen Sie 2 € 
 
Also bedeutet für beide Teilnehmer: 
Behalten: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 1 Punkt = 1€ / 2 Punkte = 2€ / 3 Punkte = 3€ usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 10€ 
Weitergeben: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 1 Punkt = 2€ / 2 Punkte = 4€ / 3 Punkte = 6€ usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 20€ 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 1, entscheiden also als Erster. 
 
Das heißt, Sie entscheiden, wie viele von Ihren 10 Punkten Sie an die andere Person 
(Teilnehmer2) weitergeben und wie viele Sie behalten. 
 
Teilnehmer 2 wird nie erfahren wer Sie sind, aber wir werden Ihre Entscheidung an 
diese Person übermitteln. 
 
Teilnehmer 2 weiß also, wie viele Punkte Sie ihm gegeben haben, wenn er nun seine 
Entscheidung über die Aufteilung der 10 Punkte trifft. 
 
Aus beiden Entscheidungen zusammen errechnet sich der Geldbetrag, den Sie 
erzielen. Diesen Geldbetrag werden wir Ihnen per Verrechnungsscheck zusenden. 
Ihre Teilnahme ist freiwillig. Der Rechtsweg ist ausgeschlossen.  
 
 
Um Ihre Punkte einzutragen, drehen Sie das Blatt bitte um.   
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Entscheidungsblatt für Teilnehmer 1 
 
Wie teilen Sie die 10 Punkte auf? 
 
Das heißt, wie viele Punkte (von 0 bis 10) geben Sie an Teilnehmer 2 weiter und wie viele 
behalten Sie? 
 
 
 Ich gebe Punkte weiter 
 
 
 und behalte Punkte  
 
 
 zusammen also    10    Punkte. 
 
 
 
 
Und so geht’s weiter: 
 
Infratest übermittelt nun die Punktezahl, die von Ihnen weitergegeben wurde, an Teilnehmer 2. 
 
Teilnehmer 2 entscheidet daraufhin, wie viele Punkte er an Sie gibt. 
 
Hierzu noch eine Frage: 
Was denken Sie, wie viele Punkte wird Teilnehmer 2 an Sie geben? 
 
 
 Teilnehmer 2 wird Punkte an mich geben. 
 
 
 
Haben Sie die drei oberen Kästchen ausgefüllt? 
 
 
Dann sagen Sie uns bitte noch:  
 
 Wie gerne nehmen Sie an einer solchen Wie verständlich haben wir die  
 Entscheidungsaufgabe teil? Entscheidungsaufgabe erklärt? 
 sehr weniger ungern sehr weniger schlecht 
 gerne gerne  gut gut  
 
 ------------- --------------  ------------- --------------  
 
 
 
Nun stecken Sie bitte das Blatt in den Briefumschlag und überreichen Sie den verschlossenen 
Umschlag dem Interviewer! 
 
 
Vielen Dank fürs Mitmachen! 
Can We Trust the Trust Game? 2.E. Participants’ Instructions
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Leben in Deutschland 
 
 
Verhaltensexperiment „Geben und Nehmen“ 
  
Zwei Personen, 
die sich nicht kennen, 
treffen jeder eine Entscheidung 
 über die Verwendung von Geld 
und erzielen zusammen ein Ergebnis. 
 
 
Spielregeln: So wird’s gemacht! 
 
Es gibt zwei Teilnehmer. 
Jeder Teilnehmer erhält einen Anfangsbetrag von 10 Punkten.  
 
Beide Teilnehmer können ihre 10 Punkte 
• zwischen sich und der anderen Person aufteilen oder 
• ganz für sich behalten oder 
• ganz an die andere Person weitergeben.  
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie behalten, bekommen Sie selbst 1 €.   
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie weitergeben, bekommt die andere Person 2 €.   
 
Umgekehrt gilt: 
Für jeden Punkt, den die andere Person an Sie weitergibt, bekommen Sie 2 € 
 
Also bedeutet für beide Teilnehmer: 
Behalten: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 1 Punkt = 1€ / 2 Punkte = 2€ / 3 Punkte = 3€ usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 10€ 
Weitergeben: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 1 Punkt = 2€ / 2 Punkte = 4€ / 3 Punkte = 6€ usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 20€ 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 2, entscheiden also als Zweiter. 
 
Teilnehmer 1 hat begonnen, er hat schon entschieden, wie viele Punkte er behält 
bzw. an Sie weitergibt. Das Ergebnis finden Sie auf der Rückseite. 
 
Jetzt sind Sie an der Reihe, das heißt, Sie entscheiden, wie viele von Ihren 10 
Punkten Sie an die andere Person (Teilnehmer1) weitergeben und wie viele Sie 
behalten. 
 
Aus beiden Entscheidungen zusammen errechnet sich der Geldbetrag, den Sie 
erzielen. Diesen Geldbetrag werden wir Ihnen per Verrechnungsscheck zusenden. 
Ihre Teilnahme ist freiwillig. Der Rechtsweg ist ausgeschlossen.  
 
 
Um Ihre Punkte einzutragen, drehen Sie das Blatt bitte um.    
2.E. Participants’ Instructions Can We Trust the Trust Game?
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Entscheidungsblatt für Teilnehmer 2 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 2, das heißt Teilnehmer 1 hat seine Entscheidung bereits  
 
 
getroffen und hat Ihnen Punkte gegeben. 
 
 
 
 
 
Wie teilen Sie die 10 Punkte auf? 
 
Das heißt, wie viele Punkte (von 0 bis 10) geben Sie an Teilnehmer 1 weiter und wie viele 
behalten Sie? 
 
 
 Ich gebe Punkte weiter 
 
 
 und behalte Punkte  
 
 
 zusammen also    10    Punkte. 
 
 
 
 
 
Und so geht’s weiter: 
 
Haben Sie die beiden oberen Kästchen ausgefüllt? 
 
 
Dann sagen Sie uns bitte noch:  
 
 Wie gerne nehmen Sie an einer solchen Wie verständlich haben wir die  
 Entscheidungsaufgabe teil? Entscheidungsaufgabe erklärt? 
 sehr weniger ungern sehr weniger schlecht 
 gerne gerne  gut gut  
 
 ------------- --------------  ------------- --------------  
 
 
 
Nun stecken Sie bitte das Blatt in den Briefumschlag und überreichen Sie den verschlossenen 
Umschlag dem Interviewer! 
 
 
 
Vielen Dank fürs Mitmachen! 
 
Can We Trust the Trust Game? 2.E. Participants’ Instructions
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CHAPTER
THREE
DECOMPOSING TRUST: EXPLAINING NATIONAL AND
ETHNIC TRUST DIFFERENCES
Joint with Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher,
Ju¨rgen Schupp and Gert G. Wagner
3.1 Introduction
The level of trust is not the same for every person nor is the aggregate level of trust
similar in different countries. In their seminal papers, Knack and Keefer (1997) and
La Porta et al. (1997) have demonstrated that country differences in the aggregate level
of trust are related to important economic variables such as growth and inflation in
those countries. As mentioned in section 1.4 there is little research on what explains
differences in trust on national level. This is especially intriguing as national differences
in trust may well be at the core of understanding differences in economic developments
and between changes of economic systems. One of many examples for the importance
of trust may well be the recent credit crunch and the mistrust between banks.
We largely follow James Coleman’s concept of trust (Coleman, 1990) which is well
suited for behavioural sciences such as economics. In his perspective, the following two
points characterise the action of placing trust. On the one hand it implies that the
truster freely transfers assets to another person, without controlling the actions of that
other person or having the possibility to retaliate. Second, there must be a potential gain
in order to have an incentive to trust. The incentive is such that if the other person is
trustworthy, the truster is better off trusting than not having trusted: and worse off if the
other person does not fulfil the trust placed in him/her. There is no monetary incentive
for the second-mover to reward the first-mover’s trusting behaviour with trustworthiness.
61
3.1. Introduction National and Ethnic Trust Differences
Note that in this concept, trust is considered as a form of behaviour. Thus, following
this concept, using experimental methods to measure trust suggests itself (Berg et al.,
1995).
This paper uses novel empirical methods with the aim of shedding light on some
interesting aspects of trust. For this purpose, we developed a new empirical approach
that enables us to combine large non-interactive surveys with interactive experiments.
Given the relevance of trust in economic and political relations, we explore if levels of
trust and trustworthiness differ between countries; and how any such differences can be
explained. We also illuminate differences in trust within a country, along demographic,
mainly ethnic variables. Our choice to compare Germany and the United States (U.S.)
reflects the interesting role which trust plays in the performance of the economy and
the different institutions in these countries (Alesina et al., 2001). Some indications as
to expected differences in levels of trust between countries might be found in survey
data. Measured by questionnaire in a representative sample of respondents, the World
Values Survey allows conclusions about the generalised expectancies for interpersonal
trust on national levels. The levels of trust found therein are higher in the United States
than in Germany for 1990, slightly higher in Germany for 1999, and slightly higher in
the United States in 2006. A representative study of elderly people in Germany and
the United States in 2000/2001, however, shows a slightly higher level of expectancies
for neighbourhood-related trust in the United States than in Germany (Pollack and
von dem Knesebeck, 2004). Regarding differences within countries, a quick analysis
of World Value Survey data for 2006 shows that the share of the Caucasian populace
with positive expectancies for interpersonal trust is more than double that of the African
American populace. Similar results for ethnic differences are found in the General Social
Survey (Glaeser et al., 2000). However, serious doubts have been raised about the validity
of the survey measure of trust used in the World Values Survey and the General Social
Survey and especially about the cross-cultural comparison (Glaeser et al., 2000; Miller
and Mitamura, 2003; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008). Thus, a measure of trust other than
the commonly used trust question in these surveys is desirable.
The second question we address is why certain people trust more than others or why
people in a certain country behave more trustingly than people in other countries. What
are the factors that influence whether a person trusts or mistrusts? Previous literature
suggests that risk preferences (Schechter, 2007), social preferences (Bohnet and Zeck-
hauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008), expectations about others’ trustworthiness (Ashraf
et al., 2006; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) and life experiences and life expectancy mea-
sured by demographic variables such as age (Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007; Sutter and
Kocher, 2007), education (Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007) income (Alesina and La Ferrara,
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2002; Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007) and religion (Guiso et al., 2003) are determinants
of trusting behaviour. For our analysis we take up these suggested factors and improve
upon them by exploring models including several rather than single factors.
In this paper we combine two national representative surveys with a trust experiment.
This approach allows us, on the one hand, to simultaneously analyse the influence of
a large variety of personal characteristics on trusting behaviour. On the other hand,
in contrast to many studies based on experiments conducted with student populations,
we have the opportunity to analyse trusting behaviour of the general populace of two
countries. This has the advantage that the heterogeneity of our subjects’ behaviour and
characteristics is much larger than with a student population.
Thanks to this new approach, we are able to conclusively demonstrate a significant
difference in the level of trust between Germany and the United States – people in the
United States trusting more than in Germany, on average. We further illustrate that
the factors that were suggested to influence trust, i.e. risk preferences, social prefer-
ences, and expected trustworthiness, do indeed correlate strongly with levels of trust –
individually as well as when controlling for the other factors. We were also able to show
that these factors are found in differing levels in the two countries. U.S. Americans are
less risk averse, less betrayal averse and more optimistic about others’ trustworthiness.
Now, if factors that explain trust were distributed differently in our two countries, this
would serve to explain the differing trust levels found. Indeed, running multivariate
regression models across our data, we show that the national differences in trust are
almost entirely explained by the national differences in social and risk preferences and
expected trustworthiness. In contrast, neither the range of demographic variables that
we tested, nor income differences, had a relevant part in explaining the trust gap (social
and risk preferences and expected trustworthiness explain 81%, demographic variables
7% and income 7% of the gap).
As our methods allowed us to acquire representative data for countries, we were also
able to explore some variations of trust levels within the United States. Particularly,
we found that Caucasian Americans exhibit a 72% higher level of trust than African
Americans, whilst Latinos and Latinas trust not quite as much, but still 48% more than
African Americans. In contrast to the difference between countries, we were only able
to explain 40% of this ethnic trust gap within the United States. Furthermore, income
is of much higher relevance for explaining this trust gap than it is for the gap between
Germany and the United States. On the other hand, the effect of income together with
our explanatory variables, comprising risk and social preferences as well as expected
trustworthiness, do still account for 96% of the explainable ethnic trust gap.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section we describe
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the design of the experiment and the survey and show that our procedures are suitable
for procuring representative data. In sections 3.3 - 3.8 we present our results. Section
3.9 summarises and concludes the paper.
3.2 Design
We measure trust through a trust game, played anonymously with real monetary stakes
(Berg et al., 1995; Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Coleman, 1990). In the trust game
two players receive an endowment of ten US$ or Euros from the experimenters and
interact in the following way. The first-mover may voluntarily place trust in the second-
mover (a person unknown to him/her), by transferring zero to ten US$ of his or her
endowment. This money will then be at the disposal of the second-mover, without
any commitment from the second-mover to the first-mover. Thus, according to our
concept of trust, the first-mover becomes a truster, whereas the second-mover is trusted,
so we will name him/her ‘trustee’. Every transfer is doubled by the experimenters
and thus increases the total amount earned for the trustee. At the next stage of the
game, the trustee is informed about the transfer he/she has received from the truster
and then decides on how much to transfer back. The transfer is again between zero
and ten US$ and the experimenters again double the amount transferred. After the
second-mover’s decision, the game is over and both players are paid the amount earned.
There are no other rounds of interaction between the two players. The design of the
experiment is kept simple in order to make sure that everybody in the population has a
chance to understand the rules of the game and calculate the payoffs in their head. The
symmetry of the game is a consequence of these limitations but also a design feature.
Contrary to the trust game usually used (Berg et al., 1995), the strategy space of second-
movers is independent of the decision of first-movers, for this reason a positive relation
between received and returned money cannot be due to a larger available strategy. The
experimental instructions can be found in appendix 3.A. If the truster places full trust
in the trustee – that is, if he/she transfers the whole endowment of ten US$ – and
the trustee behaves other-regardingly and fully honours the placement of trust by re-
transferring the whole endowment of ten US$, then the overall income is maximised such
that both players end up with twenty US$. On the other hand, by behaving selfishly
and not transferring anything back, the trustee is able to increase his/her earnings to
thirty US$ while leaving the truster with nothing. The first-mover’s dilemma therefore
is between a) transferring a positive amount and perhaps earning more than ten US$,
while bearing the risk of losing some or all of his/her original endowment of ten US$,
and b) taking the guaranteed award of ten US$ by not transferring anything. Thus,
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the outcome depends on the action of the trustee. The interpretation of a positive
transfer by the truster as placement of trust in the trustee is thus compatible with
the concept of trust by James Coleman (Coleman, 1990) given above. To collect a
large amount of high quality, representative data including an interactive experiment
is challenging. Thus we cooperated with two well-known, experienced institutions, one
in each country. In Germany, we used the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a
longitudinal study, as the framework for our experiment. The SOEP is located at the
German Institute of Economic Research (DIW Berlin) and funded by the Leibniz society,
a research organisation for applied sciences. A subsample of 1,202 SOEP respondents was
selected to participate in the experiment1. After the normal SOEP questionnaire, the
interviewer handed over the written instructions to participants. The interviewers were
briefed to give detailed information to the participants if needed before they made their
decisions. Then the participants were asked to privately make their decision and put the
decision sheet into an envelope and close it. Thus the interviewer does not know and will
never get to know how the participant decided. The feedback and a check for the amount
earned were mailed to the subjects a few weeks later together with a thank-you letter.
One might worry that respondents did not believe that they would eventually receive the
money. Thus, respondents needed to believe that the survey organisation would keep its
promises. Since respondents are in this panel for several years, they experienced several
interactions with the survey organisation. Most importantly for our purpose is that
the survey respondents are promised a lottery ticket for a national charity lottery as an
incentive for participation in the yearly survey. This ticket is mailed to them only after
the interview took place. Thus the respondents repeatedly experienced that the survey
organisation would keep its promise and that is the reason why we think respondents did
not doubt that the money would be paid out. The SOEP is a representative sample of
the entire German population (Wagner et al., 2007). Our randomly drawn subsample is
thus representative for Germany as well. Nevertheless, we compare socio-demographic
characteristics of the participants in the experiment with the total SOEP sample of
21,105 individuals. The weighted2 distribution of the participants closely follows that
of the entire SOEP population (Table 3.1) that assures us of the representativity of our
subsample.
In the United States we used the facilities of Knowledge Networks (KN) who run
1Only persons above the age of 18 and only one person per household is selected and 90% of the
selected persons could be fielded between February and May 2005 and the rest before October 2005.
2The weights are based on the distributions of geographical position, the size of the household,
gender, age, and nationality compared to the distributions in the German Census. These weights are
then adjusted every year with the determinants of the dropouts in that year.
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Table 3.1: Demographic description of the data (in percent)
United States Germany
CPS first second SOEP first second
mover mover mover mover
Gender male 48.1 48.2 48.0 46.1 50.2 46.6
female 51.9 51.8 52.0 53.9 49.8 53.4
Age 18 - 30 23.5 23.5 23.2 18.5 14.2 16.6
31 - 50 39.5 39.4 40.6 37.5 36.2 34.9
51 - 103 37.0 37.1 36.2 44.0 49.6 48.5
Household below 10,000 US$ 6.8 11.3 10.2 8.9 6.7 9.3
income 10,000 - 24,999 17.3 18.4 18.2 30.2 31.8 33.3
25,000 - 49,999 28.3 31.0 33.5 35.3 38.0 35.9
50,000 - 74,999 20.1 21.3 18.2 15.8 16.6 16.5
75,000 and more 27.5 18.1 19.8 9.8 6.9 5.0
Household size 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.4
Education less than high school 16.0 15.6 15.9 21.0 20.3 20.9
high school 58.7 60.0 59.9 59.6 64.7 65.8
more than high school 25.3 24.4 24.2 19.4 14.9 13.3
Employment employed 56.6 48.2 48.7 47.3 44.3 46.1
status unemployed 3.2 6.6 4.8 7.3 6.8 7.7
self-employed 7.5 7.2 7.0 5.5 4.6 4.6
retired 16.0 15.2 17.2 26.8 31.4 32.0
non labour market 16.7 22.7 22.2 13.1 12.9 9.6
Ethnical non-Hisp. Caucasian 70.0 72.7 72.6
group non-Hisp.African A. 11.2 11.7 11.6
non-Hisp. Other 6.1 4.8 4.6
Latinos and Latinas 12.7 10.8 11.2
Region of Northeast 18.9 19.0 18.7
living Midwest 22.4 22.9 22.9
South 35.9 35.4 35.8
West 22.7 22.7 22.6
West-Germany 81.7 80.7 76.9
East-Germany 18.3 19.3 23.1
Nationality Germans 92.9 92.9 94.9
Non-Germans 7.1 7.1 5.1
a representative nation panel via the Internet3. The data collection was supported by
TESS (Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences)4 that is run by the University
of Michigan at Ann Arbor and Ohio State University and funded in part by the National
3Uslaner (2004) shows that people using the internet regularly are not more trusting than those
who rarely use it. In our regression we control for the frequency people use the internet. Since it does
not affect trusting behaviour we are confident that this methodological difference does not change our
results.
4For further information on TESS, see http://www.experimentcentral.org or Mutz and Lupia (2003)
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Science Foundation. A randomly drawn subsample of 1,489 participated in our study5. A
few days after the fieldwork period the subjects got feedback and a check for the amount
earned was sent to them by mail. Similar to the German sample, people are experienced
panel respondents and received compensation for their participation before. So they
know that the survey organisation is not going to cheat on them and that they will
receive the money earned. The KN sample was recruited off-line through list-assisted
random-digit dialling techniques. Once contacted, the sample members are provided
with WebTV set-top boxes, including a remote keyboard and a pointing device, and free
monthly Internet access (the connection is paid by KN) as an incentive to participate
in the surveys. As a result of this two-step procedure, the KN sample is representative
for the basic demographic characteristics of the U.S. population (Huggins and Krotki,
2001; Lee, 2006). As Table 3.1 documents, the weighted6 distribution of our sample in
the KN panel closely follows the distribution of the Current Population Survey (CPS)
from April 2005.
Thus, our sampling procedures yielded representative samples of the German and
U.S. population for a wide range of socio-economic variables. Furthermore, we would
like to know if the sampling procedure selected more trusting people into the study
since this is our variable of interest. We can assess this question indirectly by comparing
the unweighted distribution of trust with the weighted one. If less trusting people are
underrepresented in the survey we would expect the weighted mean to be lower than
the non-weighted mean. We find that the differences in the means are very small and
the weighted means (Germany: 5.62; United States: 6.77) lie within the 95% confidence
intervals of the unweighted means (Germany: 5.44 – 5.86; United States: 6.57 – 7.02).
For Germany, we have further evidence that selection into the experiment is not due to
trust. People who drop out of the surveys in the following two years, did not exhibit a
different level of trust in the experiment than those who stayed in the survey (t-test; t
= 0.26, p > .790, two-sided)
In the following analysis the descriptive results are always weighted results and re-
gression models are estimated with unweighted data. When analysing survey results,
we use all data available. That is, in Germany we use the whole SOEP population of
24,000 individuals and in the United States all 1,489 participants in our study.
5Only one adult (age > 18) panel member per household was eligible for the survey and the study
was conducted between April and May 2005.
6The post-stratification weights are based on gender, age, ethnicity, geographical distribution and
education of subjects.
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3.3 The Trust Gaps
In the United States, on average first-movers transferred 68% of their endowment to the
trustee, whereas in Germany only 56% was transferred (Figure 3.1). Thus the average
level of trust as measured by our experiment in the United States is 20% higher than
in Germany (t-test; t = 5.77, p < .001, two-sided). In Germany, about 7% of the first-
movers transferred nothing, 41% transferred five and 14% transferred the maximum.
In the United States on the other hand, the peak of the distribution is not at half of
the endowment but on the maximum level of trust. 46% of the first-movers transferred
ten, 26% transferred five and 10% transferred nothing. Thus U.S. residents are more
trusting of strangers than German residents. Interestingly, the low-trusting people in
Germany (below the median person7) transferred about the same as the low-trusting
U.S. residents (38% versus 36%). The difference in the mean is driven by differences in
the upper part of the distribution. High-trusting people in Germany (above the median
person) transferred on average 74% whereas high-trusting U.S. residents transferred on
average 99% of their endowment. This difference is mirrored in the higher variance in
the U.S. compared to the German distributions of levels of trust (Levene’s test for equal
variance; W = 161.51, p < .001). Concerning within country differences, we find that
Figure 3.1: Levels of trust in the United States and Germany
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7The median person transfers five in Germany and seven in the United States.
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the average level of trust differs substantially between ethnic groups within the United
States. The Caucasian populace transfers on average 72%, the Latino populace 65% and
the African Americans 44% of their endowment to the trustee (Figure 3.2). The average
trust level of Caucasian Americans is thus 65% higher than the level of trust of African
Americans (t-test; t = 6.01, p < .001, two-sided) and that of Latinos and Latinas is
48% higher (t-test; t = 3.29, p < .002, two-sided) than that of African Americans. The
average transfers of Caucasians and Latinos and Latinas are not significantly different.
Furthermore we do not find any significant differences between the Northeast, Midwest,
South and West of the United States8 and between East and West Germany.
Figure 3.2: Levels of trust for non-Hispanic Caucasians, non-Hispanic African Americans
and Latinos and Latinas
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In the following we would like to analyse the gap in trusting behaviour between
Germany and the United States and between the ethnic groups. Two conditions have to
be fulfilled to be able to explain these observed trust gaps. First, we have to identify the
factors that can explain a significant part of the variation in trusting behaviour. Second,
these variables must exhibit different means for the two countries or groups of people.
In the following we therefore focus on the determinants of trusting behaviour.
8We find a weakly significant difference between the Midwest (72% of the endowment) and the South
(65% of the endowment) (t-test; t = 1.76, p < .079)
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3.4 Possible Explanations for the Germany – United
States Trust Gap
Economic theory predicts preferences and expectations/beliefs to influence behaviour.
Concerning preferences we will on the one hand focus on risk preferences since trusting
behaviour is a risky decision (Coleman, 1990) and on the other hand on social preferences,
since social relations are involved in the trust game (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004).
Concerning beliefs the first-mover may form an expectation on how the second-mover will
react to his/her transfer. Thus different expectations might lead to different behaviour.
Furthermore, demographic characteristics possibly influence trusting behaviour.
3.4.1 Risk Preferences
The decision to trust is by definition a risky decision if some trustees are expected to
have other-regarding preferences. The risk is such that the truster gains money if the
trustee fully reciprocates the trust placed in him/her and the truster loses money if
the trustee behaves selfishly. Furthermore, the risk is increasing with the level of trust.
That is, the more a truster trusts the larger is the difference between the worst and
best outcome. Thus, a risk averse first-mover is expected to trust less than a non-
risk averse first-mover. We measured player’s risk preferences by asking them to what
extent they are willing to take a risk in general. They indicated their answer on an
eleven-point Likert scale, with zero indicating completely unwilling to take risks and
ten indicating completely willing to take risks. It has been shown that this question is
correlated with actual risk taking behaviour, as for example lottery choices, investments
in stocks, smoking, self-employment and participating in medical studies (Dohmen et al.,
forthcoming; Roe et al., 2009). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that
compares individual risk preferences across countries on a representative basis. We find
that in the risk question on average people in the United States report less risk aversion
than people living in Germany (Mann-Whitney U-test; z = 17.67, p < .001, two-sided).
This can be seen in Figure 3.3 where the cumulative distribution of our measure of risk
preferences is depicted. That people in the United States are less risk averse compared
to Germans can be seen in that the curve representing the U.S. residents (dashed curve)
lies to the right of the curve representing the German residents (solid curve). This result
is in line with previous arguments and observations. From a historical point of view
it is argued that Europeans that migrated to the United States (the largest group of
immigrants came from Germany) were those who were less risk averse (Alesina et al.,
2001). Due to intergenerational transmission of preferences, this can explain why U.S.
Americans are less risk averse than Germans. A behavioural observation in line with our
70
National and Ethnic Trust Differences 3.4. Possible Explanations
Figure 3.3: Risk- and betrayal aversion in Germany and the United States
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result is the fact that the proportion of U.S. American households that invest in risky
assets is double that of households in Germany (Guiso, 2002). Our finding is also not
restricted to our specific measure of risk aversion. An alternative survey measurement is
used by Barsky et al. (1997) who measured risk preferences using hypothetical situations
about people’s willingness to give up a secure income for an insecure, on average higher
income. In an accompanying unpublished study to the SOEP we used the same other
measurement and find again that Germans are more risk averse than U.S. residents
in the study by Barsky et al. (1997). This reinforces our result that U.S. residents
are less risk averse than Germans. The next step will be to see if risk preferences
indeed influence the decision to trust as predicted by economic theory. The previous
empirical evidence in non-representative samples (mostly students) generally supports
this prediction (Andreoni et al., 2003; Ashraf et al., 2003; Eckel and Wilson, 2000, 2004;
Sapienza et al., 2007; Schechter, 2007; Snijders and Keren, 1999).
3.4.2 Social Preferences
Theories of social preferences (e.g. Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)
assume that some people experience a disutility solely from unequal payoffs or getting
betrayed. By not trusting at all, a first-mover can avoid getting betrayed and can exclude
disadvantageous inequality between him/her and the trustee. The more a truster trusts,
the higher is the potential inequality and the stronger is the potential betrayal. Thus,
these models predict that an inequality or betrayal averse person trusts less than one
that does not mind inequity or to get betrayed. The reason is that by trusting less,
the first-mover is less vulnerable to experience inequality or betrayal. As predicted by
these models, it has been shown that in non-representative trust games first-movers
incur betrayal costs, costs shown to be more than purely monetary losses (Bohnet and
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Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008). Furthermore, they show that betrayal costs
cannot be explained by risk preferences. Thus, we predict that the more betrayal averse
a first-mover is, the less he/she trusts. We measure betrayal aversion by two survey
questions on how much a person agrees with a norm of negative reciprocity. People
indicated on a Likert scale how much they agreed with the statements ‘If I suffer a
serious wrong, I will take my revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the costs.’
and ‘If someone offends me, I will also offend him/her.’ We categorised the answers into
the three categories low, medium and high. These questions are taken from Perugini
et al. (2003), in which it was argued that people high on the scale are sensitive to
negative interpersonal behaviour. We find that people from the United States are less
betrayal averse than people from Germany (Mann-Whitney U-test; z = 19.78, p < .001,
two-sided) (Figure 3.3).
3.4.3 Expectations
In the existing literature on trust games there is no doubt, that expectations strongly
influence trusting behaviour (Ashraf et al., 2006; Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2007;
Garbarino and Slonim, 2009; Vyrastekova and Garikipati, 2005). Although this sounds
almost trivial, only few among the many articles on trust games actually used expec-
tations as an explanation for trusting behaviour. One difficulty is that expectations
should be elicited for the whole strategy space. The reason is best explained with an
example. Imagine a situation with two first-movers. We know that both expect the
second-movers to transfer back five points after they transfer five points. Further we
observe that one of these two first-movers actually transfers five points and the other
transfers ten points. In this case expectations have no explanatory power for the dif-
ferent transfers of the two first-movers. The solution could well be that the first-mover
who transfers ten points has more optimistic expectations about the behaviour of the
second-movers if he transfers ten points than has the first-mover who actually transfers
five points. Thus we asked people ‘What would you expect participant 2 to do in the fol-
lowing three examples?’ These examples were if they transferred zero, five or ten points.
We therefore have expectations concerning the behaviour of the second-mover at three
different points distributed over the whole strategy space. By soliciting the first-movers’
expectations at zero, five and ten points we take major differences in first-movers’ expec-
tations into account and are able to analyse in depth the role of expectations in trusting
behaviour. Given the expectations at zero, five and ten points, we are able to calculate
which of the three transfers is believed to yield the highest payoff. We thus have a mea-
sure of what first-movers believe to be the payoff-maximising transfer. If self-interest
is a driving motive of trusting behaviour, trusters’ transfers are likely to increase with
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the expected payoff-maximising transfer. The relationship between first-mover transfer
and payoff-maximising transfer would be weaker for individuals with social preferences.
Similarly, we compute which of the three transfers is believed to produce the smallest
income inequality between the first and the second-mover. We thus know what the first-
movers believe to be the inequality-minimising transfer. If first-movers’ transfers are
also motivated by a concern for fairness and equality, then truster’s transfers are likely
to increase with the expected inequality-minimising transfer. This relationship would be
stronger for individuals with a strong social preference. We find that U.S. residents have
significantly more optimistic expectations concerning the behaviour of the trustee. The
transfer expected to be payoff-maximising is significantly higher in the United States
than in Germany (t-test; t = 6.81, p < .001, two-sided). In more detail (Figure 3.4),
69% of U.S. first-movers expect that to place trust fully is the most profitable strategy,
whereas only 45% of the Germans are of this opinion. Similarly, the transfers expected
to minimise the income inequality are on average much higher in the United States than
in Germany (t-test; t = 8.11, p < .001, two-sided). Only 34% of Germans believe that a
transfer of ten is the best when concerned with inequality, whereas this share is double
(67%) for U.S. Americans (Figure 3.4). The question arises whether these expectations
Figure 3.4: Transfer expected to be payoff-maximising and inequality-minimising
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are correct in the sense that they reflect the observed behaviour of second-movers. We
did not ask people what they expect the ‘average’ second-mover to do, because people
have difficulties in understanding what an average person is. Our question was framed for
the most likely reaction of the second-movers. To assess whether first-movers correctly
predict the behaviour of second-movers we compute how many first-movers expected
a back-transfer that was among the most likely observed back-transfers. Overall the
observed back-transfer of second-movers was remarkably well predicted. In the United
States 77% of first-movers predicted a back-transfer that was among the most likely
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observed back-transfers and in Germany this share was 67%.
3.4.4 Demographic Characteristics
An advantage of using a representative sample is that the variations in demographic
factors in modern societies are much larger compared to the student samples common in
the experimental literature. It is therefore not surprising that income is seldom included
in the analysis of trusting behaviour. We have extensive information on the income
situation of the subjects. We use the total income before taxes of the household the
person is living in as a measure of the income situation. The size of the household is used
to correct for how much of the income is disposable for each member of the household.
We thereby take into account that often not every adult member of a household has a
personal income and that households with a lot of children need a higher income to have
the same economic status as other households with no children. In order to make the
incomes comparable across countries we used the purchasing power parity exchange rate
between the Euro and the US$ in 2005, from the OECD (1 US$ = 0.883e). The median
yearly household income in the United States is around 40,000 US$ whereas in Germany
it is 32,500 US$. Previous research using questionnaires suggest a positive relation
between income and the level of trust (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Bellemare and
Kroeger, 2007). We therefore expect income to positively influence trusting behaviour.
We further expect age to influence trusting behaviour based on the evidence by Bellemare
and Kroeger (2007) and Sutter and Kocher (2007), who find an inverted-U relation
between age and trusting behaviour. A further interesting characteristic of people is
their religious affiliation and religiosity (Iannaccone, 1998). The results from previous
research on the relation of trust and religion is mixed. Using the World Values Survey,
Guiso et al. (2003) find for a total of 66 countries that the more religious people are
the more they trust and that Christian religions foster trust, but less so for Catholics
than for Protestants. Welch et al. (2004) on the other hand do not find this relation for
people in the United States. We measure religiosity by the frequency of going to church
and/or visiting religious events.
3.4.5 Control Variables
Altruistic motives could possibly increase trusting behaviour. However, transfers that
are only based on altruistic motives are not compatible with our concept of trust. Our
concept requires that the incentive to trust is based on the potential gain. The incentive
for purely altruistic people is to transfer the whole endowment and this incentive is
clearly not based on the potential gain. Therefore, we control for altruistic motives in
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the main regressions in order to make sure that our results are not driven by differences
in altruism. We use the amount of time people spend in volunteering in clubs and
social services as a proxy measure for the degree of altruism. People who volunteer are
ready to help others and spend time for others and thus behave in a selfless manner.
Respondents could answer the question by indicating that they engage in volunteering
weekly, monthly, seldom or never. This measure of altruism is correlated with other
measures such as blood donation or charitable giving (Piliavin and Charng, 1990) and
captures the essence of altruism. To be certain that we capture altruism with the variable
volunteering and not purely sociability we included sociability as a control as well. We
measure sociability with the frequency of meeting friends and neighbours.
3.5 Determinants of Trusting Behaviour
We argued that risk aversion, social preferences, and first-movers’ expectations about the
reaction of second-movers are determinants of trusting behaviour. Further we showed
that these potential explanations exhibit different means in the two countries. It remains
to check whether our conjectures about the determinants of trusting behaviour hold
true. Estimating a linear model by ordinary least squares (OLS)9 in which the trusting
behaviour of first movers is regressed onto the different variables can test this. Our
results show that the three conjectures cannot be rejected at conventional significance
levels (regression 2 – 4 in Table 3.2). The most risk averse people trust 1 point less on
average on the scale from zero to ten than the least-risk averse. The most betrayal averse
people transfer on average 1.2 points less than people who are the least betrayal averse.
Controlling for the transfer expected to be payoff-maximising, a person who thinks a
transfer of ten points is payoff-maximising transfers on average 0.9 points more than a
person who thinks it is a transfer of zero points. Similarly, trust increases by 2.3 points
if the transfer expected to be inequality-minimising increases by ten points.
Further, we hypothesised that for people with social preferences the relation between
trusting behaviour and the transfer expected to be profit maximising is weaker and the
relation with the transfer expected to be inequality minimising stronger. In order to
address this question, we create an overall measure for social preferences. We have two
measures of social preferences that are betrayal aversion and altruism. We combine
these two measures into a dummy variable if a person has social preferences or not. This
variable is one if a person frequently volunteers and at the same time scores high on
betrayal aversion and zero if the opposite is true. People who only score high or low in
one of the two measures are left unclassified. We then regress trusting behaviour on the
9Estimating the model by ordered probit or tobit does not change the results
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dummy of being a U.S. resident, the two measures of expectations and their interaction
with the dummy variable for social preferences and the dummy itself. We find that both
interaction terms are significant at the 5% level and have the expected sign. For the
transfer expected to be profit maximising we find that the coefficient for people with
low social preferences is significantly positive (βˆ = 0.11 t = 3.56 p < .001) whereas
for people with strong social preferences it is significantly lower (Interaction term: βˆ =
-0.22 t = 2.92 p < .004). However the negative effect is not significantly different from
zero (F[1,810] = 2.08 p > .149). Concerning the relation of the transfer expected to
be inequality minimising with trusting behaviour; we find that it is almost double for
people with strong social preferences (Interaction term: βˆ = 0.19 t = 2.00 p < .047) than
for people with weak social preferences (βˆ = 0.21 t = 5.99 p < .001). The finding that
the influence of our measure of expectations varies with the degree of social preferences
nicely supports the validity of our measures for expectations.
Table 3.2: Determinants of trusting behaviour (first-mover transfer)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
first-mover transfer
Dummy of being 1.18?? 0.99?? 1.01?? 0.48?? 0.14 0.06
an U.S. resident (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.20)
Risk aversion: high −1.00?? −0.93?? −0.67??
(Base: low) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
Risk aversion: medium −0.62?? −0.57?? −0.50??
(0.20) (0.18) (0.18)
Betrayal aversion: med. −0.42? −0.44?? −0.30◦
(Base: low) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Betrayal aversion: high −1.20?? −1.27?? −1.03??
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32)
Transfer expected to be 0.09?? 0.09?? 0.08??
payoff-maximising (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Transfer expected to be 0.23?? 0.23?? 0.21??
inequality-minimising (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 5.64?? 6.29?? 5.96?? 3.89?? 4.85?? 3.87??
(0.11) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16) (0.26) (0.50)
Observations 1,436 1,436 1,436 1,436 1,436 1,436
Adjusted-R2 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.21
Demographics included no no no no no yes
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) reported.
◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
The stability of each of these determinants of trusting behaviour can be verified by
simultaneously controlling for the other variables. The results show that these variables
each have an influence on trust independently from each other (regression 5 in Table
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3.2). The coefficients are very similar to the regression without controlling for the other
determinants and all coefficients remain significantly different from zero. Even to control
for demographic and other control variables does not weaken the significance of these
coefficients in an important way (regression 6 in Table 3.2).
The unexplained difference in the trust level is captured in the cited regressions by
the dummy-variable of living in the United States or Germany. When controlling for
the three important determinants, the demographic and control variables, the size of
the unexplained difference in the trust level is reduced from 1.18 US$ to essentially zero
(regression 1 and 6 in Table 3.2). Most of the reduction is due to the inclusion of the
three determinants of trusting behaviour, as the coefficient in column 5 is already not
significantly different from zero. This suggests that our variables – lower risk aversion, a
lower level of betrayal aversion, and more optimistic expectations about the behaviour
of the trustee in the United States compared to Germany – fully explain the trust gap.
This indicates the importance of our determinants as discussed above. Among the
demographic variables (regression 2 in Table 3.3), a person’s income and whether the
person is living in a detached or semi-detached home have a positive influence on trusting
behaviour. People with a household income in the highest quartile transfer on average
1.14 points more than people with an income from the lowest quartile. Whether the
person is living in a detached or semi-detached home can be interpreted as a proxy
for wealth, which suggests that not only people with a high income trust more but
also wealthy individuals trust more than relatively poor people. Other demographic
variables such as gender, age, education and employment status do not influence trusting
behaviour. The control variable altruism is far from being significant and does not affect
the overall conclusion of our analysis. Being more sociable with friends, neighbours and
relatives has a marginally significant, positive effect on trust. That is, the more sociable
someone is the more trust this person has in strangers. Frequent usage of the Internet
does not affect our results either.
As found in previous research, we find an inverse u-shaped relation between trust and
age when not including other variables. Regressing age and age2 and a dummy for living
in the United States onto trusting behaviour yields a significant and positive coefficient
on age (βˆ = 0.06 p < .02) and a significant negative coefficient for age2 (βˆ = -0.001
p < .01). As soon as we control for either income or education the relation vanishes.
This suggests that the age-effects in previous studies could be partly driven by different
income or education of young and elderly. A similar result is found for the religiosity of
people. A regression of a dummy variable indicating whether people go to church and a
dummy for people living in the United States on trusting behaviour shows that people
visiting religious events exhibit higher levels of trust than people never visiting a religious
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event (βˆreligiosity = 0.44 p < .02). However, the effect is reduced and not significant any
more as we include either our measure of altruism – the frequency of volunteering in
clubs and social services – (βˆreligiosity= 0.25 p > .20) or income (βˆreligiosity = 0.27 p >
.13). Sociability is not the driving force behind the effect of altruism. Only controlling
for sociability does not render the effect of religiosity (βˆreligiosity = 0.36 p < .05). This
suggests that the relation of religiosity and trust is driven by people’s income and their
degree of altruism. We also tested for an influence of religious affiliation and the political
party people most identify with. Neither of them has a significant influence on trusting
behaviour.
We give evidence that risk aversion, betrayal aversion, and expectations are determi-
nants of trusting behaviour and that these determinants exhibit different means in the
United States and Germany. Furthermore, these variables fully explain the trust gap.
3.6 Decomposition of the Germany – United States
Trust Gap
It remains to show the relative importance of these determinants when explaining the
trust gap between the United States and Germany. With this goal we apply a decompo-
sition of the determinants for the trust gap similar to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
used to decompose wage gaps in labour economics (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). Based
on the estimation of the model with OLS one can show (appendix 3.B) that the relative
importance of an explanatory variable in explaining the trust gap is equal to the product
of the regression coefficient and the absolute difference in the mean of that variable in
Germany and the United States (columns 2 and 5 in Table 3.3). Thus the sum of these
products is exactly equal to the revealed trust gap of 1.12 points (1.18 – 0.06). The
bars in Figure 3.5 represent the relative importance of the determinants in explaining
the trust gap.
This decomposition shows that the most important determinant in explaining the
trust gap between the United States and Germany are the expectations concerning the
behaviour of the second-mover. The differences between the United States and Ger-
many in the beliefs of which transfers minimise inequality explains 43% of the trust gap.
The Germans are more pessimistic than the U.S. residents in their expectation of which
transfer is payoff-maximising, and this difference explains another 15% of the trust gap.
The lower level of betrayal aversion in the United States compared to Germany can
explain another 11% of the trust gap. The fact that U.S. residents are more prepared
to take risks than Germans explains 11%, while the lower incomes in Germany com-
pared to the United States explains 7% of the trust gap. Only 7% and 6% of the trust
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Table 3.3: Determinants of trusting behaviour (first-mover transfer)
Dep. var.: first-mover’s transfer (1) (2) mean mean
U.S.A. Germany (3)-(4) (5)*(2)
Dummy of being an U.S. resident 1.18?? 0.06 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.06
(0.16) (0.20)
Risk aversion: high (Base: low) −0.67?? 0.19 0.39 -0.20 0.14
(0.22)
Risk aversion: medium −0.50?? 0.45 0.43 0.02 -0.01
(0.18)
Betrayal aversion: medium (Base: low) −0.30◦ 0.28 0.50 -0.21 0.06
(0.17)
Betrayal aversion: high −1.03?? 0.03 0.09 -0.06 0.06
(0.32)
Transfer expected to be payoff-maximising 0.08?? 7.58 5.60 1.98 0.17
(0.02)
Transfer expected to be inequality-minimising 0.21?? 7.54 5.31 2.23 0.48
(0.02)
Dummy of being a female −0.09 0.51 0.52 -0.01 0.00
(0.16)
Age: 18 - 30 (Base: 31 - 50) 0.11 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.01
(0.25)
Age: 51 - 92 −0.09 0.45 0.50 -0.06 0.01
(0.21)
Household income: 2nd quartile 0.28 0.18 0.27 -0.09 -0.02
(Base: 1st quartile) (0.24)
Household income: 3rd quartile 0.83?? 0.19 0.20 -0.01 -0.01
(0.25)
Household income: 4th quartile 1.14?? 0.40 0.30 0.10 0.12
(0.24)
Household size −0.10 2.71 2.65 0.06 -0.01
(0.07)
Head of household −0.22 0.78 0.56 0.21 -0.05
(0.18)
Lives in a detached or semi-detached home 0.31◦ 0.73 0.50 0.23 0.07
(0.17)
Education: high school 0.12 0.61 0.68 -0.07 -0.01
(Base: less than high school) (0.23)
Education: more than high school 0.44 0.24 0.16 0.08 0.03
(0.28)
Employment status: unemployed −0.21 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.00
(Base: Employed) (0.34)
Employment status: self employed 0.23 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.01
(0.31)
Employment status: retired 0.18 0.22 0.32 -0.10 -0.02
(0.23)
Employment status: non labour market 0.33 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.02
(0.24)
Daily internet user −0.06 0.47 0.13 0.34 -0.02
(0.18)
Dummy of behaving selflessly 0.18 0.69 0.34 0.35 0.06
(0.17)
Dummy of behaving sociable 0.38◦ 0.88 0.80 0.07 0.03
(0.22)
Constant 5.64?? 3.87??
(0.11) (0.50)
Observations 1436 1436
Adjusted-R2 0.03 0.21
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) reported.
◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5 % and 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 3.5: Decomposition of the trust gap between the United States and Germany
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3.7 Ethnic Trust Gap Within The United States
As noted earlier we find large differences in the level of trust between the different ethnic
groups in the United States. People from the Caucasian populace exhibit the highest
trusting behaviour among U.S. residents and they transfer on average 65% more than
African Americans and Latinos and Latinas transfer on average 48% more than African
Americans (Table 3.4: regression 1). We analyse this ethnic trust gap with the same
explanatory variables as we used for the gap between Germany and the United States.
The most important explanations for the Germany-United States trust gap are different
expectations of the second-mover’s behaviour, followed by risk aversion, betrayal aver-
sion, income and other demographic variables. We find that African Americans have
the least optimistic expectations regarding the behaviour of the second-mover followed
by Latinos and Latinas and Caucasians (Figure 3.6). The differences between Cau-
casians and African Americans are highly significant for both the transfer expected to
be inequality-minimising (t-test; t = 3.06, p < .003, two-sided) and the transfer expected
to be payoff-maximising (t-test; t = 2.64, p < .009, two-sided). Although Caucasians
have more optimistic expectations than Latinos/Latinas and the latter more optimistic
than African Americans these differences are not significant. People from different ethnic
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groups do not have different attitudes towards risk, but have significantly different so-
cial preferences. Interestingly, on average the Caucasian populace acts less by a norm of
reciprocity than Latinos/Latinas (Mann-Whitney U-test; z = 3.38, p < .001, two-sided)
and African Americans (Mann-Whitney U-test; z = 1.98, p < .048, two-sided). From the
set of demographic variables the largest differences are unsurprisingly found in income.
The median income of the Caucasian populace is between 40,000 to 50,000 US$ and thus
substantially larger than the median income of Latinos/Latinas and African Americans
which is between 25,000 to 30,000 US$. The differences between the Caucasians and
the two other groups are highly significant (Median tests; both p < .004) whereas the
median income for African Americans and Latinos/Latinas is not different.
Figure 3.6: Differences in the determinants of trust among non-Hispanic Caucasian,
non-Hispanic African Americans and Latinos and Latinas
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In short, we find that Caucasians have on average higher expectations concerning the
transfers to be inequality-minimising and payoff-maximising, are less betrayal averse, and
have a higher income compared to African Americans. We do not find a difference in
risk aversion. We find no significant difference between the Latino populace and African
Americans. The first condition, which is that potential explanations for the trust gap
between the ethnic groups must exhibit different means for these groups, is fulfilled
for the trust gap between Caucasian and African American, but not for the trust gap
between Latinos/Latinas and African Americans.
81
3.7. Ethnic Trust Gap National and Ethnic Trust Differences
Table 3.4: Determinants of trusting behaviour within the United States
Dep. var.: First-mover’s transfer (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy for non-Hispanic Caucasians 2.10?? 2.08?? 2.02?? 1.54?? 1.46?? 1.23??
(Base: non-Hispanic African American) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.37) (0.38)
Dummy for non-Hispanic other 1.71? 1.66? 1.67? 1.28? 1.20◦ 0.97
(0.69) (0.69) (0.67) (0.64) (0.62) (0.62)
Dummy for Latino or Latina 1.65?? 1.58?? 1.73?? 1.39?? 1.39?? 1.46??
(0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49)
Risk aversion: high (Base: low) −1.13?? −1.11?? −0.82?
(0.34) (0.32) (0.32)
Risk aversion: medium −0.82?? −0.68?? −0.55?
(0.24) (0.22) (0.23)
Betrayal aversion: medium −0.78?? −0.72?? −0.55?
(Base: low) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25)
Betrayal aversion: high −1.58?? −1.76?? −1.62?
(0.59) (0.63) (0.64)
Transfer expected to be 0.06◦ 0.06◦ 0.05
payoff-maximising (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Transfer expected to be 0.29?? 0.29?? 0.27??
inequality-minimising (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Dummy of being a female −0.40◦
(0.22)
Age: 18 - 30 (Base: 31 - 50) 0.05
(0.32)
Age: 51 - 92 −0.31
(0.29)
Household income: 2nd quartile 0.34
(Base: 1st quartile) (0.32)
Household income: 3rd quartile 0.72?
(0.33)
Household income: 4th quartile 0.87?
(0.34)
Household size −0.12
(0.09)
Head of household −0.25
(0.30)
Lives in a detached or 0.52◦
semi-detached home (0.27)
Education: high school −0.06
(Base: less than high school) (0.32)
Education: more than high school 0.09
(0.39)
Employment status: unemployed −0.44
(Base: Employed) (0.47)
Employment status: self employed 0.10
(0.38)
Employment status: retired 0.06
(0.34)
Employment status: non labour market 0.11
(0.30)
Dummy of behaving selflessly 0.19
(0.25)
Dummy of behaving sociable 0.37
(0.36)
Constant 5.01?? 5.61?? 5.34?? 2.81?? 3.71?? 3.38??
(0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.41) (0.45) (0.73)
Observations 856 856 856 856 856 856
Adjusted-R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.20 0.21
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) reported.
◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
82
National and Ethnic Trust Differences 3.7. Ethnic Trust Gap
A regression analysis shows that the determinants of trusting behaviour remain the
same as discussed in the comparison between the United States and Germany (Table 3.4:
regressions 2 – 5). Among the demographic variables, income and living in a detached or
semi-detached home increase trusting behaviour (regression 6). Furthermore we find that
women transfer 0.38 points less than men, which is significant at the 10% level. The
dummy variables ‘non-Hispanic Caucasians’ and ‘Latino or Latina’ shows that these
two groups show a significantly higher level of trust compared to African Americans.
When controlling for all the variables discussed, the trust gap between Caucasian and
African Americans is reduced by 41% from 2.10 to 1.23 points and the trust gap between
Latinos/Latinas and African Americans by 12% from 1.65 to 1.46 points (Table 3.4:
regression 1 and 6).
Figure 3.7: Decomposition of the trust gap between the non-Hispanic Caucasian and
non-Hispanic African Americans
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Once again we apply the method similar to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in
analysing the relative importance of the different explanations for the trust gap be-
tween Caucasian and African Americans. This decomposition confirms that the most
important factor in explaining differences in trusting behaviour is the expectation of the
reaction of the second-mover (Figure 3.7). Different expectations make up 59% of the
explanation, which is very similar to the share of 58% in the explanation for the trust
gap between the United States and Germany. The transfer expected to be inequality-
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minimising represents 51% and the transfer expected to be payoff-maximising amounts
to 8% of the explanation. The relative importance of the former is a bit higher in this
case than in comparing the United States and Germany. The large differences in income
represent 23% and a different betrayal aversion on average amounts to 8% of the expla-
nation. The control variables explain another 8% and of minor importance in explaining
the lower level of trust among African Americans compared to Caucasian Americans are
risk aversion (1%), and other demographic variables (<1%).
3.8 Trustworthiness
We have shown that the trust gap between Germany and the United States is mainly
explained through differing expectations regarding the behaviour of the second-mover.
It is therefore interesting to analyse the behaviour of second-movers and compare this
behaviour across nations and ethnicities. We say that a second-mover is trustworthy if
his/her back-transfer makes the first-mover better off than the initial endowment of ten
US$. In our design of the game this means that to be trustworthy a second-mover has
to transfer back more than half of the received transfer of the first-mover. Controlling
for the trust placed in them, we find that U.S. Americans are slightly trustworthier
than Germans and that the degree of trustworthiness decreases with increasing levels
of trust (Figure 3.8)10. A regression analysis confirms this graphical impression. U.S.
Figure 3.8: Trustworthiness
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f t
ru
st
wo
rth
y 
pe
op
le
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Received first−mover transfer
(Level of trust: 0=lowest 10=highest)
U.S.A.      (n=571)
Germany (n=566)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Received first−mover transfer
(Level of trust: 0=lowest 10=highest)
Non−Hispanic Caucasians           (n=433)
Non−Hispanic African Americans (n=  54)
Latinos and Latinas                      (n=  50)
Americans are around 8 percentage points more likely to be trustworthy than Germans
10We control for the level of trust placed in them because a different level of trust was placed in the
second-movers in the two countries. Remember that in the United States most people transferred ten
points whereas in Germany five points was the most likely transfer. We did not plot the results for a
first-mover transfer of one and nine since there were fewer than ten observations in each country. The
average trustworthiness in Germany for a first-mover transfer of one is 90% and for nine it is 88%. In
the United States the trustworthiness is 100% for a first-mover transfer of one point and 97% for a
transfer of nine points.
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are. The level of trustworthiness decreases with increasing trust. Between a first-mover
transfer of 1 – 7 the level of trustworthiness is quite stable around 85% and then drops
dramatically. It is 32 percentage points lower for a first-mover transfer of ten points
compared to one of five points (regression 1 in Table V). Economic thinking suggests
that the decision to behave trustworthily is influenced by social preferences. There is
a positive and a negative side. On the one hand, altruistic people are expected to
behave trustworthier than selfish people and, positively reciprocal people are expected
to reciprocate and behave trustworthy when they perceive the decision of the first-mover
as fair. On the other hand, negative-reciprocal second-movers might retaliate following a
transfer perceived as unfair and thus are less likely to be trustworthy than non-negative-
reciprocal second-movers.
Table 3.5: Determinants of trustworthiness (second-mover)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dummy for behaving Received first-mover transfer . . .
trustworthy all ≥ 5 ≥ 5 < 5 < 5
Dummy of being an 0.08?? 0.07? 0.06◦ 0.09 0.10
U.S. resident (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Positive reciprocity: medium 0.06◦
(Base: low) (0.03)
Positive reciprocity: high 0.08?
(0.03)
Negative reciprocity: medium −0.10◦
(Base: low) (0.06)
Negative reciprocity: high −0.32?
(0.17)
Dummy of behaving selflessly 0.03 −0.07
(0.03) (0.06)
Dummy of being a 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01
daily internet user (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Controlled for received
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
first-mover transfer
N 1,129 960 960 169 169
Pseudo-R2 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.09
Prob(dep.var = 1) 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.85 0.85
Notes. Probit regression, marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) re-
ported. ◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively.
We measure altruistic motives and negative reciprocity in the same way as outlined
in section 3.4. Positive reciprocity is measured as the agreement to the statement ”I
am willing to accept personal costs to help someone who helped me in the past.” This
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measure is based on Perugini et al. (2003), who show that the measures for positive and
negative reciprocity are two distinct concepts. Since the reaction of second-movers can
depend on whether people perceived first-movers’ behaviour as trusting or distrusting,
we analyse the determinants of trustworthiness for those who received less than 5 US$
and those who received 5 US$ or more separately11.
Concerning the second-movers who received five or more points from the first-movers,
we find that the positive-reciprocal persons are 8 percentage points more likely to be
trustworthy. Our measure of altruism - the frequency of volunteering - has no influence
on the level of trustworthiness (regression 3 in Table V). Taken together, these variables
reduce the difference between U.S. Americans and Germans from 7 to 5 percentage
points, where the latter is only marginally significant. The analysis for the second-
movers who received less than five points is difficult because of the relatively low number
of observations. We find that high-negative reciprocal persons are 32 percentage points
less likely to be trustworthy than low-negative reciprocal persons (regression 5 in Table
V). The other variables cannot explain the variance in trustworthy behaviour if the first-
mover had a low level of trust. The different ethnic groups within the United States do
not differ in this case. 82% of the Caucasian populace, 79% of African Americans and
78% of Latinas and Latinos are trustworthy. However, due to the small number of cases,
these differences are not significant.
3.9 Conclusions
We have shown by means of two representative sample surveys, which were each com-
bined with an experiment on trust, that U.S. residents place 20% more trust in strangers
than do residents of Germany. This result in itself is of interest, since trust is widely
regarded as an important lubricant of social interactions and economic growth. Our
results might therefore indicate to some extent why we generally experienced better eco-
nomic performance in the United States compared to Germany in the last two decades.
Furthermore, and even more important, we have been able to elicit the reasons for this
trust gap. We have shown that the gap can be completely explained through differing
expectations, betrayal aversion, and risk preferences, in this order of effect size. U.S.
residents are not per se more trusting people. Germans are not generally distrustful
because they are German. However why are U.S. citizens more optimistic about the
trustworthiness of strangers? And why do Germans shrink from risks and situations in
which they might be betrayed? Clearly more research is necessary on this. Concerning
trustworthiness we have shown that Americans are more likely to behave trustworthy
11Changing the cut-off value from five to six US$ changes the coefficient estimates only minimally
86
National and Ethnic Trust Differences 3.9. Conclusions
than Germans. The difference can only partially be explained by different preferences.
A further observation might shed some light on this difference. We can check if the be-
lief about others’ trustworthiness is correlated with trustworthy behaviour. The survey
measures of trust can be interpreted as a measure for the belief in others’ trustworthi-
ness, since it is highly correlated with the belief measures in the experiment (chapter
2). The belief in others’ trustworthiness is indeed significantly correlated with the own
trustworthy behaviour (Spearman rank correlation: ρ = .07, p < .013). It seems like
the believed behaviour of others influences people’s own behaviour. Overall, our data
combining representative experimental results with extensive survey data allowed us to
find and explain differences in trust on a level heretofore unique. Whereas trust is a
topic of growing importance, previous studies tended to focus on small, selected, non-
representative numbers of subjects. They can tell us much about the organic processes
involved in trusting behaviour in individuals. Our own newly developed methodology
on the other hand allows to capture and explain the heterogeneity of trust and its deter-
minants, and thus illuminates the wider contexts by focusing on the differences between
individuals on a large scale.
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3.A Participants’ Instructions
Welcome! You are participating in a study that consists of a short decision-making
task. By completing this task, you have the chance to earn money. You are paired with
another person who also makes a decision. The exact amount of money you will earn
depends on your decision, as well as the of decision the person you are paired with. You
will receive your money in the form of a check after the study is completed.
Rules:
There are two participants.
Each participant initially receives 10 points.
Each participant can use his/her 10 points in the following ways:
• he/she can either divide up the amount between him/herself and the other partic-
ipant or
• keep the whole amount or
• transfer the whole amount to the other participant.
You will receive $1.00 for
each point that you keep.
The other participant will
receive $2.00 for each point
that you transfer.
And vice versa:
For every point that the other participant transfers to you, you will receive $2.00.
Further Instructions for First-movers
You are Participant 1, so you make the first decision.
You decide how many of your 10 points you keep and how many you want to transfer
to the other person (Participant 2).
We inform Participant 2 of your decision without letting him/her know who you are.
Participant 2 therefore knows how many points you have transferred to him/her. Then
he/she decides how many of his/her initial 10 points to transfer to you.
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Both decisions (yours and that of Participant 2) determine the amount of money that
you and Participant 2 earn. You will receive the sum of money in the form of a check.
Further Instructions for Second-movers
You are Participant 2, so you make the second decision.
Participant 1 has already began and decided how many points to keep and how many
to transfer to you. His/Her decision will be presented shortly.
Now it is your turn to decide how many of your 10 points you want to keep and how
many you want to transfer to the other person (Participant 1).
Both decisions (yours and that of Participant 1) will determine the amount of money
that you and Participant 1 will earn. You will receive the sum of money in the form of
a check.
Examples
Here are three examples:
• Each participant keeps his/her own 10 points and transfers 0 points to the other
person. In this case, each participant receives $10.00.
• Each participant keeps 0 points and transfers all 10 points to the other person. In
this case, each participant receives $20.00.
• Participant 1 keeps 3 points for himself/herself and transfers 7 points to Participant
2. We then tell Participant 2 that Participant 1 transferred 7 points. Participant
2 then decides to keep 4 points and transfers 6 points to Participant 1.
In this case, Participant 1 keeps 3 points and receives 2x6 points: 3+(2x6) = $15
Participant 2 keeps 4 points and receives 2x7 points: 4+(2x7) = $18.
First-mover Decision
How do you want to divide up your 10 points?
How many points (from 0 to 10) do you want to transfer to Participant 2 and how many
do you want to keep?
Enter an answer from 0 to 10 into each cell of the grid
I transfer . . . points
and keep . . . points
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Second-mover Decision
You are Participant 2; Participant 1 already made his/her decision and transferred
X points to you.
How do you want to divide up your 10 points?
How many points (from 0 to 10) do you want to transfer to Participant 1 and how many
do you want to keep?
Enter an answer from 0 to 10 into each cell of the grid
I transfer . . . points
and keep . . . points
Expectations of First-movers
Now, we will tell Participant 2 how many points you transferred to him/her.
Participant 2 will then decide how many points he/she transfers to you.
”What would happen if. . . ?” This well-known, everyday question interests us, too. It is
often important to predict how others will act. Therefore, we are asking you to answer
an additional question:
What would you expect Participant 2 to do in the following three examples?
Enter an answer from 0 to 10 into each cell of the grid
• If I transferred 10 points to him/her, he/she would transfer ......... points to me.
• If I transferred 5 points to him/her, he/she would transfer ........... points to me.
• If I transferred 0 points to him/her, he/she would transfer ........... points to me.
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3.B Derivation of the Decomposition
We estimate the following two equations by OLS:
trust = α0 + δ0D
USA + 0 (B.1a)
trust = α1 + δ1D
USA +X ′β + 1 (B.1b)
trust is the number of points transferred in the experiment, DUSA is the dummy variable
being 1 if a person lives in the U.S.A. and being 0 if a person lives in Germany. X is the
matrix with all the other explanatory variables and  is the error term. We are interested
in the difference of the estimated coefficients of DUSA in (1a) and (1b): (δˆ0 − δˆ1)
The estimated models (1a) and (1b) have the following properties:
¯trust = αˆ0 + δˆ0D¯
USA (B.2a)
¯trust = αˆ1 + δˆ1D¯
USA + X¯ ′βˆ (B.2b)
Conditioning all the expectations on living in Germany (DUSA = 0) yields the following:
¯trustGermany = αˆ0 (B.3a)
¯trustGermany = αˆ1 + X¯
′Germanyβˆ (B.3b)
Setting (2a) and (2b) equal:
αˆ0 + δˆ0D¯
USA = αˆ1 + δˆ1D¯
USA + X¯ ′βˆ
(δˆ0 − δˆ1)D¯USA = αˆ1 − αˆ0 + X¯ ′βˆ
(δˆ0 − δˆ1)D¯USA = αˆ1 − αˆ0 + [D¯USAX¯ ′USA + (1− D¯USA)X¯ ′Germany]βˆ
(δˆ0 − δˆ1) = [X¯ ′USA − X¯ ′Germany]βˆ + [D¯USA]−1[αˆ1 + X¯ ′Germanyβˆ − αˆ0]
The last term is equal to the difference between 3a and 3b which is equal to zero.
Therefore,
(δˆ0 − δˆ1) =
[
X¯ ′USA − X¯ ′Germany] βˆ (B.4)
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CHAPTER
FOUR
MISTRUST AND BETRAYAL: A VICIOUS CIRCLE
”The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can
make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him
untrustworthy is to distrust him.”
Henry L. Stimson (1867–1950), United States Secretary of State
4.1 Introduction
Whereas trust has been explored extensively across countries and societies, we still know
little about the dynamic aspects of trusting behaviour in time. Trust in strangers as
measured in surveys is reportedly in decline in the United States (Putnam, 2000). In
2006 trust as measured in the General Social Survey was at its lowest since 1972, re-
maining at that level in 2008. In other countries things look different. In Germany for
example, trust as measured by the World Values Survey slightly increased from 1981
to 1999 and remained at the higher level in 2006. These two cases are only exemplary
illustrations. They demonstrate that trust is not static in society but subject to dynamic
change. However, with all these reported changes what remains open is the question of
whether these changes are caused by cohort effects or are rather actual changes within
the individual participants’ level of trust. Whereas we know little about what drives
aggregate levels of trust we know even less about the dynamic aspects of trust in indi-
viduals. Before we can adequately explore country-level dynamics of trust, we need to
better understand what shapes trust on an individual level.
Related to trust on the individual level are also contributions to the public good
in charitable giving, tolerance of foreigners, acceptance of large corporations and stock-
trading behaviour (e.g. Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Dohmen et al., 2008; Guiso et al., 2008).
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It is probable that trusting people are also more likely to engage with strangers and thus
to agree to beneficial exchanges. Because of their importance for economic and social
life, it is crucial to understand these changing levels of trust. What are the causes of
decline? What breeds trust in individuals? Answers to these questions would have
implications for economic and social policies, because understanding the dynamics of
trust on the individual level would also have implications for changing levels of trust on
the aggregate level.
Based on economic theory, I showed empirically in chapter 3 that trust is related to
risk and social preferences and most importantly to expectations about others’ trust-
worthiness. Among these three factors, expectations suggest themselves as a candidate
variable that might explain changes in levels of trust. This is due to their adaptability:
expectations change when people experience new situations or simply acquire more in-
formation. Thus, changing experiences in interactions with others can be assumed to
explain changes in levels of trust. This reasoning is in line with social capital theory
(Putnam, 2000). Putnam argues:
In America blacks express less social trust than whites, the financially dis-
tressed less than the financially comfortable, people in big cities less than
small-town dwellers, and people who have been victims of a crime or been
through a divorce less than those who have not had these experiences. It is
reasonable to assume that in each case these patterns reflect actual experience
rather than different psychic predisposition’s to distrust. When such people
tell pollsters that most people cannot be trusted, they are not hallucinating -
they are merely reporting their experience. (p.138)
In this paper we focus on experience as a factor by which levels of both trust and
trustworthiness potentially change. This is not to say that there are no other factors
involved. Nonetheless, experience seems to be central to all questions trust related and
we focus on both sides of the coin: trusting and trustworthy behaviour. Thus we ask if
positive or negative experiences change a person’s trusting and trustworthy behaviour.
We explore what the mechanisms are that lead to this change in behaviour. To be
precise, we investigate if the connection between between experience and behaviour is
indeed principally captured by changing beliefs or if there are other important factors
involved.
To avoid confusion we must first clarify what we mean by the term ‘trust’. In this,
we follow James Coleman’s concept of trust (Coleman, 1990). From his perspective, the
following two points characterise the action of placing trust: First, trust implies that the
truster freely transfers assets to another person, without controlling the actions of that
other person or having the possibility to retaliate; second, there must be a potential
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gain in order to have an incentive to trust. The incentive is such that if the other
person is trustworthy, the truster is better off having trusted, and worse off if the other
person does not merit the trust placed in him/her. ‘Worse off’ can be understood in an
absolute sense where the truster ends up with less assets than initially. However it can
also be understood relatively, where ‘worse off’ is seen in relation to the other person’s
assets. Note that in this concept, trust and trustworthiness are considered to be forms
of reflected behaviour rather than personal characteristics or traits.
Despite the unquestioned importance of trust and the strong likelihood of it being
closely related to experience, very few studies investigate if and how experience affects
trust. Among these few none has established a causal relationship between experience
and trusting behaviour. For self-reported trust as collected in surveys four recent papers
are particularly worth mentioning as they focused on solving the causality issue. Olken
(forthcoming) analysed the causal effect of the introduction of television and radio on
trust in Indonesia. He finds that in regions with TV and radio reception people spend less
time participating in the life of the community and their trust is lower when compared to
regions without TV and radio reception. On the other hand, changing experiences can
be observed in panel studies. Here, the Labonne and Chase (2008) paper is interesting.
They studied the effect of the construction of roads on trust in the Philippines. Using
a panel study they find that reduced transaction costs, captured by road construction,
had a positive effect on trust in strangers but not on trust in other community members.
Dekkers (2006) tested the social capital theory prediction that associational membership
in organisations is a positive experience and therefore increases trust (Putnam, 1995).
Although cross-sectional studies frequently find such relations, Dekkers (2006) finds
no effect when analysing this relation with panel data. Analysing long-term effects of
negative experience on trust, Nunn and Wantchekon (2009) show that people from sub-
Saharan Africa whose ancestors were in danger of being caught for slavery, show lower
trust in 2005 than people whose ancestors where not affected by slave trade. Whilst
interesting, it must be kept in mind that such approaches can tell us only little about
the intermediary factors relating long ago experiences with present day levels of trust.
Whereas the latter four studies measured trust with the help of surveys, to the best of
our knowledge no study1 has yet investigated the causal effect of experience on trusting
behaviour. Moreover, there is also very little correlative evidence that experience affects
trusting behaviour. As sole exception, we must mention Bohnet and Huck (2004), who
find that in a repeated trust game the experience of trustworthiness in past rounds is
correlated with trusting behaviour in the present round. However, it is not clear if this
1Harbring (2006) studied the causal effects of incentive schemes on trusting behaviour and concen-
trated on the effect of the scheme itself rather than the experience in those schemes.
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effect is causal or not, since in the approach they used the trustworthiness a truster
experiences in past rounds depends on his/her trusting behaviour in those past rounds.
This constitutes a problem because past levels of trust are not only correlated with
experience but also with present levels of trust. A correlation of experience with present
levels of trust can thus not be disentangled from the correlation of present with past
levels of trust. Unlike in their study, the experienced trustworthiness in our approach is
independent of the individuals’ previous actions. Thus, it is possible for us to explore
the causal effects.
There is also only little empirical evidence for a correlation between experience and
trustworthy behaviour. Bohnet and Huck (2004) find no relation of experience of trust
with the propensity to behave trustworthily. This result does not allow a causal inter-
pretation for the same reason as discussed above. If one interprets the revelation of the
truster’s expectation as an experience then the following two papers are also of inter-
est. Ellingsen et al. (forthcoming) and Reuben et al. (forthcoming) analyse the effects
of revealed first-mover expectations on trustworthy behaviour. While Ellingsen et al.
(forthcoming) do not find any effect, Reuben et al. (forthcoming) do find a positive
effect. The main difference in their design is that in the latter study the first-movers
were informed that their expectation would be shown to the trustee, and in the for-
mer study the truster was not informed. This extra information could induce people to
strategically manipulate their stated beliefs, thus explaining the different results.
There is slightly more evidence that experienced trust increases reciprocal behaviour
measured by trustee’s return ratio in trust games (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2009; Ben-
Ner et al., 2007; Burks et al., 2003; Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2007; Meidinger et al.,
1999)2. In contrast, several other studies did not find any correlation (Berg et al., 1995;
Csukas et al., 2008; Willinger et al., 2003). However, we would argue that one cannot use
this data as evidence for a relation of trustworthiness and experienced trust. The reason
is that we understand trustworthiness as a discrete either or behaviour. Someone either
behaves in a trustworthy way or does not. There is no room in between3. Accordingly,
if we analyse the second-mover decision as a zero/one decision, it follows that random
second-mover behaviour would by design generate a negative relation between experi-
enced trust and the probability of being trustworthy, the line between trustworthy and
2Croson and Buchan (1999) and Glaeser et al. (2000) also find a positive relation. However due
to their slightly different design, the mere presence of fair types creates a positive relation between
experienced trust and the return ratio. Croson and Buchan (1999) allowed second-movers to use their
endowment for a back-transfer and Glaeser et al. (2000) did not give second-movers an endowment.
Either change of the design has the effect that for fair types, the return ratio is higher, the higher the
experienced trust.
3If the answer to the question if I can trust you, is ‘a little’, then my interpretation would be that
you are not trustworthy and that I had better not trust you.
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untrustworthy behaviour not lying in the middle of second-mover’s strategy space. This
explains why any result based on a cross-section analysis of second-mover behaviour in
a trust game might be biased.
In sum, levels of trust that were self-reported in a survey have been shown to change
with experience, that is, experience causally affects levels of trust. Concerning trusting
behaviour, however, there are to the best of our knowledge no studies which analyse the
causal effects of experience on trusting behaviour. In order to fill this gap we devised
a procedure which embeds an experimental trust game in a panel survey study, thus
combining the strengths of controlled behavioural measurement methods with both the
ability of establishing causality through an exogenous experience and the large data
coronary of a representative panel survey.
We measured trusting behaviour by means of an experiment - a modified trust game.
In 2004 subjects played a trust game as first-movers. Their trust was either (i) abused,
leaving them with less than than the trustee; (ii) fairly rewarded, meaning they earned
the same as the trustee; or (iii) greatly rewarded, where they earned more than the
trustee. We analyse how this exogenous experience changes people’s level of trust one
year later. We thus exclude effects of spontaneous and immediate emotional responses
to the previous experience and therefore make it hard to find an effect. Nonetheless,
we do find that a strong negative experience significantly reduces trusting behaviour.
The main channels through which experience affects behaviour are the more pessimistic
expectations about the counterpart’s behaviour following a negative experience. The
change in expectations can explain most of the influence which experience has on trust,
but not its entirety. We further find that these expectations change most for people with
low self-assurance. Moreover, once controlled for the change in expectations, people with
strong social preferences reduce their trust much more after a negative experience than
people with weak social preferences. Social preferences thus appear to be a moderator
of the relationship between experiences and trust.
The propensity to behave trustworthily in 2005 is positively influenced by an increase
from 2004 to 2005 in trust placed by the truster. Importantly, the effects of experiences
on trust and trustworthiness are not only significant, but in most cases they are also
larger in magnitude than other influencing factors, such as socio-economic characteristics
and changes thereof.
We proceed with the description of the design of the study (section 4.2), followed by
the results on trusting behaviour (section 4.3) and on trustworthy behaviour (section
4.4), and finally the conclusions.
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4.2 Experimental Design
We measure trust and trustworthiness by using a trust game based on the design by Berg
et al. (1995). There are two players, a first- and a second-mover. Both get an endowment
of 10 Euros. The first-mover decides on how many of the 10 Euros he/she would like to
transfer to the second-mover. Every Euro transferred is doubled by the experimenter.
If the first-mover, for example, transfers 4 Euros, the second-mover receives 8 Euros.
Then the second-mover decides on how much of his/her original endowment of 10 Euros
he/she would like to send back. Again, every transfer is doubled by the experimenter.
If both players are rational and selfish the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is not to
send anything back as a second-mover and for the first-mover to transfer nothing. If the
second-movers are for example inequity averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or reciprocal
(Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), then their back-transfer might be positive and thus the
first-movers have an incentive to transfer a positive amount even if they are completely
selfish. If both players transfer the whole endowment to the other player then both
earn more than their initial endowment. However, the first-mover decision is a risky
decision, in which the outcome depends on the behaviour of the second-mover. That is
why we call the first-mover decision a trusting decision, a subset of risky decisions. The
more he/she transfers to the second-mover the more he/she trusts and thus becomes
a truster. The second-mover on the other hand can behave trustworthily or not. We
say that someone behaves trustworthily if their back-transfer is at least as high as what
they received from the truster. With ‘received transfer’ we always refer to the amount
transferred before it was doubled. The reasons why we chose this definition are twofold.
On the one hand, the design of our trust game is completely symmetric and thus if the
back-transfer is equal to the first-mover transfer, both players earn the same amount.
On the other hand, this is actually the most likely outcome in the game. In 2005, 42%
of trustees transferred the same amount back as they received, 33% transferred back
less and 25% transferred back more than they received. Furthermore, when asked about
what trusters expect back from the trustees in case they sent 0, 5 or 10 points, the modal
expected back-transfer was 0, 5 and 10 points. Thus we think it is natural to assume
that people perceive a back-transfer that is equal to their own transfer as trustworthy
behaviour.
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Exogenous variation of trusters’ experience
The exogenous variation of trusters’ experience is created by playing the trust game
twice4. The two games were played in spring 2004 and spring 2005. Thus, in the 2004
trust game trusters experienced if the trustees behaved trustworthily towards them or
not. Since trusters are randomly matched with a new trustee in the next year, their
experience is exogenous to their level of trust, and we analyse if the exogenous experience
in 2004 changed their level of trust. If the second-mover was not trustworthy in 2004,
we say the truster had a negative experience. If the trustee was just trustworthy, that
is, he/she sent back the same amount as received, we say this is a neutral experience.
In case the trustees were trustworthy and sent back more than received, we say this is
a positive experience. The long time span between the two games prevents spontaneous
and immediate emotional responses to the previous experience affecting behaviour. If
we find a significant effect it would be a strong indicator that experience does indeed
affect trusting behaviour.
In order to ensure that the experience is fully exogenous to behaviour, we restrict
our analysis to those trusters who transferred half of their endowment to the trustee
in 2004. All our subjects therefore have the same starting level of trust, eliminating
any possibility of a correlation between experience and past trusting behaviour. This
enables us to study how changes in their trust is affected by an exogenous manipulation
of experience. In addition to preventing any endogeneity problems, this restriction also
excludes the possibility that any effect might be driven by ‘regression toward the mean’
rather than a causal effect of experience. For any level of trust other than 5 points we
cannot rule out that the results would be biased due to a ‘regression toward the mean’
effect. Thus, causal inference requires the restriction described above. The drawback of
this restriction is that our sample is not a fully random sample anymore. We explore
the existence of any observable biases below.
Exogenous variation of trustees’ experience
The exogenous variation of trustees’ experiences is implemented in the following way.
In 2004 and 2005 the trusters placed a certain level of trust into the trustees. Thus, the
trust placed in a certain trustee either increases, decreases or is stable between the two
years. We analyse if the change in the level of trust placed in trustees influences the
probability that trustees behave trustworthily in 2005. In order to prevent a ‘regression
towards the mean’ effect we restrict the analysis to trustees who received 5 points from
4Subjects actually played the trust game three times. We can only analyse the last two games
because we did not elicit expectations in the first trust game.
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the truster in 2005. If a second-mover decided randomly, the probability that this second-
mover behaves trustworthily would decrease with higher levels of trust. This restriction
is not necessary because our design is slightly different than the standard trust game
where this would also be necessary5. This is also the reason why we analysed levels of
trustworthiness in 2005 and not the change in trustworthiness over the two years.
The subjects of the experiments are a random sub-sample of the adult (age > 17)
respondents in sample F of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP
is a household panel study representative of the German population (Wagner et al.,
2007). Sample F is the largest sample (n = 7,243) of the SOEP and was randomly drawn
from the German population in 2000. 1,202 respondents participated in the experiment,
and 594 were assigned to be first-movers and 608 to be second-movers. Among the
second-movers 234 received 5 points in 2005 and were thus the trustees selected for
our analysis. Note that since the amount of points trustees receive is independent of
Table 4.1: Socio-economic characteristics of the experimental sample
Our sample 2005 SOEP
first- second- 2005
mover mover
Women (in percent) 47.5 53.8 52.8
Average age (in years) 53.9 51.0 49.1
Average household income (in 1,000 Euros) 33.1 32.8 34.2
Average household size (in persons) 2.6 2.6 2.7
Education (in percent) less than high school 15.3 18.8 18.1
high school 69.0 64.5 64.9
more than high school 15.7 16.7 17.0
Employment status employed 46.7 48.7 48.9
(in percent) self-employed 4.1 6.4 5.7
unemployed 6.2 7.7 5.9
non labour market/retired 43.0 37.2 39.5
Resident 1989 in West Germany 74.4 81.2 72.1
(in percent) East Germany 20.2 13.2 22.6
Abroad 5.4 5.6 5.4
German nationality (in percent) 95.9 94.0 95.7
Marital status (in percent) Married 69.2 61.5 59.4
Single 15.7 19.7 23.9
Divorced/separated 8.3 11.1 9.4
Widowed 6.6 7.7 7.3
Number of observations 242 234 7,243
their own actions and characteristics, the sample of trustees remains a randomly drawn
5Although it is possible to analyse how reciprocity depends on experienced trust but not the exact
relation between trustworthiness and experienced trust.
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sample of the SOEP. This is different for the first-movers. Among the first-movers
242 transferred half of their endowment in 2004 and were thus the trusters selected
for our analysis. This selection is based on their level of trust. In order to see if and
how our experimental samples differ we compare their socio-economic characteristics
with those of sample F of the SOEP (Table 4.1), which is a random sample of the
German population. Both sub-samples, the first-mover and the second-mover sample,
closely follow the distribution of the German population as a whole with a few minor
exceptions.
4.3 The Effect of Experienced Trustworthiness on
Trusting Behaviour
We examine the extent to which negative or positive experiences affect trusting be-
haviour. To test this we regress the change of trust between 2004 and 2005 on to the
positive or negative experience in 2004 using OLS6. We find that if trusters are betrayed
in 2004, which is exogenous to their decision in 2004, trusters’ trust decreases in 2005
compared to 2004 (Regression 1 in Table 4.2). A received back-transfer of zero in 2004
reduced trust by almost 1 point on average, that is, 20% of the previous year’s trust.
Furthermore, we control for socio-economic changes such as changes in income, the em-
ployment status, whether a person moved home, and bereavement (partner, mother or
father). We find that the coefficient of negative experience hardly changes and is still
significant at the 5% level when controlling for these changes (Regression 2 in Table
4.2). Concerning the socio-economic changes we find that even a 100% increase in the
household income between the years increases trust only by 0.52 points. Similarly, mov-
ing home and changes in employment or retirement status also do not have particularly
strong effects, suggesting that last year’s experience has a very fundamental influence
on behaviour that is more influential than important changes in life conditions. Further
controlling for socio-economic characteristics does not affect the influence of the negative
experience on trust (Regression 3 in Table 4.2). The coefficient of negative experience
is slightly smaller but remains significant at the 5% level.
A positive experience, however, does not increase trust. The coefficient is almost zero
and far from being significant. Thus we find that a lack of trustworthiness (negative
experience) decreases people’s trust, and very kind behaviour (positive experience) has
no effect on people’s trust.
Next, we analyse if the influence of the negative experience depends on its magnitude,
6Taking into consideration that trusters could maximally increase their trust by 5 points we run a
tobit regression. The results are essentially the same as with OLS.
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Table 4.2: Experience affects trusting behaviour
Dep. var.: change in trust (1) (2) (3)
Negative experience [1 5] (Base: neutral experience) −0.24? −0.23? −0.21?
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Positive experience [1 5] 0.03 0.02 0.05
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Change in log HH income adj. for HH-size 0.49? 0.51?
(0.21) (0.22)
Is newly employed −0.97 −1.16
(0.73) (0.76)
Is newly unemployed −0.54 0.92
(0.85) (1.08)
Is newly non-labour market/retired 0.54 0.56
(0.69) (0.74)
Has moved home −1.29◦ −1.31◦
(0.74) (0.74)
Bereavement (partner, mother or father) 0.42 0.21
(0.92) (0.97)
Log household income adjusted for HH-size 0.55◦
(0.33)
Employment status: unemployed (Base: employed) −1.23
(0.76)
Employment status: self-employed 0.52
(0.69)
Employment status: non labour market/retired 0.29
(0.43)
Dummy of being female −0.44
(0.28)
Age 0.02
(0.06)
Age2 −0.00
(0.00)
High school (Base: less than high school) 0.42
(0.43)
More than high school 0.82
(0.53)
Resident in East Germany in 1989 (Base: West Germany) −0.31
(0.35)
Resident abroad in 1989 0.05
(0.65)
Foreign nationality 0.94
(0.72)
Marital status: single (Base: married) 0.44
(0.53)
Marital status: divorced 0.16
(0.51)
Marital status: widowed 0.44
(0.61)
Constant 0.54?? 0.56?? −5.43
(0.15) (0.16) (3.59)
Observations 242 242 242
Adjusted-R2 0.02 0.04 0.08
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) reported.
◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Negative and positive experience is defined as the difference between the level of
trust and the received back-transfer in 2004.
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i.e. if the effect of a small negative experience differs from the effect of large negative
experience. In order to analyse this, we create two new dummy variables. One takes the
value of 1 if the difference between last year’s transfer and the received transfer is either
1 or 2 and the other dummy variable takes the value 1 if the difference is 3,4, or 5 points.
We chose these groups because with a difference of 1 or 2 points the truster earns more
than his initial endowment of 10 Euros, whereas for a larger difference his/her earnings
are lower than 10 Euros. Thus, the latter is a measure for a strong negative experience
Figure 4.1: The effect of experienced trustworthiness on trust
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Notes. The bars represent the mean change in trust from 2004 to 2005, aligned by the experience
in 2004. The bars illustrate the mean difference in the change of trust compared to the baseline
group, who received the same back-transfer as what they had sent. The error bars denote +/-
the standard error of the mean.
and the former for a weak one. This equates with absolute and relative untrustworthiness
as introduced in section 4.1. We find that people who are exposed to a weak negative
experience do not change their level of trust compared to a ‘neutral’ experience (Figure
4.1 and regression 1 in Table 4.3). However, those who were exposed to a strong negative
experience reduce their trust by 0.5 points. Compared to an increase of 0.5 points for
people with a ‘neutral’ experience this is a difference of almost 1 point. Note that the
size of the effect of the highest possible negative experience (-5 points) is about the same
with both the linear and non-linear model.
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Table 4.3: Strong and weak experience
Dep. var.: change in trust (1)
Negative experience: strong [3 5] (Base: neutral) −0.98?
(0.44)
Negative experience: weak [1 2] 0.02
(0.43)
Positive experience: strong [3 5] 0.18
(0.57)
Positive experience: weak [1 2] 0.49
(0.49)
Constant 0.46??
(0.16)
Observations 242
Adjusted-R2 0.01
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and standard errors (in
parentheses) reported. ◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance
on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
In sum, we find that experienced untrustworthiness results in a strong and significant
negative decrease in trusting behaviour. This effect does not change when including
socio-economic changes and characteristics.
4.3.1 What drives the change in trust?
The question arises why people change their trust based on one interaction that happened
a year ago? Remember that participants are explicitly told on the decision sheet that
the trustee/truster will be a different person than last year. This rules out possible
reputation effects. However, playing a trust game is something new for the vast majority
of people in this world. Thus, trusters do not really know how others behave in the role
of trustees in a trust game. People may have only a vague idea on how many people are
trustworthy. Thus every experience is valuable information and people should update
their prior beliefs with this new information.
In order to test if trusters updated their beliefs based on their experience in the
trust game, we also measured trusters’ beliefs about the behaviour of trustees. We
confronted them with three hypothetical situations. What would they expect the trustee
to transfer back if they transferred 0, 5, or 10 points? Since we measured expectations
in both years7, we can analyse if the expected back-transfer is affected by the subjects’
7The expected back-transfer at a first-mover transfer of 5 points was only asked in 2005. For the
analysis in Table 4.4, we imputed the expectation for 2004 based on the expectation at 0 and 10 points
assuming a linear relationship.
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Table 4.4: Experience affects beliefs
Dependent variable: at a first-mover transfer of ...
change in expected back-transfer 0 points 5 points 10 points
Negative experience [1 5] −0.38? −0.36? −0.33?? −0.31?? −0.33? −0.30?
(Base: neutral experience) (0.18) (0.18) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13)
Positive experience [1 5] 0.26 0.35 −0.14 −0.10 −0.12 −0.15
(0.22) (0.22) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16)
Change in log household income 0.56 −0.61 −0.95
(adjusted for household size) (0.39) (0.58) (0.72)
Is newly employed −1.56 −1.47◦ −0.31
(1.30) (0.78) (0.98)
Is newly unemployed 0.89 −0.60 0.85
(2.19) (1.33) (1.46)
Is newly non-labour market/retired −0.97 −0.97 −0.01
(1.26) (0.75) (0.95)
Has moved home −0.46 −0.70 −0.17
(1.35) (0.80) (0.96)
Bereavement (partner, mother, father) −0.74 0.34 1.97
(1.67) (1.00) (1.25)
Log HH income adjusted for HH-size −0.08 −0.02 0.20
(0.58) (0.38) (0.48)
Employment status: unemployed 0.62 1.08 −0.85
(Base: employed) (1.35) (0.87) (0.98)
Employment status: self-employed 1.51 0.85 0.27
(1.26) (0.75) (0.95)
Employment status: non labour market −0.00 0.08 0.36
and retired (0.74) (0.44) (0.55)
Dummy of being female −1.58?? −0.21 0.43
(0.49) (0.29) (0.37)
Age 0.00 −0.11 −0.02
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08)
Age2 −0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
High school −1.61? −0.37 0.32
(Base: less than high school) (0.75) (0.45) (0.57)
More than high school −0.60 0.37 0.69
(0.93) (0.55) (0.70)
Resident in East Germany in 1989 0.47 −0.09 0.31
(Base: West Germany) (0.63) (0.38) (0.47)
Resident abroad in 1989 0.78 −0.19 0.29
(1.15) (0.69) (0.83)
Foreign nationality −0.69 0.10 −0.63
(1.27) (0.76) (0.93)
Marital status: single 1.22 0.16 0.21
(Base: married) (0.91) (0.54) (0.68)
Marital status: divorced 0.16 −0.02 0.25
(0.95) (0.58) (0.70)
Marital status: widowed −0.53 0.21 0.22
(1.09) (0.65) (0.82)
Constant 0.39 3.35 0.47?? 4.43 −0.50? −1.92
(0.27) (6.27) (0.16) (3.96) (0.19) (5.02)
Observations 231 231 231 231 232 232
Adjusted-R2 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.02 −0.00
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) reported.
◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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experiences.
We run an OLS regression in which we regressed the change of the expected back-
transfers on to the experience and other control variables. We find that a negative
experience in 2004 decreases the amount of points trusters expect back from the trustees
in 2005 for all three transfer levels (Table 4.4). The expected back-transfer for a first-
mover transfer of 10 and 5 points reduces by 1.5 points after a strong negative experience,
the expectation at 0 points by 1.8 points. A positive experience does not influence the
expectations in any significant way. Concerning socio-economic changes we do not find
any strong effects. We find a marginally significant negative effect for newly employed
people.
In sum, we showed that the experience in the trust game in 2004 affected trusting
behaviour and we showed that it affects expectations about the trustworthiness of the
second-mover. It is now interesting to see if the influence of the experience on behaviour
is fully explained by changed expectations. We therefore regress the change in trusting
behaviour on the experience in 2004 and the change of expectations.
For the expectations we created two measures which are easier to interpret than the
raw expected back-transfer. For every person, we regressed the three expected back-
transfers on the respective first-mover transfers. If a person expected the same amount
back than what he/she sent, the slope of the fitted line would be one and the constant
would be zero. The slope and the constant have a straightforward interpretation. The
latter can be thought of as measuring expected generosity and the slope the expected
reciprocity. Thus, one would predict that the higher the expected generosity and reci-
procity is, the higher the truster’s transfer. As expected, the changes in expectations
have a significant influence on the change in trusting behaviour (Regression 2 in Table
4.5). A 1 point increase in expected generosity significantly increases trusting behaviour
by 0.19 points and an increase in the expected reciprocity from 0 to 1 increases trusting
behaviour by 1.72 points.
To see if experience directly influences trusting behaviour or only expectations, we
regress the change in trusting behaviour on 2004’s experience and the change in expec-
tations. We find that the coefficient of negative experience decreases from 0.26 to 0.20
when controlling for the change in expectations (Regression 1 and 3 in Table 4.5). How-
ever, the influence of negative experience is still significant at the 5%-level. Controlling
for socio-economic changes slightly reduces the coefficient of negative experience to 0.19
and is now only significant at the 10%-level (Regression 4 in Table 4.5). Further con-
trolling for socio-economic characteristics does not change the results in an important
way (Regression 5 in Table 4.5). To compare the magnitude of the experience and the
expectations effect, we also perform the same analysis with standardised coefficients.
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Table 4.5: Change in trusting behaviour
Dependent variable: change in trusting behaviour (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Negative experience [1 5] (Base: neutral experience) −0.26? −0.20? −0.19◦ −0.17◦
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Positive experience [1 5] 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.08
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Change in expected generosity [-10 10] 0.19?? 0.16? 0.16? 0.16?
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Change in expected reciprocity [-2 2] 1.72?? 1.56?? 1.58?? 1.69??
(0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.41)
Change in log HH income adj. for HH-size 0.11 −0.63
(0.48) (0.54)
Is newly employed −0.85 −0.90
(0.70) (0.72)
Is newly unemployed 0.22 1.12
(0.98) (1.21)
Is newly non-labour market/retired 0.78 0.81
(0.66) (0.70)
Has moved home −0.83 −0.71
(0.74) (0.75)
Bereavement (partner, mother or father) 0.62 0.15
(0.88) (0.93)
Log household income adjusted for HH-size 0.97??
(0.36)
Employment status: unemployed (Base: employed) −0.70
(0.76)
Employment status: self-employed −0.49
(0.70)
Employment status: non labour market/retired 0.16
(0.41)
Dummy of being female −0.19
(0.28)
Age −0.01
(0.06)
Age2 0.00
(0.00)
High school (Base: less than high school) 0.57
(0.42)
More than high school 0.81
(0.52)
Resident in East Germany in 1989 (Base: West Germany) −0.23
(0.35)
Resident abroad in 1989 0.09
(0.64)
Foreign nationality 1.37◦
(0.70)
Marital status: single (Base: married) −0.03
(0.50)
Marital status: divorced 0.33
(0.52)
Marital status: widowed 0.72
(0.61)
Constant 0.56?? 0.38?? 0.47?? 0.46?? −9.12?
(0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (3.70)
Observations 230 230 230 230 230
Pseudo-R2 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.13
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) reported.
◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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The results clearly reveal that the change in expectations is the most important channel
for a change in trust behaviour: For example, an increase in expected reciprocity by one
standard deviation increases trust by 0.79 points, but an increase in negative experiences
by one standard deviation decreases trust only by 0.25 points.
Thus, negative experiences have an important effect on trusting behaviour through
their impact on belief formation, i.e. on expectations; but beyond this, they have a
further independent effect on trusting behaviour. Based on economic theory one would
suggest that apart from expectations, preferences determine behaviour. Among the more
important preferences determining trusting behaviour are risk and social preferences (see
chapter 3). We explore if these preferences moderate the remaining effect of experience
on trusting behaviour. Besides discussing this possibility in the next section we will also
investigate for what types of people the belief formation channel is important.
4.3.2 Attitudes, types and preferences
In the previous section we showed that negative experience induces a change in be-
haviour. A question arising at this point is if everyone was affected in the same way by
such experiences or whether we can identify systematic differences. The answer to this
question is important to gain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that contribute
to a self-reinforcing or self-destroying propagation of trust or mistrust within a society.
What types of people are most likely to change their expectations? One would expect
that people who have low self-assurance are more likely to change their expectation based
on new information. We use two proxies for self-assurance. On the one hand, we measure
the degree of worry about an individual’s financial situation and his/her health condition
and calculated the mean answer to these two questions. This gives us an indication of
how much a person worries about his/her own situation. On the other hand we use
the agreement to the statement ‘How my life goes depends on me’ as a proxy for self-
assurance. The higher the agreement to this statement the less likely we expect a person
to change their expectations.
We find that people who show low self-assurance (lots of worries and disagreement
with the statement) change their expectations much more than those with high self-
assurance (Table 4.6). In detail, an increase by one standard deviation in people’s
worries increases the effect of a strong negative experience from -2.72 to -4.47 points for
the expectation at 10 points. Conversely, an increase by one standard deviation in the
agreement to the statement ‘How my life goes depends on me’ reduces the effect of a
strong negative experience from -2.72 to -0.05 points (Regression 3 in Table 4.6). The
changes in expectations at 0 and 5 points do not significantly depend on self-assurance.
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Table 4.6: Self-assurance mediates the change in expectations
Dep. var.: change in expected back-transfer at a first-mover transfer of ...
0 points 5 points 10 points
Negative experience: strong [3 5] (Base: neutral) −1.26? −1.42?? −2.72??
(0.61) (0.50) (0.83)
Worried * strong negative experience −0.30 −0.27 −1.75?
(0.59) (0.48) (0.80)
Life control * strong negative experience −0.58 −0.19 2.67?
(0.80) (0.66) (1.08)
Negative experience: weak [1 2] 0.11 0.12 −0.27
(0.55) (0.46) (0.74)
Worried * weak negative experience −0.98 −0.38 0.57
(0.60) (0.49) (0.81)
Life control * weak negative experience 1.39? 0.17 −0.64
(0.59) (0.49) (0.80)
Positive experience: strong [3 5] −0.40 −0.52 1.50
(0.76) (0.66) (1.03)
Positive experience: weak [1 2] −0.24 −0.21 0.47
(0.61) (0.50) (0.82)
Worried about own finances and health (std.) 0.01 0.14 0.31
(0.19) (0.15) (0.25)
How my life goes depends on me (std.) −0.07 0.01 −0.03
(0.18) (0.16) (0.26)
Constant −0.54? 0.42? 0.36
(0.21) (0.17) (0.28)
Observations 231 230 230
Adjusted-R2 0.02 0.01 0.06
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) reported.
◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
As we have seen above, the change in expectations cannot fully capture the effect
of experience on trusting behaviour. That is, negative experience affects behaviour in
some way which is independent of expectations. In order to gain further insights into
this remaining unexplained influence of experience on trusting behaviour, we consider if
different types of preferences moderate this remaining effect. Specifically we explore risk
and social preferences which have been shown to influence trusting behaviour (chapter
3). We use a survey question shown to be a valid measure (Dohmen et al., forthcoming;
Roe et al., 2009) for capturing risk preferences. Therein people rate their risk aversion
on a scale from 0 to 10. Regarding social preferences we measure two aspects. On
the one hand we measure betrayal aversion, which is shown to be related to trusting
behaviour (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). As a proxy for betrayal aversion we measure
how strongly people obey a norm of negative reciprocity. This survey measure was
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developed by Perugini et al. (2003). On the other hand we consider the desire for an
appreciation of one’s kind actions towards others as a measure for social preferences.
Since appreciation of one’s engagement is often the only reward/incentive for voluntary
work, volunteering promises to be a good proxy for measuring this concept. We measure
how frequently people volunteer in clubs and social services. In order to differentiate the
desire for an appreciation from pure socialising we include the frequency of socialising
with friends and relatives.
We now regress the change in trusting behaviour on the experience and its interaction
with risk and social preferences while controlling for the change in expectations. We
find that the degree of risk aversion does not influence the impact of experience on
trusting behaviour. However, after a strong negative experience, betrayal-averse people
exhibit a 2.31 points lower trust level compared to the baseline group, i.e. people with
low social preferences who had a strong negative experience. The interaction effect
‘negative experience x volunteering’ is even stronger. Volunteers’ level of trust is 3.4
points lower than the baseline group. Thus, since the effect of experiences on trust differs
substantially depending on people’s social preferences, it appears that social preferences
are strong moderators of the effect of experience on trust.
The question arises how to interpret this result. Why do people with social prefer-
ences react differently to experience than others? A possible answer is offered by the
‘Discovered Preference Hypothesis’ (DPH) first introduced by Plott (1996). According
to this hypothesis people are not fully aware of their preferences, or they do not know
that a certain preference is relevant to a particular situation. Through experience people
become aware of what their preferences really are or they discover that a certain pref-
erence also matters in a new situation (Braga and Starmer, 2005; Loomes et al., 2003;
Plott, 1996; Smith, 1994). Plott (1996) noted:
The hypothesis suggests that attitudes like expectations, beliefs, risk-aversion
and the like, are discovered, as are other elements of the environment. People
acquire an understanding of what they want through a process of reflection
and practice. (p. 227)
In other words, people who are confronted with a decision that is new to them do not
yet know their own preferences for that particular situation very well. Experiencing the
consequences of one’s own actions in such a situation shapes an individual’s preferences
or enables people to discover that they have a certain preference. Clearly, the DPH offers
possible interpretations for our results. Participation in a trust game is an unusual and
new experience for most people. Therefore, people might initially have only a vague
sense of how they might feel in case their trust is rewarded or abused. They might then
go on to discover in their first experiences of the set-up that they do not like to be taken
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Table 4.7: Preferences mediate influence of experience
Dep. var.: change in trust (1) (2)
Negative experience: strong [3 5] (Base: neutral) −0.78◦ 0.59
(0.44) (0.76)
Risk aversion * strong negative experience 0.54
(0.46)
Betrayal aversion * strong negative experience −1.72?
(0.85)
Volunteering * strong negative experience −2.81??
(0.99)
Socialising * strong negative experience 0.58
(0.86)
Negative experience: weak [1 2] −0.22 −1.71?
(0.42) (0.81)
Risk aversion * weak negative experience −0.47
(0.49)
Betrayal aversion * weak negative experience 1.29
(0.91)
Volunteering * weak negative experience 0.82
(0.86)
Socialising * weak negative experience 1.55◦
(0.88)
Positive experience: strong [3 5] 0.19 0.19
(0.61) (0.60)
Positive experience: weak [1 2] 0.35 0.43
(0.46) (0.46)
Change in expected generosity [-10 10] 0.16? 0.17?
(0.07) (0.07)
Change in expected reciprocity [-2 2] 1.52?? 1.45??
(0.37) (0.38)
Risk aversion (std.) −0.04
(0.15)
Betrayal aversion (Dummy) 0.09
(0.30)
Dummy of volunteering at least sometimes 0.49◦
(0.29)
Dummy of socialising at least weekly −0.11
(0.29)
Constant 0.48?? 0.29
(0.16) (0.26)
Observations 228 228
Adjusted-R2 0.08 0.11
Notes. OLS regression, coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) reported.
◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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advantage of in this particular situation. In other words, they might find out that they
do indeed care. In this light, our results can be interpreted insightfully: Experienced
untrustworthiness makes people aware that they do not like to be taken advantage of, nor
do they take lightly the non-appreciation of their trust, even in this particular setting.
Returning to the original question, we showed that after a strong negative experience,
people who lack self-assurance are more likely to adjust their expectations about the
behaviour of the trustee. Furthermore, we showed that, controlled for a change in
expectations, betrayal-aversion as well as the desire for appreciation for kind actions
strongly increase the impact of a strong negative experience.
4.4 The Effect of Trust on Trustworthy Behaviour
The question whether an increase of trust is rewarded with a higher probability of trust-
worthy behaviour has provoked several studies, as discussed in section 4.1. However, as
we have discussed, the approaches taken cannot convincingly show a causal relationship,
the main reason being that the design of the trust game is not suitable for a cross-section
analysis of the question of interest. In order to solve this problem we took the following
approach.
We exogenously increased the trust placed in randomly selected panel participants
from one year to the next. We then analysed if the probability of trustworthiness is
higher for those people in whom more trust was placed in 2005 than in 2004, compared
to people who received the same level of trust in 2004 and 2005. Thus we ask the
following question: Does the experience of a higher level of trust than earlier increase
the probability of being trustworthy compared to the experience of a constant level of
trust?
To ensure that the change in trust is not endogenous to the observation of trustwor-
thiness, we select a group which is characterised by all having received the same level
of trust in 2005, namely 5 points, from the whole population of second-movers. Thus,
the only difference between the second-movers in our sample is that they experienced a
different level of trust a year earlier in 2004. It was common knowledge that the trust
was placed by two different first-movers. Since the time-span of one year between the
two placements of trust is quite long, we again exclude short-term emotional responses
and reduce a potential experimenter demand effect. If we still find an effect this will then
be a strong indicator that there is a relation between a change in trust and trustworthy
behaviour.
We regress a dummy variable that indicates if someone behaved trustworthily8 or not
8As outlined in section 4.2 someone is defined to be trustworthy if her/his back-transfer is at least
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Table 4.8: Influence of Experienced Change in Trust on Trustworthiness
Dep. variable: Dummy for Behaving Trustworthy (1)
Increase in trust: strong [3 5] (Base: no change in trust) 0.15?
(0.05)
Increase in trust: weak [1 2] −0.12
(0.09)
Decrease in trust: strong [-3 -5] 0.09
(0.06)
Decrease in trust: weak [-1 -2] 0.06
(0.09)
Change in log HH income adj. for HH-size 0.03
(0.10)
Has moved home −0.04
(0.11)
Log household income adjusted for HH-size 0.02
(0.06)
Employment status: unemployed (Base: employed) −0.15
(0.13)
Employment status: non labour market/retired −0.02
(0.08)
Dummy of being female 0.01
(0.06)
Age −0.00
(0.01)
Age2 0.00
(0.00)
High school (Base: less than high school) 0.09
(0.08)
More than high school 0.15◦
(0.06)
Resident in East Germany in 1989 (Base: West Germany) −0.03
(0.08)
Resident abroad in 1989 −0.01
(0.13)
Foreign nationality −0.01
(0.12)
Marital status: single (Base: married) −0.09
(0.10)
Marital status: divorced −0.11
(0.11)
Marital status: widowed −0.09
(0.14)
N 234
Pseudo-R2 0.11
Prob(dep.var = 1) 0.80
Notes. Probit regression, marginal effects and standard errors (in
parentheses) reported. ◦, ?, ?? denote statistical significance on the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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in 2005 on the change of trust placed in these trustees from 2004 to 2005 and on socio-
economic controls9. Based on a probit regression, we find that 80% of second-movers
behave trustworthily if the trust placed in them did not change over the time interval.
If the trust strongly increased from 2004 to 2005 (3 to 5 points) the probability that a
second-mover is trustworthy also increases significantly from 80% to 95% (Regression 1
in Table 4.8). A small increase (1 to 2 points) decreases the probability to 68%, but
this effect is not significant. A decrease in trust over one year hardly changed trust-
worthy behaviour. Socio-economic characteristics have almost no explanatory power for
trustworthy behaviour. We find a weak positive effect of education and a weak effect of
religion in that Catholics are more likely to be trustworthy than Protestants.
In sum we find that a strong increase in trust is rewarded with an increased trust-
worthiness compared with no change in trust. A small increase in trust is not rewarded.
Interestingly, we find again that the effect of a positive experience is stronger than the
effect of the socio-economic characteristics included.
On the question why people respond with higher trustworthiness when trust in-
creases, we can only speculate. One possible mechanism is that people reciprocate with
a higher trustworthiness to an increase in trust placed in them. Note that in 2005 the
trust experienced by all the second-movers in our sample is the same. The only differ-
ence is the trust placed in them in 2004. Since we made it very clear that the first-mover
is a different person than the year before10, the first-mover’s action in 2005 is evalu-
ated based on the experienced first-mover decision a year earlier. This is not surprising
against the background that playing a trust game is a new situation for respondents
and a second-mover cannot evaluate first-movers’ behaviour against a long experience
with other first-movers. Based on this reasoning one can conclude that an increase in
trust increases trustworthiness in those circumstances where trustees perceive the level
of trust they receive as higher than what they ‘normally’ receive.
4.5 Conclusions
Because of the importance of trust for many economic and social relationships it is
important to understand how levels of trust change over time and to understand the
mechanisms that contribute to a self-reinforcing or self-destroying propagation of trust
or mistrust within a society. Theoretically, experience of untrustworthiness is claimed
to be an important force that drives changes in trust. However, to the best of our
as big as the transfer received from the truster.
9Some socio-economic variables were not included due to too few observations per category.
10It was written in bold in the instructions and a second time on the decision sheet
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knowledge, there is no empirical, causal evidence on whether experience can actually
change trusting behaviour. In this chapter we address this gap by exploring whether an
exogenous experience of untrustworthiness changes trusting behaviour.
We demonstrated that experienced untrustworthiness causes a significant decrease in
trusting behaviour. This effect is independent of important socio-economic changes such
as changes in income and employment status. We find that the main channel through
which experience affects trusting behaviour is by beliefs. An experience of untrustworthi-
ness decreases the belief about others’ trustworthiness which in turn decreases trusting
behaviour. The change in beliefs is strongest for people of low self-assurance. However,
the effect of experienced untrustworthiness on behaviour cannot be fully explained by
changing beliefs. It is unclear what precisely the remaining effect is. However, we do
find that it is strongly moderated by social preferences. It is strongest for people with
pronounced social preferences and inexistent for people with weak social preferences. A
possible interpretation we offer is in relation to the ‘Discovered Preference Hypothesis’:
Through experience people discover that their social preferences are indeed salient in
the situation of the experimental trust game, leading them to adapt their behaviour
in the later game. An indication of this result’s importance can perhaps be found in
the fact that the magnitude of the effect of experience on trusting behaviour by far
surpasses the effects of any other factors we found to be influential. For instance, we
find that an increase in people’s household income is related to an increase in trusting
behaviour but its magnitude is much lower than that of the effect of experienced untrust-
worthiness. A 10% increase in income only increases trust by 1%, whereas experience of
untrustworthiness decreases trust by more than 20%.
Similarly, an increase in experienced trust increases the likelihood of observing trust-
worthy behaviour. In contrast, socio-economic changes and characteristics are not re-
lated to trustworthy behaviour.
Both experiences, of trust and of untrustworthiness, have a strong impact on be-
haviour. This is especially remarkable since there is a large time gap of one year between
the experience and our second behavioural measure. This is further evidence that the
experience of untrustworthiness is a powerful determinant of trusting behaviour, and it
is actually more important than other relevant changes in life. Thus, social interactions
have their own dynamics and give rise to self-reinforcing or self-destroying propagation
of trust or mistrust within a society.
Taken together, our results suggest that the relation of trust and trustworthiness
might be in the form of a vicious circle, where less trust leads to less trustworthiness,
which again leads to less trust. Although other factors do also influence trusting be-
haviour, the influence of untrustworthiness is the strongest influence we found. Thus
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even small scale, individual experiences of untrustworthiness can possibly, by means of
the vicious circle, be an important aspect for understanding decreases in aggregate lev-
els of trust. On the other hand, the fact that we found no evidence of a positive effect
of experienced trustworthiness on trusting behaviour, and only minor effects by other
factors, raises the question of how to explain observed increases in trust. Clearly, more
research is needed, particularly to understand not just decreases, but also increases in
trust.
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TNS Infratest Sozialforschung Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 
 
 - 1 - 
Leben in Deutschland 
 
 
Verhaltensexperiment „Geben und Nehmen“ 
  
Zwei Personen, 
die sich nicht kennen, 
treffen jeder eine Entscheidung 
 über die Verwendung von Geld 
und erzielen zusammen ein Ergebnis. 
 
 
Spielregeln: So wird’s gemacht! 
 
Es gibt zwei Teilnehmer. 
Jeder Teilnehmer erhält einen Anfangsbetrag von 10 Punkten.  
 
Beide Teilnehmer können ihre 10 Punkte 
• zwischen sich und der anderen Person aufteilen oder 
• ganz für sich behalten oder 
• ganz an die andere Person weitergeben.  
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie behalten, bekommen Sie selbst 1 €.   
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie weitergeben, bekommt die andere Person 2 €.   
 
Umgekehrt gilt: 
Für jeden Punkt, den die andere Person an Sie weitergibt, bekommen Sie 2 € 
 
Dies bedeutet für beide Teilnehmer: 
Behalten: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 1 Punkt = 1€ / 2 Punkte = 2€ / 3 Punkte = 3€ usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 10€ 
Weitergeben: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 1 Punkt = 2€ / 2 Punkte = 4€ / 3 Punkte = 6€ usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 20€ 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 1, entscheiden also als Erster. 
 
Das heißt, Sie entscheiden, wie viele von Ihren 10 Punkten Sie an die andere Person 
(Teilnehmer 2) weitergeben und wie viele Sie behalten. 
 
Teilnehmer 2 ist eine andere Person als letztes Jahr! 
 
Teilnehmer 2 wird nie erfahren wer Sie sind, aber wir werden Ihre Entscheidung an 
diese Person übermitteln. 
 
Teilnehmer 2 weiß also, wie viele Punkte Sie ihm gegeben haben, wenn er nun seine 
Entscheidung über die Aufteilung der 10 Punkte trifft. 
 
Aus beiden Entscheidungen zusammen errechnet sich der Geldbetrag, den Sie 
erzielen. Diesen Geldbetrag werden wir Ihnen per Verrechnungsscheck zusenden. 
Ihre Teilnahme ist freiwillig. Der Rechtsweg ist ausgeschlossen. 
Um Ihre Punkte einzutragen, drehen Sie das Blatt bitte um.   
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  - 2 - 
Entscheidungsblatt für Teilnehmer 1 
 
Wie teilen Sie die 10 Punkte auf? 
 
Das heißt, wie viele Punkte (von 0 bis 10) geben Sie an Teilnehmer 2 weiter und wie viele 
behalten Sie? 
 
 
 Ich gebe Punkte weiter 
 
 
 und behalte Punkte  
 
 
 zusammen also    10    Punkte. 
 
 
Teilnehmer 2 ist eine andere Person als letztes Jahr! 
 
 
 
Und so geht’s weiter: 
 
Infratest übermittelt nun die Punktezahl, die von Ihnen weitergegeben wurde, an Teilnehmer 2. 
 
Teilnehmer 2 entscheidet daraufhin, wie viele Punkte er an Sie gibt. 
 
„Was wäre wenn …“ Die bekannte Frage aus dem Alltag bewegt auch die Wissenschaft. 
Auch im Wirtschaftsleben ist es häufig notwendig, vorherzusagen, wie sich andere Menschen 
verhalten. Daher bitten wir Sie, hier noch eine Zusatzfrage dazu zu beantworten: 
 
Was denken Sie, wie würde sich Teilnehmer 2 in den drei folgenden Beispielen verhalten? 
 
Wenn ich ihm  10 Punkte gebe, erhalte ich von ihm  Punkte 
 
Wenn ich ihm  5 Punkte gebe, erhalte ich von ihm  Punkte 
 
Wenn ich ihm  0 Punkte gebe, erhalte ich von ihm  Punkte 
 
 
 
 
Haben Sie alle fünf Kästchen ausgefüllt? 
 
Dann stecken Sie bitte das Blatt in den Briefumschlag und überreichen Sie den 
verschlossenen Umschlag dem Interviewer! 
 
Vielen Dank fürs Mitmachen! 
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 - 1 - 
Leben in Deutschland 
 
 
Verhaltensexperiment „Geben und Nehmen“ 
  
Zwei Personen, 
die sich nicht kennen, 
treffen jeder eine Entscheidung 
 über die Verwendung von Geld 
und erzielen zusammen ein Ergebnis. 
 
 
Spielregeln: So wird’s gemacht! 
 
Es gibt zwei Teilnehmer. 
Jeder Teilnehmer erhält einen Anfangsbetrag von 10 Punkten.  
 
Beide Teilnehmer können ihre 10 Punkte 
• zwischen sich und der anderen Person aufteilen oder 
• ganz für sich behalten oder 
• ganz an die andere Person weitergeben.  
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie behalten, bekommen Sie selbst 1 €.   
Für jeden Punkt, den Sie weitergeben, bekommt die andere Person 2 €.   
 
Umgekehrt gilt: 
Für jeden Punkt, den die andere Person an Sie weitergibt, bekommen Sie 2 € 
 
Dies bedeutet für beide Teilnehmer: 
Behalten: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 1 Punkt = 1€ / 2 Punkte = 2€ / 3 Punkte = 3€ usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 10€ 
Weitergeben: 0 Punkte = 0€ / 1 Punkt = 2€ / 2 Punkte = 4€ / 3 Punkte = 6€ usw. bis / 10 Punkte = 20€ 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 2, entscheiden also als Zweiter. 
 
Teilnehmer 1 hat begonnen, er hat schon entschieden, wie viele Punkte er behält 
bzw. an Sie weitergibt. Das Ergebnis finden Sie auf der Rückseite. 
 
Teilnehmer 1 ist eine andere Person als letztes Jahr! 
 
Jetzt sind Sie an der Reihe, das heißt, Sie entscheiden, wie viele von Ihren 10 
Punkten Sie an die andere Person (Teilnehmer 1) weitergeben und wie viele Sie 
behalten. 
 
Aus beiden Entscheidungen zusammen errechnet sich der Geldbetrag, den Sie 
erzielen. Diesen Geldbetrag werden wir Ihnen per Verrechnungsscheck zusenden. 
Ihre Teilnahme ist freiwillig. Der Rechtsweg ist ausgeschlossen. 
 
Um Ihre Punkte einzutragen, drehen Sie das Blatt bitte um.    
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Entscheidungsblatt für Teilnehmer 2 
 
 
Sie sind Teilnehmer 2, das heißt Teilnehmer 1 hat seine Entscheidung bereits  
 
 
 
getroffen und hat Ihnen Punkte gegeben. 
 
 
 
Teilnehmer 1 ist eine andere Person als letztes Jahr! 
 
 
 
 
Wie teilen Sie die 10 Punkte auf? 
 
Das heißt, wie viele Punkte (von 0 bis 10) geben Sie an Teilnehmer 1 weiter und wie viele 
behalten Sie? 
 
 
 
 
 Ich gebe Punkte weiter 
 
 
 
 und behalte Punkte  
 
 
 zusammen also    10    Punkte. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Haben Sie die beiden oberen Kästchen ausgefüllt? 
 
 
 
Dann stecken Sie bitte das Blatt in den Briefumschlag und überreichen Sie den 
verschlossenen Umschlag dem Interviewer! 
 
 
 
 
Vielen Dank fürs Mitmachen! 
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CHAPTER
FIVE
CONCLUDING WORDS
ON TRUST AND RESEARCHING IT
In the following I first point out what are, in my opinion, the most important results of
the essays in this thesis. Following this, I reflect on some insights which were gained less
from the data and in relation to the original questions asked in this dissertation, but
rather from the processes entailed, such as data elicitation and analysis and reporting.
In particular, I comment on the problems and advantages associated with implementing
experimental approaches on a nationally representative scale. I continue to address that
perspective which is associated specifically with economists’ ways of thinking, and on
how it shapes and affects data analysis and interpretation.
Let me start with the first chapter, ‘Can We Trust the Trust Game?’. In this essay,
we came to the conclusion that yes one can indeed trust the trust game - it trustworthily
does what it is expected to do. We demonstrated that the game is robust to a number
of interferences. Still in the same chapter we also connected survey and experimental
measures of trust by showing where they overlap and where not. The bottom line here
is that the experimental measure specifically measures one dimension of trust, namely
trust in strangers. The survey measure is more strongly correlated to expectations than
to actual trusting behaviour which suggest that the survey measure mainly measures the
expectation-part of the decision to trust. This is not very surprising since the wording
of most survey measures of trust induces people to rate statements about expected
trustworthiness. Nevertheless, the precise calculation of the dimensions shared by both
survey and experimental measures of trust, as well as of what distinguishes them, is an
important contribution to the growing methodological literature on trust.
Having dealt with some mostly methodological aspects of trust, the following two
chapters turn to specific empirical questions. In the second chapter ‘Decomposing Trust:
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Explaining National and Ethnic Trust Differences’ we showed that at the time of our
data collection (2005), the level of trust was 20% higher in the United States than in
Germany. As the difference is rather striking, we gave it a name: the trust gap. The
trust gap can be fully explained by the facts that U.S. Americans exhibit lower risk
and betrayal aversion and are more optimistic about their countrymen’s trustworthiness
than Germans are. This result is interesting per se, but equally interesting is that
aggregate risk and social preferences differ quite substantially between U.S. Americans
and Germans, as we went on to demonstrate. As it is generally accepted that risk and
social preferences are important for many decisions people take, it is surprising that
measures for these preferences are not included in large scale surveys such as the World
Values Survey or the General Social Survey. To the best of my knowledge there is no
study except ours that compares risk preferences across countries on a representative
basis. Thus the relevance of this result is not to be underestimated.
Whereas chapter three introduced this novelty of studying and explaining trusting
behaviour representatively across countries, it does remain a somewhat static approach.
In the following chapter I attempted to rectify this by focusing on the dynamics of change
across time. In the fourth chapter, ‘Trust and Betrayal: a Vicious Circle’, we showed
that the experience of untrustworthiness decreases the extent to which we are prepared
to trust. Until now, little is known about the temporal dynamics of trusting behaviour.
On the basis that trust in strangers is important for economic and social relations, I
study the forces that drive the changes in individuals’ levels of trust. From theory I
expect that positive and negative experiences change trusting behaviour. However, no
empirical study has yet investigated whether and how this happens. In this paper, I
am able to establish a strong causal link from past experience of untrustworthiness to
reduced trusting behaviour, measured by a repeated trust game over the period of one
year. I determine that this causal link mainly functions by way of changed beliefs, and
is moderated by social preferences. Experience of trustworthiness, in contrast, does not
alter trusting behaviour. Furthermore, I investigated if an increase in the experience of
trust promotes trustworthy behaviour. I show that there is indeed a causal link here, too.
I conclude that negative experience in relation to trust might kick-start a vicious circle
thus eroding overall levels of trust. Further research is needed for better understanding
of the factors that increase trusting behaviour.
In experimental economics one usually conducts experiments using student volunteers
as participants. The advantages to this approach are that they usually are smart, know
how to use a computer, understand even complex instructions, and have low opportunity
costs. The disadvantage is, however, that the results from these experiments are not
generalisable to the whole population and thus conclusions from theses experiments
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might only hold in the very limited population of students, thus limiting the relevance
of such research.
Selecting a nationally representative sample for participating in an experiment ob-
viously solves the problem of generalisability. But the advantages do not end here. A
further advantage is that the sample is much more heterogeneous in terms of socio-
economic characteristics such as income, education, age, and life experience in general.
As there is more variance in the data, the exploration of the interesting relationship
of socio-economic characteristics with behaviour becomes feasible. These advantages,
however, come at a cost. The main disadvantages of using a representative sample are
the mirror image of the advantages of a student sample. A nationally representative
sample will necessarily include less educated participants, who might find it difficult to
understand the rules of the game. Some might not even be able to read or do not speak
or read the national language. Furthermore, lots of people have little to no computer
literacy. Sitting them down in front of a computer screen with z-Tree in front of them
might have decidedly problematic and data-distorting effects, such as for instance scar-
ing them. Finally it is very expensive to collect data on a representative scale1. In
order to counteract these problems, any project that aims to conduct experiments on a
representative scale - as ours do - must devise and use a very simple design, which is
easy to explain to participants.
Collecting representative data on your own is complex and costly. From a pragmatic
point of view, integrating your experiment into an existing panel study has the advantage
of outsourcing the sampling and collection of the data. However this comes with a price.
Panel organisers are very careful about not losing panel participants, thus they will
avoid anything that might annoy or anger their respondents. In the experiment they
might see such a risk. This has the result of restricting the integrated experiment to
simple, straightforward and quick designs as anything else will fail to gain the organisers’
approval. One thing that would clearly be difficult to implement is to play a game with
multiple periods. I combined the experiment with the German Socio-economic Panel
Study, where they were very open to integrating experimental methods into the panel.
However, it took quite some effort to convince the governing board to agree to this
‘experiment’.
As I pointed out above, the design of the experiment has to be simple in order to
be understandable for everyone. An example we encountered was that hypothetical
questions are difficult to ask, because lots of people have difficulties imagining a non-
existent situation. This has consequences for the elicitation of expectations, which can
1At this point I would like to reemphasise my gratefulness to my supervisor Ernst Fehr for organising
the financing of the implementation of the trust game as part of the SOEP survey.
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only be done in a very simple way. Asking people how certain they are about their
expectation is almost impossible to do successfully. It might appear to be more pragmatic
to simply go ahead and implement standard games on representative scales, or include
complex and cognitively demanding questions without much reflection, but proceeding in
this way would have consequences for the interpretability of the resulting data. Ignoring
the cautions about the complex and cognitively demanding designs for experiments on
a representative level is likely to cause increases in noisy behaviour. In other words,
participants might simply decide something randomly in order to bring the experiment
to an end. Noisy behaviour in student samples is maybe less of an issue but still a possible
driving force in behaviour, which is often not taken into account when analysing data.
The reasons for not taking this into account may lie in the specific view economic theory
has on individual’s decision making.
From a typical economist’s point of view, an individual’s decision or behaviour is
based on rational reasoning which aims to maximise utility. A certain amount of random
decisions is usually expected and considered not to be a problem for interpreting, as
it simply increases the noise in the data. However, depending on the experimental
design, random behaviour can in some cases result in seemingly structured patterns, or
correlations which appear convincing but are in fact spurious and simply an effect of
the design. In other words, a correlation is observed which would not exist if no-one
behaved randomly. This was a relevant insight I gained while crunching through the
data reported in chapter 4. If a first-mover in this situation fully trusts the trustee and
transfers the whole endowment of 10 points, the trustee is by definition only taken to
be trustworthy if he/she also transfer all of the 10 points back to the first-mover. This
means that if the second-mover decides randomly about the back-transfer, the chances
that he/she is trustworthy is 1
11
. In contrast, if the first-mover transfers 5 points, the
likelihood of observing trustworthy behaviour, given random decisions, increases to 6
11
.
Thus simply the participation of some randomly behaving second-movers would create
a negative correlation between trust and trustworthy behaviour in the data, or reduce
a possibly positive relationship and render it insignificant. Unfortunately, this problem
is often ignored when designing and analysing experiments. In some cases, it could be
solved by adapting the design, but being unaware of the problem leaves it to chance
if the design bypasses the problem or not. In consequence, the problem often needs
to be addressed on the level of analysis. The simple assumption, widespread among
economists, that people maximise their utility unfortunately can prevent researchers
from seeing this possible bias, thus causing erratic findings and obscuring possible real
effects.
Another example where the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness influ-
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ence the design of experiments, is how expectations are normally measured and analysed
in experiments on social preferences. Obviously, the trust game is my example of choice.
Here, first-movers are asked what amount they expect back from the second-movers or
sometimes what they expect the return ratio to be. This reported estimate is then used
to explain first-mover behaviour. Leaving aside endogeneity problems, such explana-
tions may only actually be meaningful for participants who maximise their income. In
contrast, the reported expected back-transfer might have totally different influences on
behaviour for people who try to minimise inequality. I started to analyse expectations as
everyone else did. Soon I started to realise that for inequity-averse first-movers it would
not be reasonable to expect a positive relation between trust and expected back-transfer
such as would indeed be expected for income-maximising first-movers. Thus, I took this
into account when using expectations as explanatory variables (section 3.4). I consider
this a simple but important methodological insight gained from this thesis. In contrast,
to the best of my knowledge, no other paper apart from ours allows expectations to have
differentiated effects on behaviour for different types of people. Thus, while designing
and analysing experiments one should always bear in mind the limitations of economic
theory and be aware of other possible explanations, predictions and theories.
Overall, the main insights to be derived from this thesis are not least on a methodolog-
ical level. This includes data elicitation techniques and their advantages and problems
as well as approaches to data analysis where particular issues necessitated devising new
procedures. This said, the empirical results are obviously at centre stage: The trust
gap between U.S. Americans and Germans can be fully explained by deploying concepts
of economic theory; and mistrust and betrayal are related in the form of a vicious cir-
cle. Whereas I hope to have contributed to some key questions within the field of the
microeconomics of trust, many other questions have not been addressed, and the field
offers plenty of possibilities for future investigations.
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